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Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk 
13-433 
Ruling Below: Busk v. Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc., 713 F.3d 525 (9th Cir. 2013), cert 
granted, 134 S.Ct. 1490 (U.S. 2014). 
Former employees brought putative class action against former employer, alleging violations of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Nevada labor laws. The United States District Court 
for the District of Nevada, Roger L. Hunt, Senior District Judge granted employer's motion to 
dismiss. Employees appealed. 
Question Presented: Whether time spent in security screenings is compensable under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act. 
 
 
JESSE BUSK; LAURIE CASTRO, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly 
situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant-Appellee. 
U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 
Decided on April 12, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
THOMAS, Circuit Judge 
In this appeal, we consider whether the 
district court erred in dismissing the 
plaintiffs' state law claims for unpaid wages 
because those claims would be certified 
using different class certification procedures 
than their federal wage and hour claims. We 
also consider whether the plaintiffs have 
alleged plausible claims for unpaid wages 
under federal and Nevada law for 
undergoing a security screening meant to 
prevent employee theft and for unpaid lunch 
periods shortened by five-minute walks to 
the cafeteria. We affirm the district court in 
part, reverse in part, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
I 
Plaintiffs Jesse Busk and Laurie Castro are 
former employees of Integrity Staffing 
Solutions, Inc., which provides warehouse 
space and staffing to clients such as 
Amazon.com. Busk and Castro worked as 
hourly employees at warehouses in Las 
Vegas and Fernley, Nevada, respectively, 
filling orders placed by Amazon.com 
customers. In 2010, Busk and Castro sued 
Integrity on behalf of a putative class of 
workers in both warehouses, claiming 
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violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) and Nevada labor laws. 
Busk and Castro alleged Integrity violated 
federal and state labor laws by requiring 
them to pass through a security clearance at 
the end of each shift, for which they were 
not compensated. Employees waited up to 
25 minutes to be searched; removed their 
wallets, keys, and belts; and passed through 
metal detectors. The plaintiffs alleged the 
clearances were “necessary to the 
employer's task of minimizing ‘shrinkage’ 
or loss of product from warehouse theft.” 
The plaintiffs also sought compensation 
under FLSA and Nevada law for their entire 
30–minute unpaid lunch periods because 
they spent up to 10 minutes of the meal 
period “walking to and from the cafeteria 
and/or undergoing security clearances.” 
They said it took them about five minutes 
after punching out “to walk to the facility 
cafeteria and/or pass through security 
clearances” and “approximately five minutes 
to walk from the cafeteria to the time 
keeping system to clock back in.” 
Additionally, managers would frequently 
“remind” workers to “finish their meal 
period quickly so that they would clock back 
in on time.” 
The district court granted Integrity's motion 
to dismiss the amended complaint for failure 
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). The court held that the 
time spent clearing security was not 
compensable under FLSA, relying on out-
of-circuit cases finding the time employees 
spent passing through security screenings 
noncompensable. The court also held that 
the plaintiffs' allegations about shortened 
meal periods did not state a claim under 
FLSA because the plaintiffs did not allege 
that they performed “any duty related to 
their job as warehouse workers” during their 
lunch breaks. 
The district court also held that the state law 
claims “must be dismissed” due to 
“conflicting” class certification mechanisms, 
namely that while plaintiffs must opt into a 
collective action under FLSA, plaintiffs 
must opt out of a class action under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Alternatively, 
the court dismissed the state claims on the 
merits. It held that since the claims were 
based entirely on the security clearance and 
lunch allegations, the “Plaintiffs have failed 
to allege fact scenarios that would support a 
valid claim” under Nevada law. 
II 
We review de novo the district court's 
conclusion that a FLSA collective action and 
state law class action are inherently 
incompatible as a matter of law. We agree 
with all other circuits to consider the issue 
that such actions can peacefully coexist. 
Therefore, the district court erred in 
dismissing the state law claims based on a 
perceived conflict. 
Under FLSA, a potential plaintiff does not 
benefit from (and is not bound by) a 
judgment unless he or she “affirmatively 
‘opts in’ ” to the lawsuit. This rule is in 
contrast to a typical Rule 23 class action, 
where a potential plaintiff must opt out to be 
excluded from the class. Although some 
district courts have held that a FLSA 
collective action cannot be brought in the 
same lawsuit as a state-law class action 
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based on the same underlying allegations, all 
circuit courts to consider the issue have held 
that the different opting mechanisms do not 
require dismissal of the state claims.  
Our sister circuits have correctly reasoned 
that FLSA's plain text does not suggest that 
a district court must dismiss a state law 
claim that would be certified using an opt-
out procedure. Its opt-in requirement 
extends only to “any such action”—that is, a 
FLSA claim. FLSA also expressly permits 
more protective state labor laws. This 
savings clause provides further evidence that 
a federal lawsuit combining state and federal 
wage and hour claims is consistent with 
FLSA.  
Nor does the legislative history of Section 
216(b) support the view of some district 
courts that allowing both actions to proceed 
simultaneously “would essentially nullify 
Congress's intent in crafting Section 216(b) 
and eviscerate the purpose of Section 
216(b)'s opt-in requirement.” We agree with 
the Third Circuit that the “full legislative 
record casts doubt” on the contention that 
Section 216(b) was intended to eliminate 
opt-out class actions. When Congress 
created Section 216(b)'s opt-in requirement 
as part of the Portal–to–Portal Act of 1947, 
it was responding to concerns about third 
parties filing “representative” FLSA actions 
on behalf of disinterested employees. 
Accordingly, it amended FLSA “for the 
purpose of limiting private FLSA plaintiffs 
to employees who asserted claims in their 
own right and freeing employers of the 
burden of representative actions.”  
This purpose does not evince an intent to 
eliminate opt-out class actions for state wage 
and hour claims brought in federal court. 
Even if it did, Congress has expressed a 
contrary intent in the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005, which confers federal 
jurisdiction over class actions where certain 
diversity and amount-in-controversy 
requirements are met. Because the Class 
Action Fairness Act provides that federal 
courts should exercise jurisdiction over 
certain class actions (including those 
alleging violations of state wage and hour 
laws), and these class actions are certified 
pursuant to Rule 23's opt-out procedure, we 
cannot conclude that Congress intended 
such claims be dismissed simply because 
they were brought in conjunction with FLSA 
claims.  
Integrity argues that allowing both classes to 
proceed simultaneously would cause 
“unnecessary confusion” for potential class 
members who would receive notices “stating 
both that they must opt in to have their 
compensation issues adjudicated and that 
they must opt out to avoid having their 
compensation issues adjudicated.” While we 
do not minimize this practical concern, we 
agree with the Seventh Circuit that district 
courts should be able to “work[ ] out an 
adequate notice in this type of case.” 
Furthermore, “if these actions were to 
proceed separately—the FLSA in federal 
court and the state-law class action in state 
court—an entirely different and potentially 
worse problem of confusion would arise, 
with uncoordinated notices from separate 
courts peppering the employees.”  
In sum, we agree with the other circuits to 
consider the issue that the fact that Rule 23 
class actions use an opt-out mechanism 
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while FLSA collective actions use an opt-in 
mechanism does not create a conflict 
warranting dismissal of the state law claims. 
III 
Turning to the merits, we review de novo a 
district court's dismissal of a complaint for 
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 
Accepting the plaintiffs' allegations as true 
and construing them in the light most 
favorable to plaintiffs, we may affirm a 
dismissal only if the complaint fails to state 
a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. 
Applying this standard, we hold that the 
district court erred in holding that the 
plaintiffs failed to state a claim under FLSA 
for passing through security clearances at 
the end of the day. But, under the facts 
alleged, we affirm its dismissal of the claim 
for shortened lunch periods. 
A 
FLSA, as amended by the Portal–to–Portal 
Act of 1947, generally precludes 
compensation for activities that are 
“preliminary” or “postliminary” to the 
“principal activity or activities” that the 
employee “is employed to perform.” But 
preliminary and postliminary activities are 
still compensable under the Portal–to–Portal 
Act if they are “integral and indispensable” 
to an employee's principal activities. To be 
“integral and indispensable,” an activity 
must be (1) “necessary to the principal work 
performed” and (2) “done for the benefit of 
the employer.”  
In Alvarez, we held that putting on and 
taking off protective gear was necessary to 
the principal work of employees at a meat 
packing plant because the gear was required 
by the employer's rules, by federal 
regulators, and by the “ ‘nature of the work.’ 
” Moreover, the donning and doffing 
benefited the employer by preventing 
“workplace injury and contamination.” But 
in Bamonte v. City of Mesa, we held that 
donning and doffing police uniforms was 
not necessary to police officers' principal 
work because they could change at home 
and chose to do so at work for their own 
benefit.  
Here, Busk and Castro have alleged that 
Integrity requires the security screenings, 
which must be conducted at work. They also 
allege that the screenings are intended to 
prevent employee theft—a plausible 
allegation since the employees apparently 
pass through the clearances only on their 
way out of work, not when they enter. As 
alleged, the security clearances are 
necessary to employees' primary work as 
warehouse employees and done for 
Integrity's benefit. Assuming, as we must, 
that these allegations are true, the plaintiffs 
have stated a plausible claim for relief. 
In holding otherwise, the district court relied 
upon out-of-circuit cases holding that time 
spent clearing security was not compensable 
under the Portal–to–Portal Act. But these 
cases are distinguishable because, in these 
cases, everyone who entered the workplace 
had to pass through a security clearance. In 
Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., the 
Second Circuit held that security procedures 
at a nuclear power plant were part of 
noncompensable travel time under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 254(a)(1) in part because the “security 
measures at entry are required (to one 
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degree or another) for everyone entering the 
plant,” including visitors. In Bonilla v. 
Baker Concrete Construction Inc., the 
Eleventh Circuit held that construction 
workers employed by a subcontractor to 
work on an airport construction project were 
not entitled to compensation for passing 
through a security clearance. Because the 
Federal Aviation Administration mandated 
the security process, the court held that the 
screening did not benefit the employer.  
Gorman and Bonilla do not concern a 
security screening put in place because of 
the nature of the employee's work. But here 
Integrity allegedly requires the screening to 
prevent employee theft, a concern that stems 
from the nature of the employees' work 
(specifically, their access to merchandise). 
Therefore, the district court erred in 
assuming Gorman and Bonilla created a 
blanket rule that security clearances are 
noncompensable instead of assessing the 
plaintiffs' claims under the “integral and 
indispensable” test. 
Because we hold that the plaintiffs have 
stated a valid claim for relief under FLSA 
for the time spent passing through security 
clearances, we also reverse the district 
court's dismissal of the parallel state law 
claim. 
B 
The district court also held that the plaintiffs 
failed to state a claim under FLSA for their 
shortened lunch periods. Under the facts as 
alleged, we agree. 
FLSA does not require compensation for an 
employee's lunch period, but an “employee 
cannot be docked for lunch breaks during 
which he is required to continue with any 
duties related to his work.” An “employee is 
not relieved if he is required to perform any 
duties, whether active or inactive, while 
eating.” For example, “an office employee 
who is required to eat at his desk or a factory 
worker who is required to be at his machine 
is working while eating.”  
Here, Busk and Castro alleged they were not 
“completely relieved from duty” because by 
placing the time clocks far from the 
lunchroom, Integrity forced upon them the 
“duty to walk to the lunch room in order to 
eat lunch.” But the district court correctly 
held that walking to the lunchroom is not a 
work duty. Walking to the lunchroom is not 
necessary to the plaintiffs' principal work as 
warehouse employees. Moreover, though the 
Portal–to–Portal Act does not clearly 
preclude compensation for walking to the 
lunchroom, as it only expressly applies to 
walking before the workday starts and after 
it ends, it would be incongruous to preclude 
compensation for walking into work on the 
employer's premises, but require it for 
walking to the lunchroom.  
Busk and Castro also argue they are entitled 
to compensation for their entire 30–minute 
lunch periods because supervisors would 
frequently “remind” workers to “finish their 
meal period quickly so that they would 
clock back in on time.” They rely upon 
cases noting that “very frequent 
interruptions” might make meal periods 
compensable. But these cases concern 
whether employees are entitled to 
compensation for lunch periods when they 
remain “on call.” They use the term 
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“interruptions” to refer to instances where 
the employee has to resume a work duty—
for instance, when emergency medical 
service employees fielded emergency calls,  
or maintenance workers responded to 
maintenance problems. That supervisors 
may have “interrupted” Busk and Castro in 
another sense of the word does not make 
their lunch periods compensable absent any 
claim that they performed a work duty. 
Finally, the first amended complaint alleges 
that employees had to pass through a 
security clearance on their way to the 
lunchroom. Assuming that the time passing 
through the security clearance on the way to 
lunch constitutes compensable work, the 
time alleged in this case is de minimis. As 
alleged in the first amended complaint, the 
walk to and from the cafeteria takes 
“approximately five minutes” each way, 
though employees pass through security 
only on their way to the cafeteria, not on the 
return trip. The relatively minimal time 
expended on the clearance in this context 
differs from the 25–minute delay alleged for 
employees passing through security at day's 
end. Therefore, the district court correctly 
dismissed this claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  
The plaintiffs also argue that even if the 
district court correctly dismissed their FLSA 
claim relating to the shortened lunch 
periods, it should not have dismissed their 
state law claim because Nevada law would 
require compensation even when federal law 
does not. 
Nevada law requires that an employer 
provide a half-hour meal break if it employs 
a worker for a continuous eight-hour period. 
The law provides, “No period of less than 30 
minutes interrupts a continuous period of 
work for the purposes of this subsection.” 
But there is no private right of action to 
enforce this section. The Nevada Legislature 
has entrusted the enforcement of this statute 
to the state Labor Commissioner by 
expressly providing that the “Labor 
Commissioner or the representative of the 
Labor Commissioner shall cause the 
provisions of NRS 608.005 to 608.195, 
inclusive, to be enforced.”  
Nevada Revised Statute § 608.140 does 
provide a private right of action to recoup 
unpaid wages. Thus, the district court 
correctly focused on whether Busk and 
Castro alleged they were required to “work” 
during their lunch periods. However, the 
plaintiffs raised for the first time on appeal 
their argument that Nevada defines “work” 
differently than federal law, such that their 
lunch periods might be compensable under 
state law even if they were not compensable 
under federal law. Because the district court 
has not considered this argument, we 
remand for it to do so in the first instance. 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN 
PART; REMANDED. Each party shall 
bear its own costs on appeal.
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“Amazon Warehouse Worker Pay Suit Heads to Supreme Court” 
Fortune 
Claire Zillman 
March 3, 2014 
Security lines. They are the worst. And 
many workers have to pass through them 
every day. The U.S. Supreme Court decided 
on Monday to tackle the question of whether 
the time spent waiting in those lines is 
deserving of hourly pay. 
The Supreme Court said that it would hear a 
class action lawsuit filed in 2010 by former 
employees of Amazon contractor Integrity 
Security Systems who claim that, under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), they 
deserve back pay for the time they spent in 
security checks at the beginning and end of 
the day, which the warehouse mandated to 
prevent employee theft. 
The workers were “required to wait at least 
10 to 15 minutes each day, and often more 
than a half hour, at the beginning and end of 
each shift without compensation whatsoever 
in order to undergo a search for contraband 
and/or pilferage of inventory,” the complaint 
says. 
Integrity Security contends that the security 
screenings are similar to other tasks — such 
as waiting to punch the clock or walking to 
and from the workplace — that are non-
compensable under the FLSA. Amazon said 
on Monday that it doesn’t comment on 
pending litigation. 
The Supreme Court never explains why it 
accepts or rejects a case, but the widespread 
use of security checks in workplaces likely 
carried a lot of weight. 
In petitioning the Supreme Court to take the 
case, Integrity’s lawyer, Paul Clement, 
argued that “in the post-9/11 world, security 
screenings have become ubiquitous in the 
American workplace and are routinely 
required for employees working in 
skyscrapers, corporate campuses, federal, 
state, and local government officers, 
courthouses, sports arenas, museums, 
airports, power plants, theme parks, and 
countless other places.” Allowing the 
Nevada workers’ suit to go forward, 
Clement argued, “opens employers up to 
billions of dollars in retroactive damages.” 
Indeed, after the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 9
th
 Circuit let the Nevada workers’ case 
continue, other employees filed similar 
nationwide class actions against Amazon 
distribution centers in Kentucky, Tennessee, 
and Washington state. Workers at a regional 
distribution center sued CVS Pharmacy in 
September 2012 over its security checks, 
and tens of thousands of workers sued Apple 
in July 2013 because it requires its hourly 
retail employees to go through bag searches 
and clearance checks. 
Wage and hour lawsuits in general — in 
which workers accuse their employers of 
unfair pay practices — is one of the few 
areas of workplace litigation that’s on the 
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rise. There were 7,882 lawsuits filed under 
the FLSA last year, up about 3% from 2012, 
according to the Annual Workplace Class 
Action Litigation Report from law firm 
Seyfarth Shaw. Many of the lawsuits hinge 
on what sort of activity constitutes the 
compensable workday, says Gerald 
Maatman, a labor and employment lawyer at 
Seyfarth, who is representing a third-party 
contractor in one of the Amazon lawsuits. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Integrity case will at least give a definitive 
answer to the question of whether security 
checks should be included in the payable 
workday. Other courts have tackled this 
issue before: the Eleventh Circuit evaluated 
whether airport employees deserved pay for 
their time in the security line, and the 
Second Circuit decided the issue as it related 
to workers at a nuclear power plant. In both 
cases, the courts sided with the employers. 
But the Integrity case is different and a fairer 
test of the issue because it’s the employer 
itself — Integrity Security — that mandated 
the security checks, not an outside authority 
like the Transportation Security 
Administration. 
That means the outcome of the Integrity 
case will apply to a “greater variety of 
companies,” says Mark Batten, a labor and 
employment lawyer at Proskauer Rose. “It 
will have a lot of impact on a lot of 
businesses.” 
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“Supreme Court May Finally Clarify Compensable Time” 
Law 360 
Kenneth W. Gage 
April 2, 2014 
Over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
had multiple occasions to address whether 
— and under what circumstances — 
employers must compensate employees for 
their time going from point A to point B and 
back. Most often, this question has arisen in 
“donning and doffing” cases, in which point 
A is the place where uniforms or protective 
gear are put on and taken off and point B is 
the location where employees perform their 
principal duties.  
The question revolves around the distinction 
between activities that are “integral and 
indispensable” to an employee’s principal 
activities, which are compensable under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, and activities that 
are merely “preliminary” and 
“postliminary,” which are excluded from 
compensable time by the Portal-to-Portal 
Act. 
On March 3, 2014, the Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the case of Integrity Staffing 
Solutions Inc. v. Busk, which presents a new 
twist to this issue, that is somewhat a 
creature of the modern age. Integrity 
Staffing is not a donning and doffing case. 
Instead, it relates to the time employees 
spend going from point B (i.e., where they 
fill customer orders for retail goods) back to 
point A (i.e., where the employer requires 
them to pass a security screening before 
leaving the facility). 
Framework of Existing Case Law 
The FLSA, as originally passed, was 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in 
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. (1946) 
to require compensation for all time during 
which an employee was required to be on 
the employer’s premises. Congress quickly 
responded to a sharp increase in litigation 
that arose after that decision by passing the 
Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947, which excludes 
two categories of activity from compensable 
time: (1) traveling to and from the place 
where employees perform their principal 
activities, and (2) “activities that are 
preliminary to or postliminary to” “the 
principal activity or activities which” the 
individual is employed to perform.” This left 
for the courts to define in any given case 
what employee activities are “principal.” 
The Supreme Court subsequently held that 
activities which are “integral and 
indispensable” to an employee’s “principal” 
activities are themselves principal activities 
and therefore compensable. In 1956, the 
high court addressed the issue in two cases. 
In Steiner v. Mitchell, it held that changing 
clothes and showering were compensable 
activities for employees who worked in an 
environment where caustic and poisonous 
chemicals were used in their work. In 
Mitchell v. King Packing Co., the Supreme 
Court held that knife sharpening is “an 
integral part of and indispensable to” the 
butchering activities for which the 
employees were principally employed. 
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Then, in 2005, the Supreme Court held in 
IBP v. Alvarez, that employee time spent 
walking at the end of the day from the 
location where they performed their meat 
processing activities back to the area where 
they removed their protective gear — an 
activity the employer conceded was integral 
and indispensable to the meat processing 
duties — was compensable. 
The Supreme Court explained that “during a 
continuous workday, any walking time that 
occurs after the beginning of the employee’s 
first principal activity and before the end of 
the employee’s last principal activity” is 
compensable. Applying these rules, lower 
courts have held that time spent waiting to 
punch in and out on a time clock, walking 
from an employer’s parking facility to the 
workplace and even changing clothes or 
showering, where those activities could be 
performed off-site, is not compensable under 
the FLSA. 
The Challenge of Security Screenings in 
the Workplace 
Integrity Staffing supplies warehouse 
workers on a contract basis to various 
clients; the plaintiffs worked for Integrity 
filling customer orders for retail goods at 
warehouses owned by Amazon.com in 
Nevada. At the ends of their shifts, the 
plaintiffs and their fellow order-fillers were 
required to pass through a security screening 
station designed to reduce employee theft. 
The screening process itself appears to have 
been relatively simple — employees were 
required to empty their pockets and walk 
through a metal detector. According to the 
plaintiffs, however, the security stations 
were badly understaffed, resulting in wait 
times of up to 25 minutes as hundreds of 
employees’ shifts ended simultaneously. 
Seeking compensation for the time they 
spent in this process, the plaintiffs filed a 
class action complaint on behalf of 
themselves and those similarly situated. 
The U.S. district court in Nevada granted 
Integrity’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss; the 
Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit 
applied a two-pronged test to determine 
whether the activity at issue was “integral 
and indispensable,” considering whether it 
is: (1) “necessary to the principal work 
performed” and (2) “done for the benefit of 
the employer.” Because the security 
screening process was allegedly required by 
Integrity for the purpose of preventing theft 
by employees with access to retail 
merchandise, the circuit court explained, the 
plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage to conclude that the 
screening was integral and indispensable to 
their principal activity of filling customer 
orders. Put slightly differently, the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that if the screening was 
not aimed at all employees, then it must be 
related to the work performed by those 
employees to which it did apply. Relying on 
the allegation that all employees were not 
required to participate in the security 
screening, the Ninth Circuit distinguished 
the case before it from a Second Circuit 
case, Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 
and an Eleventh Circuit case, Bonilla v. 
Baker Concrete Construction Co. 
Gorman involved nuclear power plant 
employees seeking compensation for the 10 
to 30 minutes a day spent in security checks 
at the plant’s entrance that were required for 
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all persons entering the plant, including 
visitors; the Second Circuit affirmed a 
district court’s Rule 12 dismissal. The 
Second Circuit’s analysis was different from 
the Ninth Circuit’s in Integrity Staffing; it 
explained that “’[i]ndispensable’ is not 
synonymous with ‘integral’,” and therefore 
the fact that an employer required 
employees to engage in certain activity only 
establishes indispensability. 
The Second Circuit did not consider whether 
the activity benefited the employer. To be 
integral, the activity at issue must be 
somehow joined or linked in other ways 
with the employee’s principal activities, the 
court explained. The court held that the 
security activities required were “necessary 
in the sense that they are required and serve 
essential purposes of security; but they are 
not integral to principal work activities.” 
There are two things worth noting about 
Gorman, however. First, the plaintiff’s 
complaint did not “even mention what kind 
of work [p]laintiff” did at the power plant. 
Second, the court of appeals explained in a 
footnote that the result may be different for 
an employee whose principal activity was 
“monitoring, testing and reporting on the 
plant’s infrastructure security.” 
Bonilla involved construction-workers 
seeking compensation for time spent in 
FAA-mandated security checks at the 
entrance to a restricted portion of the airport 
where they were working; the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s order 
granting summary judgment to the 
employer. Like the Second Circuit, the 
Eleventh Circuit explained that the necessity 
of going through the security screening was 
insufficient standing alone to make the time 
compensable. The court concluded, in order 
to be compensable “the activity in question 
must be work in the benefit of the 
employer,” and the FAA-mandated security 
screening was not. 
The Supreme Court’s Opportunity to 
Clarify What it Means for an Activity to 
be "Integral and Indispensable" to an 
Employee’s Principal Activity 
In today’s environment, it is the rare 
employer that does not have some sort of 
security process for employees entering 
and/or leaving the work location, even if that 
process merely involves swiping an 
identification badge. Participation in such 
security processes is invariably required of 
employees, and those processes undoubtedly 
benefit the employer. The Portal to Portal 
Act clearly excludes the time an employee 
travels to and from the place where she 
performs her principal activities from 
compensable time, however. 
But, under the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
employee participation in a simple security 
screening may be sufficient to support a 
claim that the time traveling from point A 
(i.e., the security screen at the beginning of 
the workday) to B (i.e., the place where the 
employee performs her principal activities) 
— and the time traveling from point B back 
to A at the end of the workday — is 
compensable. 
Integrity Staffing provides the Supreme 
Court an opportunity to more specifically 
articulate what it means for an activity 
occurring at the beginning or end of an 
employee’s workday to be integral and 
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indispensable to an employee’s principal 
work activity. The court’s existing case law 
requires that there must be some relationship 
between the activity at issue and the 
principal activities the employee is paid to 
perform. But, as the Eleventh Circuit 
observed in Bonilla, the statute “does not 
allow for a clean analytical distinction 
between those activities that are ‘integral 
and indispensable’ and those that are not.” 
Whatever test the Supreme Court may 
adopt, it should not be sufficient, as the 
Ninth Circuit suggests is the case, that the 
activity be required by and for the benefit of 
the employer in order for it to be 
compensable — something more should be 
required. 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach in Integrity 
Staffing is unworkable and inconsistent with 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. If the 
activity is required by someone other than 
the employer, as the court in Bonilla 
observed, then that activity certainly should 
not be compensable. But the fact that an 
activity is required by an employer does not 
logically lead to the conclusion that the 
activity is integral and indispensable to the 
employee’s principal activities. 
The activity may be required by virtue of the 
employment relationship itself (e.g., all 
employees must swipe a security badge to 
enter the building) or by virtue of the 
employee’s work location (e.g., all 
employees assigned to work in a particular 
location must pass through security for 
safety reason). In either case, performance 
of the activity may not facilitate the 
principal activities the employee is paid to 
perform, other than to allow him access to 
his workplace. The question, instead, should 
be whether the activity is required (i.e., 
indispensable) for the employee to carry out 
his or her job, as was the case in Mitchell 
where the evidence revealed that 
“[s]harpening the knife is integral to carving 
a carcass.” Or in the case of an employee 
participating in a security screening, as 
suggested by the Second Circuit in Gorman, 
where the evidence reveals that her principal 
activity was “monitoring, testing and 
reporting on the plant’s infrastructure 
security.” 
Similarly, the fact that an activity benefits an 
employer also does not logically lead to the 
conclusion that it is integral and 
indispensable to the employee’s principal 
activities. Rarely does an employer require 
anything of its employees without deriving 
some benefit. Requiring employees to park 
at the back of a parking lot, for example, so 
that customers can park closer to the facility 
benefits the employer, but has nothing to do 
with the employee’s principal activities. 
Requiring employees to wear a specific 
uniform certainly provides a benefit to the 
employer, and many employers require 
uniforms for all employees, regardless of 
their duties. But, it is already well-
established that such a uniform requirement 
does not start the time clock running for all 
employees the moment they get dressed at 
home before their shift. 
However the Supreme Court rules in 
Integrity Staffing, its decision will 
potentially have a wide-ranging impact on 
most large employers. 
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“Amazon Workers Want Pay for Time Spent at Security Checkpoint” 
Lawyers.com 
Aaron Kase 
April 25, 2013 
Warehouse workers subcontracted to 
Amazon.com can move forward with a 
lawsuit seeking wages for the time it takes 
them to pass through a security checkpoint 
at the end of their shift, a court ruled this 
month. 
After the workday is over, employees 
at Integrity Staffing Solutions who spend the 
day at a warehouse filling Amazon orders 
are required to wait in line for a search to 
make sure they aren’t stealing anything. It 
takes about 20 to 25 minutes to get through 
the checkpoint, plaintiffs say, after they’ve 
already clocked out. 
That’s nearly two hours or more every week 
spent at work that isn’t being compensated. 
Alleging that the practice violates federal 
labor rules, former employees Jesse Busk 
and Laurie Castro initiated a class action 
lawsuit against Integrity to recoup the 
difference. 
A district court stepped in and dismissed the 
suit, but earlier this month the 9th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals gave the class 
action the green light to advance. The 
plaintiffs “allege that the screenings are 
intended to prevent employee theft – a 
plausible allegation since the employees 
apparently pass through the clearances only 
on their way out of work, not when they 
enter,” the opinion says. “As alleged, the 
security clearances are necessary to 
employees’ primary work as warehouse 
employees and done for Integrity’s benefit.” 
However, the 9th Circuit upheld the District 
Court’s dismissal of a portion of the suit 
seeking compensation for the time it took to 
walk to the employee lunch area. 
Time on the Clock 
The federal Fair Labor Standards Act 
mandates that workers get paid for “all time 
during which an employee is necessarily 
required to be on the employer’s premises, 
on duty or at a prescribed work place,” 
which may “be longer than the employee’s 
scheduled shift, hours, tour of duty, or 
production line time.” Work time includes 
periods during which an employee is 
“engaged to wait” for an employment-
related activity. 
Other courts have found that employees do 
not have to be compensated for the time it 
takes to pass through security. However, in 
those instances the checks were made 
uniformly in the interest of safety, such as 
for workers at an airport or other sensitive 
facilities. 
The distinction in the Busk-Castro suit is 
that the checks were made solely to protect 
the employer’s interest in not having 
merchandise stolen, and therefore could 
count as time on the clock, the 9th Circuit 
reasoned. 
“Postliminary activities are still 
compensable . . . if they are ‘integral and 
indispensable’ to an employee’s principal 
activities,” the opinion states, comparing the 
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Integrity checks to situations in which 
employees are required to put on and take 
off specialized outfits on the premises of a 
job. 
If Integrity doesn’t want to pay for the extra 
20 minutes, they could reduce the amount of 
time it takes to leave the warehouse. “There 
are thousands of employees all going 
through the gates at the same time,” says 
Mark Thierman, a labor and employment 
attorney at the Reno-based Thierman Law 
Firm, which is representing the plaintiffs. 
“They could relieve it by opening more 
checkpoints or staggering releases.” 
Head of the Class 
The class potential could be huge. “We 
estimate there’s over 38,000 Amazon 
workers employed by Integrity or other 
subcontractors,” Thierman says. Taking into 
account employee turnover, the total number 
could approach 100,000 members. 
The statute allows for compensation to be 
sought for the previous three years, although 
the attorneys are hoping to extend the period 
to five years given the time it took to appeal 
the dismissal. 
Most of the workers affected make between 
$9 and $12 an hour. “If you want to take the 
pencil to paper we’re talking hundreds of 
millions of dollars,” the lawyer says. 
Current or former Integrity employees 
eligible to join the class need to opt in to the 
lawsuit by filing a consent to sue form or 
contacting the attorneys. “The bottom line,” 
says Thierman, “is people are going to get 
some serious money if they participate.” 
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“FLSA Actions Can Coexist with State Class Claims: 9th Circ.” 
Law 360 
Ben James 
April 12, 2013 
The Ninth Circuit ruled Friday that Fair 
Labor Standards Act collective action and 
state law class action claims were not 
inherently incompatible, reviving a lawsuit 
accusing Integrity Staffing Solutions Inc. of 
illegally failing to pay warehouse workers 
for time spent waiting to clear security 
checkpoints.  
A three-judge appellate panel issued a 
published opinion that partially reversed a 
Nevada district judge's ruling that said 
former Integrity workers Jesse Busk and 
Laurie Castro failed to state valid claims 
under the FLSA and that their Nevada law 
claims had to be dismissed because of 
conflicting class certification mechanisms 
under the FLSA and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23, which governs class actions. 
The panel fell into step with its sibling 
circuits' reasoning that the text of the FLSA 
— which calls for class members to opt in to 
the suit — doesn't suggest that a district 
court had to dismiss state law class claims 
governed by the usual opt-out mechanism, 
under which class members are covered 
unless they affirmatively exclude 
themselves.  
“We agree with all other circuits to consider 
the issue that such actions can peacefully 
coexist. Therefore, the district court erred in 
dismissing the state law claims based on a 
perceived conflict,” the panel held. 
The panel — ruling on a challenge to an 
order granting a motion to dismiss — also 
shot down the lower court's finding that the 
plaintiffs hadn't stated a valid  FLSA claim 
based on post-shift time workers had to 
spend passing through security checkpoints 
allegedly meant to deter theft. However, the 
panel agreed with the trial court that the 
plaintiffs hadn't stated a claim under the 
FLSA for shortened lunch periods. 
Busk and Castro worked at warehouses in 
Nevada filling orders placed by 
Amazon.com customers, court papers said. 
Busk filed the suit in October 2010, and 
both plaintiffs lodged an amended complaint 
in December 2010, alleging that workers 
had to wait up to 25 minutes at the end their 
shifts to passed through a theft-deterrent 
“post 9/11 type” of security clearance that 
involved removing wallets, keys and belts, 
and passing through metal detectors. 
They also sought compensation under the 
FLSA and federal law based on the fact that 
they had to spend 10 minutes of their 30-
minute unpaid meal breaks moving to and 
from a cafeteria. The plaintiffs and others 
like them were entitled to regular pay for all 
hours worked and premium pay for any 
overtime hours, the amended complaint said. 
Although the question of whether there's a 
conflict between the opt-out FLSA claims 
and opt-in state law class claims is 
interesting, the Ninth Circuit's ruling was 
very significant because of what it said 
about whether time spent waiting to clear 
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security checkpoints was compensable, said 
Mark Thierman of the Thierman Law Firm 
PC, which represents the plaintiffs. Making 
employees wait to go through security 
without paying them after shifts is a 
common practice, according to Thierman.   
“It's a huge case for the real world, and not 
just the legal world,” Thierman said of the 
Integrity Staffing matter. 
The panel said that the district court dropped 
the ball by assuming that there was a 
“blanket rule” that security clearance time 
isn't compensable, as opposed to applying 
the appropriate test.  
The appeals court said that the lower court 
had found that the plaintiffs' waiting time  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
wasn't compensable based on “out-of -
circuit cases.” Here, the plaintiffs' allegation 
that the security screenings are meant to stop 
theft is plausible, because they only had to 
go through such screenings when they left 
work, not when they arrived, the appeals 
court noted. In the cases the district court 
relied on, employees had to pass through 
security when entering the workplace, the 
panel said. 
“As alleged, the security clearances are 
necessary to employees’ primary work as 
warehouse employees and done for 
Integrity’s benefit,” the panel held. 
An attorney for Integrity declined to 
comment. 
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Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean 
13-894 
 
Ruling Below: MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security, 714 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2013), 
cert granted, 2014 WL 297729 (U.S. 2014).  
 
Federal Air Marshal petitioned for review of a decision of Merit Systems Protection Board, 116 
M.S.P.R. 562, which sustained his removal by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
for his unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security information. He argued that the 
Whistleblower Act of 1989 barred the government from disciplining any federal employee for 
exposing information that the individual worker believed would be “a specific danger to public 
health or safety.” The respondent argued the information petitioner disclosed was protected by 
law from exposure, and therefore, the Whistleblower Act of 1989 does not apply. 
 
Question Presented: Whether certain statutory protections codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), 
which are inapplicable when an employee makes a disclosure “specifically prohibited by law,” 
can bar an agency from taking an enforcement action against an employee who intentionally 
discloses Sensitive Security Information 
 
 
ROBERT J. MACLEAN, Petitioner 
 v.  
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Respondent. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit 
Decided on April 26, 2013 
 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted] 
 
MOORE, Circuit Judge 
Robert J. MacLean petitions for review of a 
final decision of the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (“Board”), which sustained 
the Transportation Security Administration's 
(“Agency's”) removal of Mr. MacLean from 
the position of Federal Air Marshal 
(“Marshal”).  Because the Board incorrectly 
interpreted the Whistleblower Protection Act 
(“WPA”), we vacate and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
Mr. MacLean became a Marshal in 2001. In 
July 2003, all Marshals received a briefing 
from the Agency that there was a “ 
‘potential plot’ to hijack U.S. Airliners.” 
Soon after that briefing, however, the 
Agency sent an unencrypted text message to 
the Marshals' cell phones cancelling all 
missions on flights from Las Vegas until 
early August. After receiving this directive, 
Mr. MacLean became concerned that 
“suspension of overnight missions during a 
hijacking alert created a danger to the flying 
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public.” He complained to his supervisor 
and to the Office of Inspector General, but 
they responded that nothing could be done. 
Dissatisfied, Mr. MacLean told an MSNBC 
reporter about the directive so as to “create a 
controversy resulting in [its] rescission.” 
MSNBC published an article criticizing the 
directive, and the Agency withdrew it after 
several members of Congress joined in the 
criticism. 
In 2004, Mr. MacLean appeared on NBC 
Nightly News in disguise to criticize the 
Agency dress code, which he believed 
allowed Marshals to be easily identified. 
However, someone from the Agency 
recognized his voice. During the Agency's 
subsequent investigation, Mr. MacLean 
admitted that he revealed the cancellation 
directive to an MSNBC reporter in 2003. 
Eventually, Mr. MacLean was removed 
from his position because his contact with 
the MSNBC reporter constituted an 
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security 
information (SSI). Although the Agency had 
not initially labeled the text message as SSI 
when it was sent, it subsequently issued an 
order stating that its content was SSI. 
Mr. MacLean challenged the SSI order in 
the Ninth Circuit as a violation of the 
Agency's own regulations and as an 
impermissible retroactive action, but the 
court rejected Mr. MacLean's challenges.  It 
held that substantial evidence supported 
designating the text message as SSI under 
the applicable regulations, and that the 
Agency did not engage in retroactive action 
because it “applied regulations ... in force in 
2003” to determine that the text message 
was SSI. 
Mr. MacLean challenged his removal before 
the Board, arguing that his disclosure of the 
text message was protected whistleblowing 
activity. After an interlocutory appeal from 
the Administrative Judge (AJ), the full 
Board determined that Mr. MacLean's 
disclosure fell outside the WPA because it 
was “specifically prohibited by law.” The 
Board reasoned that the regulation 
prohibiting disclosure of SSI, upon which 
the Agency relied when it removed Mr. 
MacLean, had the force of law. 
The AJ then upheld Mr. MacLean's removal 
and the Board affirmed in MacLean II, the 
decision now on appeal. Reconsidering 
MacLean I, the Board explained that a 
regulation is not a “law” within the meaning 
of the WPA. Instead, the Board held that the 
disclosure of the text message could not 
qualify for WPA protection because it was 
directly prohibited by a statute, the Aviation 
and Transportation Security Act (ATSA).  
The Board also determined that the AJ 
applied the correct regulation in upholding 
the Agency's removal of Mr. MacLean, and 
that the penalty of removal was reasonable. 
Moreover, the Board upheld the AJ's finding 
that the Agency did not terminate Mr. 
MacLean in retaliation for his activities on 
behalf of the Federal Law Enforcement 
Officers Association (FLEOA) because the 
unauthorized disclosure of SSI was a non-
retaliatory reason for removal. Therefore, 
the Board sustained the removal. 
This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 
DISCUSSION 
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We must affirm the Board's decision unless 
it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law; (2) obtained without procedures 
required by law, rule, or regulation having 
been followed; or (3) unsupported by 
substantial evidence.” We review the 
Board's legal determinations de novo.  
I. Application of Agency Regulations to 
Mr. MacLean's Removal 
The Board explained that, “[u]nder the 
regulations in effect in July 2003, 
information relating to the deployment of 
[Marshals] was included within the 
definition of SSI,” and concluded that, as a 
result, Mr. MacLean's communication with a 
reporter constituted an unauthorized 
disclosure. Mr. MacLean argues, however, 
that the Board erred by upholding his 
removal because he was not charged under 
the right regulation. He explains that the 
regulation quoted in the initial charge, 49 
C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii), was not in force in 
2003 and only became codified in 2005. Mr. 
MacLean contends that the Board wrongly 
concluded that the regulation it ultimately 
relied on to uphold his removal, 49 C.F.R. § 
1520.7(j), which was in force in 2003, is the 
same as the 2005 regulation. Mr. MacLean 
argues that the Board violated the rule 
of SEC v. Chenery Corp. because the Board 
affirmed his removal on grounds different 
from those under which he was initially 
charged by the deciding official. 
Mr. MacLean also maintains that, although 
the Ninth Circuit upheld the Agency's 
eventual designation of the text message as 
SSI, his removal violated his due process 
rights because the message was not labeled 
SSI when it was sent. He argues that the 
termination was improper because he did not 
know that he was violating any Agency 
rules by revealing the content of the text 
message. Mr. MacLean admits that he 
signed a nondisclosure agreement as a 
condition of his employment, which states 
that Marshals “may be removed” for 
“[u]nauthorized release of security-sensitive 
or classified information.” He argues, 
however, that he believed that the message 
was not SSI and that, in any event, he was 
protected as a whistleblower. Repeating the 
argument rejected by the Board, Mr. 
MacLean thus insists that he tried in good 
faith to proceed within the law. 
We do not find Mr. MacLean's arguments 
challenging the Agency's charge to be 
persuasive. The regulation that the Board 
ultimately relied upon to uphold Mr. 
MacLean's removal is no different from the 
regulation under which he was initially 
charged. The earlier regulation bars 
disclosing “[s]pecific details of aviation 
security measures,” including “information 
concerning specific numbers of [Marshals], 
deployments or missions,” while the latter 
prohibits revealing “specific details of 
aviation ... security measures” and 
“[i]nformation concerning deployments.” In 
fact, the regulation's history shows that § 
1520.5(b)(8)(ii) is simply a recodified 
version § 1520.7(j). Because the Agency 
removed Mr. MacLean for revealing SSI, 
and the Board affirmed the termination for 
that same reason, the Board did not violate 
the Chenery doctrine. 
We likewise reject Mr. MacLean's due 
process and “good faith” arguments. Both 
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the applicable regulation and the 
nondisclosure agreement that Mr. MacLean 
signed put him on notice that revealing 
information concerning coverage of flights 
by Marshals could lead to termination. Thus, 
the Agency did not violate due process even 
though it formally designated the text 
message as SSI only after it was sent. 
Furthermore, we agree with the government 
that, because the regulation prohibiting 
disclosure of SSI does not include an intent 
element, Mr. MacLean cannot be exonerated 
by his subjective belief that the content of 
the text message was not SSI or that he was 
protected as a whistleblower. 
II. Reasonableness of Mr. MacLean's 
Removal 
Mr. MacLean argues that the Board failed to 
adequately analyze the factors listed 
in Douglas v. Veterans Administration for 
possible mitigation of the penalty of 
removal. Mr. MacLean contends that the 
Board did not take into account the fact that 
he was a one-time offender and otherwise 
had an unblemished record. Mr. MacLean 
also argues that Douglas's “comparative 
discipline” factor did not weigh in favor of 
removal because other Marshals were not 
terminated even though they disclosed SSI 
regarding specific flights. Mr. MacLean 
contends that the Board ignored the fact that 
other Marshals' disclosures were for 
personal gain, while his disclosure exposed 
and led to correcting an Agency mistake. He 
thus argues that revealing the text message 
to a reporter served the public interest, and 
that his termination undermined the 
efficiency of the service. 
The government counters that the Board did 
not abuse its discretion when it determined 
that Mr. MacLean's termination promoted 
the efficiency of the service. The 
government argues that there is no evidence 
that Mr. MacLean's actions made the flying 
public safer. The government contends that, 
because even a possibility that a Marshal 
may be onboard is an important deterrent to 
terrorist activity, Mr. MacLean's disclosure 
compromised flight safety and forced the 
Agency to reallocate scarce resources to 
address this new vulnerability. The 
government explains that, although Mr. 
MacLean was a first-time offender with a 
clean record, he was properly removed 
because his disclosure could have had 
catastrophic consequences. The government 
argues that Mr. MacLean differs from the 
Marshals who kept their jobs in spite of SSI 
breaches because those Marshals 
compromised only individual flights and 
showed remorse. 
We agree with the government. The Board 
analyzed the relevant Douglas factors and 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding 
that Mr. MacLean's removal was not a 
disparate penalty. Unlike other Marshals, 
Mr. MacLean revealed that multiple flights 
would be unprotected, and we cannot say 
that it was unreasonable for the Board to 
find that Mr. MacLean's belief that he was 
doing the right thing was outweighed by the 
resulting threat to public safety. Moreover, it 
was not unreasonable for the Board to 
determine that Mr. MacLean's conduct 
“caused the [A]gency to lose trust in him,” 
because Mr. MacLean admitted that he has 
“no regrets” and “feel[s] no remorse for 
going to a credible and responsible media 
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representative,” Given these circumstances, 
the Board did not abuse its discretion by 
upholding Mr. MacLean's removal. 
III. Mr. MacLean's Prohibited Personnel 
Practice Claim 
The Board rejected Mr. MacLean's 
argument that the Agency violated the Civil 
Service Reform Act by investigating him in 
retaliation for his FLEOA activities. The 
statute at issue prohibits individuals in 
positions of authority from discriminating 
against a government employee “on the 
basis of conduct which does not adversely 
affect the performance of the employee ... or 
the performance of others.” The Board 
concluded that Mr. MacLean's prohibited 
personnel practice challenge failed because 
he did not “meet his burden to establish that 
the reason articulated by the [A]gency was 
pretextual and that the real reason 
underlying that decision was his FLEOA 
activities.”  Mr. MacLean reasserts his 
discrimination argument on appeal. He 
contends that the Agency investigated him 
because of his 2004 appearance on NBC 
Nightly News, which he made as part of his 
advocacy on behalf of FLEOA. 
We agree with the government that 
substantial evidence supports the Board's 
conclusion that the Agency did not 
discriminate against Mr. MacLean on the 
basis of his FLEOA activities. Agency 
Policy Directive ADM 3700 “regulate[s] 
and prohibit[s] [Marshals'] unauthorized 
contact with the media,” and record 
evidence is consistent with the AJ's 
determination that Mr. MacLean was 
initially investigated for his unauthorized 
media appearance, not for his FLEOA 
activities. Indeed, it is undisputed that the 
Agency began to investigate Mr. MacLean 
“within days of his unauthorized 
appearance” on NBC Nightly News, which 
was “approximately 22 months after he 
began organizing and leading the [FLEOA] 
chapter.” Although the Agency ultimately 
did not pursue the media appearance charge 
and focused on the SSI disclosure charge, 
the initial investigation does not appear to be 
frivolous or pretextual because it was 
justified by Directive ADM 3700. 
IV. Mr. MacLean's Affirmative Defense 
Under the WPA 
The WPA prohibits individuals in positions 
of authority from taking a “personnel 
action” against a government employee in 
certain circumstances, particularly 
because of any disclosure of 
information by an employee ... which 
the employee ... reasonably believes 
evidences ... a substantial and specific 
danger to public health or safety, if such 
disclosure is not specifically prohibited 
by law ...  
Board rejected Mr. MacLean's affirmative 
defense that his disclosure of the text 
message was protected whistleblowing 
activity because it determined that the 
disclosure was “specifically prohibited by 
law” within the meaning of the WPA. The 
law that the Board relied upon is the ATSA, 
which states, in relevant part: 
Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5 
..., the Secretary of Transportation shall 
prescribe regulations prohibiting 
disclosure of information obtained or 
developed in ensuring security under 
this title if the Secretary of 
Transportation decides disclosing the 
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information would ... be detrimental to 
transportation safety. 
Because its conclusion that revealing the 
content of the text message was specifically 
prohibited by the ATSA made further WPA 
inquiry unnecessary, the Board did not reach 
the question of whether Mr. MacLean 
“reasonably believe[d]” that this information 
“evidence[d] ... a substantial and specific 
danger to public ... safety.” 
The parties do not dispute that, in order to 
fall under the WPA's “specifically 
prohibited by law” proviso, the disclosure 
must be prohibited by a statute rather than 
by a regulation. Thus, the core of the 
disagreement is whether the ATSA 
“specifically prohibit[s]” disclosure of 
information concerning coverage of flights 
by Marshals within the meaning of the 
WPA. 
Mr. MacLean and his amici (three members 
of Congress) argue that the Board 
erroneously concluded that the ATSA's 
mandate to the Secretary of Transportation 
to “prescribe regulations prohibiting 
disclosure” of certain kinds of information is 
a specific prohibition under the WPA. They 
contend that the phrase “specifically 
prohibited by law” in the WPA can only 
refer to explicit statutory language that 
identifies specific classes of 
information. They argue that the ATSA's 
“detrimental to transportation safety” 
language does not establish particular 
criteria for withholding information and 
leaves a great deal of discretion to the 
Agency, which is inconsistent with the 
WPA's requirement of specificity. They 
contrast the ATSA with the Trade Secrets 
Act, which directly authorizes removal of 
any federal employee who divulges 
information that falls into particular 
categories.  
The government counters that Mr. MacLean 
violated a regulation promulgated pursuant 
to an express legislative directive in the 
ATSA, which made his disclosure 
“specifically prohibited” by a statute. It thus 
argues that Mr. MacLean's disclosure does 
not qualify for WPA protection. The 
government contends that Mr. MacLean's 
reading of the WPA eviscerates laws that 
provide for any Agency discretion in 
classifying information as SSI, and thus 
disables Congress from directing agencies to 
pass nondisclosure regulations. Lastly, the 
government argues that it does not make 
sense for Congress to order an agency to 
promulgate nondisclosure regulations and at 
the same time prohibit that agency from 
disciplining an employee for violating those 
regulations by providing a defense under the 
WPA. 
We agree with Mr. MacLean that the ATSA 
does not “specifically prohibit” the 
disclosure at issue in this case. The ATSA's 
plain language does not expressly prohibit 
employee disclosures, and only empowers 
the Agency to prescribe regulations 
prohibiting disclosure of SSI “if the 
Secretary decides disclosing the information 
would ... be detrimental to public safety.” 
Thus, the ultimate source of prohibition of 
Mr. MacLean's disclosure is not a statute but 
a regulation, which the parties agree cannot 
be “law” under the WPA. 
Notably, Congress changed the language 
“specifically prohibited by law, rule, or 
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regulation” in the statute's draft version to 
simply “specifically prohibited by law.” 
Congress did so because it was concerned 
that the broader language “would encourage 
the adoption of internal procedural 
regulations against disclosure, and thereby 
enable an agency to discourage an employee 
from coming forward with allegations of 
wrongdoing.” Congress explained that only 
“a statute which requires that matters be 
withheld from the public as to leave no 
discretion on the issue, or ... which 
establishes particular criteria for withholding 
or refers to particular types of matters to be 
withheld” could qualify as a sufficiently 
specific prohibition. In contrast, the 
“detrimental to transportation safety” 
language of the ATSA does not describe 
specific matters to be withheld. It provides 
only general criteria for withholding 
information and gives some discretion to the 
Agency to fashion regulations for 
prohibiting disclosure. Thus, the ATSA does 
not “specifically prohibit” employee conduct 
within the meaning of the WPA. 
The ATSA's insufficient specificity becomes 
even more apparent when it is contrasted 
with statutes that have been determined to 
fall under the WPA's “specifically 
prohibited by law” proviso. For example, the 
Trade Secrets Act, which the Board 
in Kent held to qualify as a specific 
prohibition, is extremely detailed and 
comprehensive. That statute penalizes 
federal employees who “divulge[ ] ... any 
information coming to [them] in the course 
of [their] employment ... which information 
concerns or relates to the trade secrets, 
processes, operations, style of work, or 
apparatus, or to the identity, confidential 
statistical data, amount or source of any 
income, profits, losses, or expenditures of 
any person, firm, partnership, corporation, 
or association....” The same is true of § 6013 
of the Internal Revenue Code, which the 
Ninth Circuit in Coons v. Secretary of the 
Treasury held to fall within the meaning of 
the WPA's “specifically prohibited” 
language. That statute prohibits federal 
employees from “disclos[ing] any return or 
return information obtained by him in any 
manner in connection with his service,” and 
then goes on to define “return” and “return 
information” in explicit detail, mentioning 
such things as “a taxpayer's identity, the 
nature, source or amount of his income, 
payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, 
credits, assets, overassessments, or tax 
payments ...”  Thus, when Congress seeks to 
prohibit disclosure of specific types of 
information, it has the ability to draft the 
statute accordingly. 
Nonetheless, we note that the ATSA's 
charge to the Secretary of Transportation to 
prescribe regulations pursuant to specific 
criteria (i.e., only information that would be 
detrimental to transportation safety) makes 
this a very close case. Indeed, the ATSA 
appears to fall in the middle of the spectrum 
of statutes flanked at opposite ends by (a) 
those that fall squarely under the WPA's 
“specifically prohibited by law” proviso, 
such as the Trade Secrets Act and § 6013 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, and (b) those in 
which Congress delegates legislative 
authority to an administrative agency 
without circumscribing the agency's 
discretion. Regulations promulgated 
pursuant to Congress's express instructions 
would qualify as specific legal prohibitions. 
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In this case, given the clarity of the statutory 
language and legislative intent behind the 
WPA's specificity requirement, the 
parameters set by Congress are not enough 
to push the ATSA over that threshold. 
We are similarly unpersuaded by the 
government's argument that a parade of 
horribles necessarily follows our adoption of 
Mr. MacLean's interpretation of the WPA. 
The government argues that, if Mr. 
MacLean is allowed to pursue his 
whistleblower defense, the WPA would in 
effect prohibit later Congresses from 
directing agencies to pass nondisclosure 
regulations. The government is concerned 
that, under Mr. MacLean's reading, the 
WPA would prohibit agencies from 
disciplining employees for violating 
nondisclosure regulations and thereby 
prevent agencies from enforcing such 
regulations. 
The government is mistaken. In spite of the 
WPA, Congress remains free to enact 
statutes empowering agencies to promulgate 
and enforce nondisclosure regulations, and it 
has done so in the ATSA. The government 
ignores the fact that the ATSA covers a wide 
range of conduct that would not qualify as 
whistleblowing. For example, no one 
disputes that the ATSA empowers the 
Agency to promulgate regulations that 
enable it to discipline employees who reveal 
SSI for personal gain or due to negligence, 
or who disclose information that the 
employee does not reasonably believe 
evidences a substantial and specific danger 
to public health or safety. The WPA also 
does not prohibit the Agency from following 
the ATSA's mandate to regulate public 
access to information that the Agency might 
otherwise be forced to disclose under the 
Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA). Indeed, it appears that the 
paramount goal of the ATSA is to empower 
the Agency to reject the public's requests for 
Agency intelligence because the statute 
recites that, “[n]otwithstanding [FOIA] ..., 
the Secretary of Transportation shall 
prescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure 
of information obtained or developed in 
ensuring security under this title.” Our 
interpretation of the WPA does not deprive 
the ATSA of meaning. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Mr. MacLean's disclosure is not 
“specifically prohibited by law” within the 
meaning of the WPA, we vacate the Board's 
decision and remand for a determination 
whether Mr. MacLean's disclosure qualifies 
for WPA protection. For example, it remains 
to be determined whether Mr. MacLean 
reasonably believed that the content of his 
disclosure evidenced a substantial and 
specific danger to public health or safety. 
VACATED AND REMANDED 
WALLACH, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
Mr. MacLean presented substantial evidence 
that he was not motivated by personal gain 
but by the desire to protect the public. He 
averred proof that he sought direction from 
his supervisors before making allegedly 
protected disclosures. While I join in the 
analysis and the result of the majority 
opinion, I concur to emphasize that the facts 
alleged, if proven, allege conduct at the core 
of the Whistleblower Protection Act. 
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“Supreme Court to Decide Whether Air Marshal Should be Protected as 
Whistleblower” 
Washington Post 
Robert Barnes 
May 19, 2014 
The Supreme Court said Monday that it will 
decide an important question of when a 
federal employee may release to the public 
sensitive information from his agency that 
he feels endangers fellow citizens. 
The court agreed to a request from the 
Obama administration that the justices 
review a lower court’s decision that a 
federal air marshal may have been unfairly 
fired for going to the media about a security 
plan with which he disagreed. 
Robert J. MacLean was an air marshal in 
2003. Just after being briefed about a 
potential terrorist attack, MacLean said he 
received another message from the 
Transportation Security Administration: that 
because of a budget shortfall, the agency 
was cutting back on overnight trips for 
undercover air marshals. 
MacLean said he went to his boss, who told 
him to keep quiet. Instead, he leaked the 
information to a reporter for MSNBC. This 
caused a congressional uproar, and the 
Department of Homeland Security canceled 
the order within 24 hours, calling it 
“premature and a mistake.” 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit said MacLean was entitled to argue 
that he was protected by whistleblower laws 
after he was fired by the TSA in 2006. 
The lower court ruling, U.S. Solicitor 
General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. told the court 
in a brief, “effectively permits individual 
federal employees to override the TSA’s 
judgments about the dangers of public 
disclosure.” 
MacLean’s response was that he should not 
have been fired for actions that others found 
heroic and were not unlawful. 
“Robert MacLean was a federal air marshal 
who spoke up about the consequences of a 
dangerous and possibly unlawful 
government decision,” wrote Washington 
lawyer and former deputy solicitor general 
Neal Katyal. 
“Because he blew the whistle, the 
government changed policy and a potential 
tragedy was averted. But Mr. MacLean paid 
a hefty price.” 
According to MacLean’s brief, Sen. Barbara 
Boxer (D-Calif.) thanked the anonymous 
tipster “who came forward and told the 
truth.” 
MacLean’s identity was not discovered until 
three years later, when he appeared on an 
NBC Nightly News program about a 
different incident. 
His disguise on that broadcast “proved to be 
inadequate,” the government’s brief says, 
and the TSA fired him for disclosing 
sensitive security information. 
The appeals court said 
MacLean was entitled to argue that he was 
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protected as a whistleblower and that his 
disclosure had not been “specifically 
prohibited by law.” The government said the 
regulations passed by the agency, which it 
contends prohibited MacLean’s actions, 
were authority enough to fire the air 
marshal. 
MacLean had contended that the plan about 
eliminating overnight trips was not 
considered sensitive by the agency; it had 
been sent unencrypted to his cellphone. 
The case, Department of Homeland Security 
v. MacLean, will be heard sometime during 
the court’s term that begins next October. 
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“Is Hike in Whistleblower Claims a Sign of Progress or Growing Mistrust?” 
Federal News Radio  
Jack Moore 
May 20, 2014 
 
Not quite two years ago, President Barack 
Obama signed into law a sweeping update to 
whistleblower protections for civilian 
federal employees. 
 
The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement 
Act expanded the authority of both the 
Office of Special Counsel and the Merit 
Systems Protection Board to review 
employees' claims of agency wrongdoing 
and made it easier to discipline agency 
officials who retaliate against 
whistleblowers. 
Both agencies have seen their caseloads 
skyrocket since the law went into effect. 
But are the growing claims of retaliation 
evidence of a crackdown on whistleblowing 
employees or that more employees actually 
feel comfortable coming forward to report 
agency misconduct? 
The heads of both OSC and MSPB told 
Federal News Radio as part of the special 
report, Trust Redefined: Reconnecting 
Government and Its Employees, that their 
increasing workloads could actually be a 
sign of progress — that more employees feel 
protected now to make disclosures. 
"If people can come forward and report 
waste, fraud or abuse — or health and safety 
problems — it makes our government 
stronger," said Carolyn Lerner, head of the 
OSC, in an interview with Federal 
Drive hosts Tom Temin and Emily Kopp. 
"When we have an environment and an 
atmosphere where employees are rewarded 
instead of punished for coming forward, I 
think that creates a better culture and it 
certainly creates a more effective 
government." 
Still, an exclusive Federal News 
Radio survey reveals a wide chasm of trust 
remains when it comes to feds blowing the 
whistle at work. Just 16 percent of 
respondents to the survey said they felt 
protected enough to report waste, fraud or 
abuse at their agencies even with the recent 
changes in law. 
"Retaliation for whistleblowing is alive and 
well, despite supposed legal protections," 
one respondent said. 
Agencies hit with wave of new 
whistleblower claims 
Lerner said OSC has seen an incredible 
uptick in its caseload over the last year or so 
as more employees come to the agency 
alleging that they've been retaliated against 
for reporting agency misconduct. 
Very often, "after somebody blows the 
whistle, the terms or conditions of their 
employment change," Lerner said. "It can be 
something like a hostile work environment. 
It can be up to and including termination." 
So far, in fiscal 2014, the agency has 
received more than 1,700 complaints of 
prohibited personnel practices, about half of 
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which involve retaliation for 
whistleblowing, she said. 
Lerner's agency wasn't the only one to be hit 
with an increased workload following recent 
changes in the law. 
Whistleblower claims filed with MSPB have 
more than doubled in recent years, 
according to the board's chairwoman, Susan 
Tsui Grundmann. 
But there may be more than the new law at 
work that explains the rise in cases, she said. 
"The reason why I suspect we're seeing 
more claims may have less to do with 
changes in the law and more to do with a 
greater awareness of a federal employee's 
rights to file in this area," she told Federal 
Drive hosts Tom Temin and Emily Kopp. 
For one thing, whistleblower organizations 
and good-government groups have helped 
raise awareness of whistleblowing concerns, 
she said. 
Agencies are also attempting to do their part. 
"At the same time, agencies are a lot sharper 
in terms of getting the word out, training 
people [on] what's protected, what's not 
protected and your venue to redress your 
claims," Grundmann said. 
Do agencies' whistleblower practices pass 
muster? 
OSC runs training workshops to brief 
managers on their responsibilities under the 
whistleblower laws and to educate 
employees about their rights, including the 
fact that retaliation against whistleblowers is 
a prohibited personnel practice. 
The ultimate goal of OSC's outreach efforts 
is to change the conversation — the climate 
— around whistleblowing. 
"No one likes to be criticized; no one likes 
to feel like they are being called out for 
doing something wrong," Lerner said. "But 
the more we can create a climate where 
disclosures are viewed as ultimately a good 
thing, as an employee trying to do what's 
right for the agency and for the government 
and, frankly, for our country, the better 
things will be. If we can help agencies create 
that climate of openness where employees 
feel like coming forward as valued, that will 
help trust." 
That will also have a very practical impact, 
she suggested. 
"I'm convinced that more education and 
outreach will help prevent 
misunderstandings and mistakes and, 
ultimately, result in fewer complaints 
needing to be filed in the first place." 
Shirine Moazed, chief of OSC's 
Washington, D.C., field office, oversees a 
team responsible for training federal 
managers and ensuring an agency's 
whistleblower practices pass muster. 
Moazed said the trainings emphasize that 
education is an essential step in preventing 
whistleblower retaliation — and other 
prohibited practices — and that such 
education must start at the top. 
"So, if the head of the agency and the head 
of the components make it very significant 
that their supervisors be trained and train 
others on the prohibitions against 
whistleblower retaliation, that's something 
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that's going to generate interest and 
understanding throughout the agency," she 
told In Depth with Francis Rose. 
'There are no real protections in place' 
But despite the recent changes to law and 
the outreach efforts across government, it 
appears many would-be whistleblowers still 
don't feel protected enough to disclose 
potential wrongdoing. Just 14 percent of 
respondents to an exclusive Federal News 
Radio survey agreed that there are enough 
protections in place for whistleblowers to 
feel safe to report waste, fraud and abuse. 
"In print and in theory, yes, there are enough 
protections in place for federal 
whistleblowers," one respondent said. "In 
reality, there is not because of the real 
possibility of retaliation from management 
and/or the agency." 
Another respondent presented an even 
gloomier perspective. 
"There are no real protections in place. It is 
all lip service. All the employees who have 
come forward in recent memory have their 
careers destroyed ... or they were punished 
with career-ending reassignments." 
While fewer than 22 percent of respondents 
said they had personally reported waste, 
fraud or abuse at their agency, 44 percent of 
those who did said they were retaliated 
against in some form. 
Those findings are similar to a 2011 MSPB 
report on whistleblower retaliation. The 
report indicated that while employees' 
perceptions of agency wrongdoing had 
actually declined between 1992 — when 
MSPB first studied the issue — to 2011, the 
overall perception that employees would be 
retaliated against for speaking out had not. 
About 36 percent of respondents said they 
were retaliated against or threatened with 
retaliation for reporting agency misconduct, 
according to the MSPB study.
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“Fed. Circ. Ups Protection for Whistleblowers’ Disclosures” 
Law 360 
Bill Donahue 
April 19, 2013 
 
The Federal Circuit stressed Friday that 
government whistleblowers are protected by 
federal law unless their disclosures are 
explicitly prohibited by another statute, 
reviving the case of an air marshal who was 
fired for leaking policy changes to a 
reporter. 
According to the opinion, Robert MacLean 
was terminated after he told an MSNBC 
reporter that the Department of Homeland 
Security planned to remove all marshals 
from flights in and out of Las Vegas for a 
short period in 2003 – a change he thought 
endangered public safety. 
Though several congressmen publicly came 
to his aid and the department eventually 
reversed course, the Merit Systems 
Protection Board later found that MacLean 
didn’t qualify for reinstatement as a bona 
fide whistleblower. 
The Whistleblower Protection Act exempts 
protection for employees who break other 
laws when they come forward, and the 
department persuaded the MSPB that 
MacLean had violated the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act by disclosing 
classified air marshal information to the 
reporter. 
The Federal Circuit overturned that decision 
Friday, saying the WPA’s exemption was 
reserved for the release of classified 
information that a law specifically bans. 
More vague laws like the ATSA—which 
merely empowers an agency to create 
nondisclosure regulations—don’t make that 
cut, the court said. 
“Notable, Congress changed the language 
‘specifically prohibited by law, rule, or 
regulation’ in the [WPA]’s draft version to 
simply ‘specifically prohibited by law,’” the 
appeals court said. 
“Congress did so because it was concerned 
that the broader language would encourage 
the adoption of internal procedural 
regulations against disclosure, and thereby 
enable an agency to discourage an employee 
from coming forward with allegations of 
wrongdoing,” the panel added. 
In contrast, similar but more direct 
provisions under laws like the Internal 
Revenue Code—which bans employees 
from disclosing a private tax return for any 
reason—are specific enough to qualify 
under the WPA’s exemption, the court 
wrote. 
“When Congress seeks to prohibit disclosure 
of specific types of information, it has the 
ability to draft the statute accordingly,” the 
court said. 
The opinion also rejected Department of 
Homeland Security’s argument that 
MacLean’s tougher interpretation of the 
WPA would effectively neuter Congress’ 
ability to empower government agencies to 
implement and enforce nondisclosure laws. 
286 
 
Under the court’s reading of the WPA, 
agencies can still punish and fire employees 
from disclosing information for personal 
gain or out of negligence and can pass rules 
to limit their exposure to Freedom of 
Information Act requests, the court said. 
What they can’t do, the court said, is punish 
an employee for blowing the whistle by 
releasing information that Congress hasn’t 
specifically barred. 
Though a win for MacLean, Friday’s ruling 
does not a whistleblower make. With the 
proper interpretation of the WPA 
established, the appeals court remanded the 
case back to the MSPB to determine other 
prongs of the whistleblower test, like 
whether MacLean made his disclosure 
because he believed the department’s policy 
posed a legitimate threat. 
Writing a one-paragraph concurring opinion, 
U.S. Circuit Judge Evan Wallach agreed 
with the ruling of the majority but used 
stronger language to stress the high bar for 
exempting disclosures from protection. 
“I concur to emphasize that the facts alleged, 
if proven, allege conduct at the core of the 
Whistleblower Protection Act,” Wallach 
wrote. 
In a statement on Monday, MacLean said 
the ruling—alongside last year’s 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement 
Act—would mean that whistleblowers will 
have “significantly more confidence to 
expose wrongdoing without the fear of being 
marginalized or suffering financial 
hardship.” 
“An honest employee with the fortitude to 
expose corruption should expect to make 
sacrifices, but no one should have to endure 
seven or more years of aggravation,” 
MacLean said. 
A representative for the Department of 
Homeland Security didn’t immediately 
return a request for comment on the 
decision. 
Judges Sharon Prost, Kimberly Moore and 
Wallach sat on the panel, with Moore 
penning the majority opinion. 
MacLean was represented by Lawrence 
Berger of Mahon and Burger and by 
Thomas M. Devine of Government 
Accountability Project. 
The case was Robert J. MacLean v. 
Department of Homeland Security, case 
number 11-3231, in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal District. 
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Comptroller v. Wynne 
13-485 
 
Ruling Below: Maryland State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Brian Wynne, 431 Md. 147 
(2013), cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 2660 (2014). 
 
Individual state-resident taxpayers sought judicial review of Tax Court decision that affirmed, 
against a Commerce Clause challenge, assessment by state comptroller of county income tax 
without a credit for payment of out-of-state income taxes. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court, 
Howard County, Louis A. Becker, III, J., reversed decision of Tax Court and remanded case. 
After an appeal was noted to the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals granted 
certiorari. 
 
Question Presented: Whether the United States Constitution prohibits a state from taxing all the 
income of its residents -- wherever earned -- by mandating a credit for taxes paid on income 
earned in other states. 
 
 
MARYLAND STATE COMPTROLLER OF the TREASURY 
 v.  
Brian WYNNE, et ux. 
 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
Decided on January 28, 2013 
 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
 
McDONALD, Judge 
Federal and Maryland law allow for the 
attribution of corporate income to the 
corporation's shareholders—without being 
taxed at the corporate level—in defined 
circumstances. In particular, the income of a 
Subchapter S corporation is deemed to “pass 
through” to the shareholders who are then 
directly taxed on that income. Some or all of 
that income may be generated outside the 
state in which a shareholder resides. 
The Maryland income tax law reaches all of 
the income of a Maryland resident. The 
State income tax law allows a credit against 
an individual's State tax liability for income 
taxes paid to other states based on the 
income earned in those states. However, that 
credit takes no account of, and cannot be 
taken against, the portion of the Maryland 
income tax known as the “county income 
tax.” 
This case poses the question whether the 
failure to allow a credit violates the federal 
Constitution when a portion of a Maryland 
resident taxpayer's income consists of 
significant “pass-through” income generated 
by a Subchapter S corporation in other 
states, apportioned to the taxpayer, and 
taxed by the states in which it was 
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generated. The taxpayer has appealed an 
assessment by the State Comptroller that did 
not allow a credit against the county income 
tax portion of the Maryland income tax. 
The Comptroller, as he should,
 
defends the 
tax law as written by the Legislature and 
interpreted by this Court. The taxpayers 
accept that interpretation, but assert that it is 
wanting when measured against the federal 
Constitution. They rely on a multitude of 
cases—virtually all of which are subsequent 
to the 1975 amendment of the Maryland tax 
law that uncoupled the credit from the 
county income tax—that assess state taxes 
against what has come to be known as the 
“dormant Commerce Clause.” 
Although the Maryland Tax Court ruled in 
favor of the Comptroller, the Circuit Court 
for Howard County reversed that decision 
and held that the statute's failure to allow 
such a credit violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause. For the reasons that 
follow, we find merit in the taxpayers' 
contentions and affirm the judgment of the 
Circuit Court. 
Background 
State Income Taxes 
A state may tax the income of its residents, 
regardless of where that income is earned. A 
state may also tax a nonresident on income 
earned within the state. Both of these 
propositions are consistent with the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, they raise the 
possibility of what might be termed “double 
taxation” when both the state of the 
taxpayer's residence and the state where the 
income was generated tax the same income. 
As explained below, the Commerce Clause 
of the federal Constitution sets certain 
constraints on this possibility, which the 
states recognize through the provision of 
credits for payments of out-of-state taxes. 
Maryland Individual Income Tax 
State law imposes an income tax on 
individuals. It is composed of three parts: 
(1) a State income tax (the “State tax”) 
at a rate set by the Legislature in statute; 
 (2) a county income tax that applies 
only to residents of each county
 
(the 
“county tax”) at a rate set by the county 
within the range allowed by statute; and 
(3) a tax on those subject to State 
income tax but not the county tax (the 
“Special Non–Resident Tax” or 
“SNRT”) at a rate equal to the lowest 
county tax. 
Thus, all individual taxpayers are subject to 
the State tax and either the county tax or the 
SNRT. These taxes are all collected by the 
Comptroller; the proceeds of the county tax 
are distributed to the relevant county. 
Credit for Income Taxes Paid to Other 
States 
State law allows for an individual subject to 
the Maryland income tax to take a credit 
against the State tax for similar taxes paid to 
other states. In particular: 
a resident may claim a credit only 
against the State income tax for a 
taxable year in the amount determined 
under [TG § 10–703(c) ] for State tax 
on income paid to another state for the 
year. There are various exceptions to 
this credit, none of which are pertinent 
to this case.
 
In general, the credit is 
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designed to ensure that Maryland 
receives, at a minimum, the Maryland 
income tax due on the taxpayer's 
income that is attributable to Maryland, 
regardless of the another state's method 
or rate of taxation.
 
No credit is given against the county tax for 
income taxes paid in other states. As this 
Court outlined in Blanton, a credit had 
previously applied with respect to the county 
tax. However, in 1975, the Legislature 
amended the tax code to eliminate that 
credit.  
S Corporations and Income Taxes 
A Subchapter S corporation or “S 
corporation” is a corporation—often a 
relatively small business—that meets certain 
requirements set forth in the Internal 
Revenue Code and makes an election to pass 
through its income and losses, for federal tax 
purposes, to its shareholders.
 
Each 
shareholder reports his or her share of the S 
corporation's income and losses on their 
individual tax returns and is assessed federal 
income tax at the shareholder's individual 
rate. In that way, the income that the S 
corporation generates for its owners is taxed 
at one level—similar to the taxation of a 
partnership—rather than at two levels 
(corporate and shareholder) as is otherwise 
typically the case.
 
To accomplish this, the 
character of any item of income or loss of an 
S corporation “passes through” to its owners 
“as if that item were realized directly from 
the source from which realized by the 
corporation, or incurred in the same manner 
as incurred by the corporation.” 
Some states accord similar pass-through 
treatment to the income of an S corporation; 
other states do not and require an S 
corporation to pay income tax directly. The 
Maryland income tax law incorporates, for 
the most part, the definitions of income 
under the Internal Revenue Code. 
Accordingly, the income of an S corporation 
“passes through” and is attributed to its 
shareholders for purposes of the Maryland 
income tax law. 
The Wynnes and Maxim Healthcare 
Services 
The underlying facts are undisputed. The 
taxpayers are Brian and Karen Wynne (“the 
Wynnes”), a married couple with five 
children residing in Howard County. During 
the 2006 tax year, Brian Wynne was one of 
seven owners of Maxim Healthcare 
Services, Inc. (“Maxim”), a company that 
does a national business providing health 
care services, and owned 2.4% of its stock. 
Maxim had made an election under the 
Internal Revenue Code to be treated as an S 
corporation. As a result of that election, 
Maxim's income was “passed through” to its 
owners for federal income tax purposes, and 
the Wynnes reported a portion of the 
corporation's income on their individual 
federal income tax return. 
Because Maryland accords similar pass-
through treatment to the income of S 
corporations, the Wynnes also reported pass-
through income of Maxim on their 2006 
Maryland tax return. A substantial portion of 
the pass-through income had been generated 
in other states and was taxed by those states 
for the 2006 tax year. 
In particular, for the 2006 tax year, Maxim 
filed state income tax returns in 39 states. 
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Maxim allocated to each shareholder a pro 
rata share of taxes paid to the various states. 
The returns did not indicate payments of 
income taxes to any county or local entity in 
other states. The Wynnes claimed their pro 
rata share of such income taxes paid to other 
states as a credit pursuant to TG § 10–
703(c) against their 2006 Maryland 
individual income tax, reflected on 
Maryland Form 502. 
Assessment and Appeal 
The Comptroller made a change in the 
computation of the local tax owed by the 
Wynnes and revised the credit for taxes paid 
to other states on the Wynnes' 2006 
Maryland Form 502. The net result was a 
deficiency in the Maryland taxes paid by the 
Wynnes, and the Comptroller issued an 
assessment, which the Wynnes appealed. 
On October 6, 2008, the Hearings and 
Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office 
affirmed the assessment, although it revised 
it slightly.
 
The Wynnes then appealed to the 
Maryland Tax Court where they argued, for 
the first time, that the limitation of the credit 
to the State tax for tax payments made to 
other states discriminated against interstate 
commerce in violation of the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution. 
The Tax Court rejected that argument and 
affirmed the assessment on December 29, 
2009. 
The Wynnes then sought judicial review in 
the Circuit Court for Howard County. 
Following a hearing on the appeal, the 
Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court in a 
decision issued on June 29, 2011. The 
Circuit Court remanded the case to the Tax 
Court for further factual development and 
“an appropriate credit for out-of-state 
income taxes paid” on Maxim's income. An 
appeal was noted to the Court of Special 
Appeals on July 22, 2011. Prior to hearing 
and decision in the intermediate appellate 
court, this Court granted certiorari. 
Discussion 
Standard of Review 
The Tax Court is “an adjudicatory 
administrative agency in the executive 
branch of state government.” A decision of 
the Tax Court is subject to the same 
standards of judicial review as contested 
cases of other administrative agencies under 
the State Administrative Procedure Act. In 
undertaking such review, this Court directly 
evaluates the decision of the agency—in this 
case, the Tax Court. 
When the Tax Court interprets Maryland tax 
law, we accord that agency a degree of 
deference as the agency that administers and 
interprets those statutes. In this case, the Tax 
Court's decision required the application and 
analysis of cases interpreting the United 
States Constitution. Because our review of 
its analysis turns on a question of 
constitutional law, we do not defer to the 
agency's determination.  
The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Wynnes do not contest the State's 
authority to tax their income, wherever 
earned, under the Due Process 
Clause. Rather, they base their challenge to 
the Comptroller's assessment on what has 
come to be known as the “dormant 
Commerce Clause” of the United States 
Constitution. The dormant Commerce 
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Clause is a restriction on State power that is 
not explicitly articulated in the Constitution 
but that has been derived as a necessary 
corollary of a power specifically conferred 
on Congress by the Constitution. 
The Commerce Clause provides Congress 
with the power to “regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”  “Though phrased as a grant of 
regulatory power to Congress, the 
[Commerce] Clause has long been 
understood to have a ‘negative’ aspect that 
denies the States the power unjustifiably to 
discriminate against or burden the interstate 
flow of articles of commerce.”  This 
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause is 
an “implied limitation on the power of state 
and local governments to enact laws 
affecting foreign or interstate commerce.” 
We assess first whether the dormant 
Commerce Clause is implicated by the 
county tax and, if so, whether the failure to 
provide a credit for out-of-state taxes 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Does the Application of the County Tax 
without a Credit Implicate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause? 
Although each of the three components of 
the State income tax has its own label and is 
created by different code provisions, each is 
for federal constitutional purposes a state 
income tax. In any event, whether the tax is 
nominally a state or county tax is irrelevant 
for purposes of analysis under the dormant 
Commerce Clause because a state may not 
unreasonably burden interstate commerce 
through its subdivisions any more than it 
may at the state level. 
Much recent case law concerning the 
dormant Commerce Clause has been “driven 
by concern about economic protectionism—
that is, regulatory measures designed to 
benefit in-state economic interests by 
burdening out-of-state competitors.” While 
many cases construing the dormant 
Commerce Clause concern state taxation, 
“[t]he dormant Commerce Clause protects 
markets and participants in markets, not 
taxpayers as such.” Therefore, the dormant 
Commerce Clause will not affect the 
application of a tax unless there is actual or 
prospective competition between entities in 
an identifiable market and state action that 
either expressly discriminates against or 
places an undue burden on interstate 
commerce. This impact must be more than 
incidental. 
The Comptroller argues that the county 
income tax is not directed at interstate 
commerce and that the Wynnes have failed 
to identify any interstate commercial activity 
affected by a failure to allow a credit against 
that tax for tax payments to other 
states. However, application of the dormant 
Commerce Clause is not limited to 
circumstances where physical goods enter 
the stream of commerce. For example, a 
state tax exemption related to the movement 
of people across state borders for economic 
purposes has been held to implicate 
interstate commerce and violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Moreover, even when a 
state tax is imposed on an intrastate activity, 
if that tax substantially affects interstate 
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commerce, the tax is subject to scrutiny 
under the Commerce Clause. 
The Comptroller asserts that the Wynnes are 
subject to Maryland income taxes because of 
their status as Maryland residents and not 
because of their activities in intrastate or 
interstate commerce. But this is a false 
dichotomy. In fact, they are subject to the 
income tax because they are Maryland 
residents and because they have income 
derived from intrastate and interstate 
activities; other states may also tax some of 
that same income because it derives from 
activities in those state. This case concerns 
the constitutional constraint on the otherwise 
overlapping power to tax such income. 
In making his argument based on a state's 
power to tax its own residents, the 
Comptroller relies on several cases from 
other states that fail to distinguish the 
constraints on state taxation imposed by the 
dormant Commerce Clause from those 
imposed by the Due Process Clause or that 
are otherwise distinguishable from the case. 
Those cases are not persuasive.
 
The limitation of the credit for payments of 
out-of-state income taxes to the State portion 
of the Maryland income tax can result in 
significantly different treatment for a 
Maryland resident taxpayer who earns 
substantial income from out-of-state 
activities when compared with an otherwise 
identical taxpayer who earns income entirely 
from Maryland activities. In particular, the 
first taxpayer may pay more in total state 
and local income taxes than the second. This 
creates a disincentive for the taxpayer—or 
the S corporation of which the taxpayer is an 
owner—to conduct income-generating 
activities in other states with income taxes. 
Thus, the operation of the credit with respect 
to the county tax may affect the interstate 
market for capital and business investment 
and, accordingly, implicate the dormant 
Commerce Clause.    
Does Application of the County Tax 
without a Credit Violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause? 
The Supreme Court has held that a state may 
tax interstate commerce without offending 
the dormant Commerce Clause so long as 
the tax satisfies a four-prong test. Under that 
test, a state tax survives a challenge under 
the dormant Commerce Clause if it: 
(1) applies to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing state; 
(2) is fairly apportioned; 
(3) is not discriminatory towards 
interstate or foreign commerce; and 
(4) is fairly related to the services 
provided by the State. 
The Wynnes apparently do not dispute that 
the application of the county tax in this case 
has a substantial nexus to Maryland or that it 
is fairly related to services provided by the 
State. Thus, for purposes of the present 
controversy, we focus on the remaining two 
prongs of the Complete Auto test: the 
requirement of fair apportionment and the 
prohibition against discrimination against 
interstate commerce. 
(1) Is the county tax without a credit fairly 
apportioned? 
The purpose of the apportionment 
requirement is to ensure that each state taxes 
only its fair share of an interstate 
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transaction. “It is a commonplace of 
constitutional jurisprudence that multiple 
taxation may well be offensive to the 
Commerce Clause. In order to prevent 
multiple taxation of interstate commerce, the 
Court has required that taxes be apportioned 
among taxing jurisdictions, so that no 
instrumentality of commerce is subjected to 
more than one tax on its full value.” “The 
rule which permits taxation by two or more 
states on an apportionment basis precludes 
taxation of all of the property by the state of 
the domicile.... Otherwise there would be 
multiple taxation of interstate operations.”  
The dormant Commerce Clause does not 
mandate the adoption of a particular income 
allocation formula for apportionment. In 
order to assess the fairness of apportionment 
courts look to whether a tax is “internally 
consistent” as well as “externally 
consistent.”  
(a) Is the county tax without a credit 
internally consistent? 
“Internal consistency is preserved when the 
imposition of a tax identical to the one in 
question by every other State would add no 
burden to interstate commerce that intrastate 
commerce would not also bear. This test 
asks nothing about the degree of economic 
reality reflected by the tax, but simply looks 
to the structure of the tax at issue to see 
whether its identical application by every 
state in the Union would place interstate 
commerce at a disadvantage as compared 
with commerce intrastate.” 
Internal consistency is thus measured by the 
answer to the following hypothetical 
question: If each state imposed a county tax 
without a credit in the context of a tax 
scheme identical to that of Maryland,
 
would 
interstate commerce be disadvantaged 
compared to intrastate commerce? 
The answer is yes. In this scenario, TG § 
10–703 (or its hypothetical equivalent in 
other states) would grant a credit against a 
taxpayer's home state income tax but not 
against the home county income tax for 
income taxes paid to other states. As a 
result, taxpayers who earn income from 
activities undertaken outside of their home 
states would be systematically taxed at 
higher rates relative to taxpayers who earn 
income entirely within their home state. 
Those higher rates would be the result of 
multiple states taxing the same income. 
This is illustrated by the following example. 
• Tax rates. Assume each state imposes a 
state tax of 4.75% on all the income of its 
residents, a county tax of 3.2% on all the 
income of residents, and a SNRT of 1.25% 
on the income of non-residents earned 
within the state. 
• Credit. Assume that each state allows a 
credit for income taxes paid to other states 
that operates in the same fashion as TG § 
10–703—i.e., the formula for the credit and 
application of the credit take only the home 
state “state tax” into account. 
• Taxpayer with in-state income only. Mary 
lives in Maryland and earns $100,000, 
entirely from activities in Maryland. 
Mary owes $4,750 in Maryland state 
income tax (.0475 x $100,000), $3,200 
in Maryland county income tax (.032 x 
$100,000) for a total Maryland tax 
of $7,950. 
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• Taxpayer with multi-state income. John 
lives in Maryland and earns $100,000, half 
($50,000) from activities in Maryland and 
half ($50,000) from activities in 
Pennsylvania. 
Because John is a resident of Maryland, 
all of his income is subject to both the 
Maryland “state tax” and the “county 
tax” applicable to his county. Before the 
application of any credit, John owes 
$4,750 in Maryland state income tax 
(.0475 x $100,000), $3,200 in Maryland 
county income tax (.032 x $100,000) 
for a total Maryland tax of $7,950. 
Because half of John's income was 
generated in Pennsylvania, John also 
owes $2,375 in Pennsylvania state 
income tax (.0475 x $50,000) and $625 
with respect to the Pennsylvania SNRT 
(.0125 x $50,000) for a total 
Pennsylvania tax of $3,000. 
John receives a credit in the amount of 
$2,375 with respect to his Maryland 
state income tax pursuant to credit 
formula set forth in TG § 10–703(c). 
This reduces his Maryland income tax 
to $5,575. 
Thus, John owes a combined total 
of $8,575 in state income taxes. As the 
above example demonstrates, a taxpayer 
with income sourced in more than one state 
will consistently owe more in combined 
state income taxes than a taxpayer with the 
same income sourced in just the taxpayer's 
home state. This may discourage Maryland 
residents from engaging in income-earning 
activity that touches other states. In the 
context of S corporations, it may encourage 
Maryland residents to invest in purely local 
businesses, and discourage businesses from 
seeking to operate both in Maryland and in 
other states. In effect, it acts as an extra tax 
on interstate income-earning activities. It 
fails the internal consistency test. 
While it is true that a failure to pass the 
internal consistency test does not always 
signal a constitutional defect in a state tax 
scheme, the circumstances under which the 
courts have tolerated a lack of internal 
consistency do not pertain here. One such 
case concerned a flat $100 annual fee 
imposed by Michigan upon trucks engaged 
in intrastate commercial hauling. The 
petitioners in that case challenged the fee on 
the ground that it discriminated against 
interstate carriers and unconstitutionally 
burdened interstate trade because the fee 
was flat but trucks carrying both interstate 
and intrastate loads engaged in less intrastate 
business than trucks carrying only intrastate 
loads. The Supreme Court held that the fee 
did not violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause. In analyzing the internal consistency 
of the tax, the Court concluded that, if every 
state imposed such a fee, an interstate 
trucker doing local business in multiple 
states would have to pay hundreds or 
thousands of dollars in fees if it 
supplemented its interstate business by 
carrying local loads in many other states, 
thus an internal inconsistency. The Court 
nonetheless found no Commerce Clause 
violation because a business would have to 
incur such fees only because it engaged in 
local business in all those states. “An 
interstate firm with local outlets normally 
expects to pay local fees that are uniformly 
assessed upon all those who engage in local 
business, interstate and domestic firms 
alike.” Such a fee, in effect a toll on in-state 
activity, is factually distinguishable from the 
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present case involving business performed 
and income earned outside of Maryland. 
Moreover, we are not aware of an instance 
in which a court has upheld an 
unapportioned income tax on the authority 
of American Trucking. 
The Comptroller advances an alternative 
argument. Because an individual can only be 
a resident of one county in the universe,
 
even if every taxing jurisdiction adopted 
Maryland's tax structure, the individual 
would only be required to pay a county tax 
once. This, argues the Comptroller, 
precludes the possibility of multiple taxation 
by operation of the county tax. However, 
this analysis appears to be inconsistent with 
the logic underlying this Court's holding 
in Frey that the Maryland SNRT is a state 
tax for constitutional purposes. Moreover, 
under dormant Commerce Clause analysis, 
there are generally only two levels of 
regulation, state and federal. The 
Comptroller's analysis posits a third level, 
the local level, such that a local tax need 
only be considered in the light of local taxes 
in other jurisdictions. But there appears to be 
no authority in the case law for this position. 
(b) Is the county tax without a credit 
externally consistent? 
The next question is whether the current 
county tax scheme is externally 
consistent. For this test, one must assess 
“whether the State has taxed only that 
portion of the revenues from the interstate 
activity which reasonably reflects the in-
state component of the activity being taxed.” 
This test looks to a state's “economic 
justification” for its claim on the value taxed 
“to discover whether a state's tax reaches 
beyond that portion of value that is fairly 
attributable to economic activity within the 
taxing state.” “[T]he threat of real multiple 
taxation (though not by literally identical 
statutes) may indicate a state's impermissible 
overreaching.”  
Thus, to test for external consistency one 
asks: Does tax liability under the Maryland 
income tax code reasonably reflect how 
income is generated? Because no credit is 
given with respect to the county tax for 
income earned out-of-state, the Maryland 
tax code does not apportion income subject 
to that tax even when that income is derived 
entirely from out-of-state sources. Thus, 
when income sourced to out-of-state 
activities is subject to the county tax, there is 
a potential for multiple taxation of the same 
income. In those circumstances, the 
operation of the county tax appears to create 
external inconsistency. This is further 
indication that the application of the tax in 
these circumstances without application of 
an appropriate credit violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause. 
(2) Does the County Tax Discriminate 
against Interstate Commerce? 
Under the third prong of the Complete 
Auto test, a tax must not discriminate against 
interstate commerce. Even if a tax is fairly 
apportioned, it “may violate the Commerce 
Clause if it is facially discriminatory, has a 
discriminatory intent, or has the effect of 
unduly burdening interstate commerce.” A 
state tax may not discriminate against a 
transaction because the transaction has an 
interstate element or because the transaction 
or incident crosses state lines. A taxing 
scheme that encourages interstate businesses 
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to conduct more of their business activities 
within the taxing state may be found to be 
discriminatory. Facially discriminatory state 
taxes are subject to the strictest scrutiny, and 
the “burden of justification is so heavy that 
‘facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal 
defect.’ ” There is no “de minimis ” 
justification if a tax is found to actually 
discriminate against interstate commerce. 
Discriminatory effect may lie in the tax 
itself, but it may also arise from interactions 
with other states' taxes. 
Particularly pertinent to the present case is 
the Supreme Court's analysis of a North 
Carolina tax in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 
supra. North Carolina imposed an 
“intangibles tax” on the value of corporate 
stock owned by North Carolina residents. 
The tax was computed as a fraction of the 
value of the stock, with the tax rate reduced 
to the extent that the corporation's income 
was subject to tax in North Carolina. This 
resulted in a North Carolina stockholder 
being taxed at a higher rate for holdings in 
companies that did not do business in North 
Carolina and at lower rates for holdings in 
companies that did business in North 
Carolina. The Supreme Court held that the 
tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause 
because it discriminated against interstate 
commerce. In striking down the tax, the 
Court stated: “[A] regime that taxes stock 
only to the degree that its issuing 
corporation participates in interstate 
commerce favors domestic corporations 
over their foreign competitors in raising 
capital among North Carolina residents....”  
This case presents a similar situation. The 
application of the county tax to the out-of-
state pass-through income without 
application of a credit for out-of-state 
income taxes on the same income means 
that Maryland shareholders—the Wynnes in 
this case—may be taxed at a higher rate on 
income earned through Maxim's out-of-state 
activities than on income earned though its 
Maryland activities. This would appear to 
favor businesses that do business primarily 
in Maryland over their competitors who do 
business primarily out-of-state—at least in 
the context of ownership of a Subchapter S 
corporation. The only difference 
between Fulton and the present case is one 
of form. Whereas in Fulton it was North 
Carolina's own tax rate that varied, in the 
present case it is the imposition of an 
additional tax, the tax set by the state where 
the income was earned—and the failure to 
provide a credit for it in Maryland—that 
creates the discrimination. Nonetheless, the 
effect is the same. 
While the failure to allow a credit is at the 
heart of the discrimination in this case, not 
every denial of a deduction or credit for 
taxes paid to another jurisdiction results in a 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
In Amerada Hess v. New Jersey Dept. of the 
Treasury, the Supreme Court evaluated the 
constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that 
denied to oil-producing companies a 
deduction for amounts paid under the federal 
windfall profits tax. Holding that the tax did 
not violate the Commerce Clause, the Court 
noted, “a deduction denial does not unduly 
burden interstate commerce just because the 
deduction denied relates to an economic 
activity performed outside the taxing State.” 
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Amerada Hess is distinguishable from the 
present case however. At issue in Amerada 
Hess was a state deduction for a federal 
income tax—a tax that a business would be 
subject to no matter where it was located in 
the United States, whether within New 
Jersey or elsewhere. By denying a tax credit 
in that case, New Jersey treated all similarly-
situated taxpayers equally because a 
business was subject to the same rate 
regardless of whether the windfall profits 
were earned within New Jersey or 
elsewhere. By contrast, the failure to provide 
a credit against the county tax in this case 
penalizes investment in a Maryland entity 
that earns income out-of-state: an 
investment in such a venture incurs both 
out-of-state taxes and the Maryland county 
tax on the same income; a similar venture 
that does all its business in Maryland incurs 
only the county tax. 
The tax at issue in this case is also similar to 
the one in Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily. 
There, a Louisiana statute had the 
discriminatory effect of imposing a greater 
tax on goods manufactured outside 
Louisiana than on goods manufactured 
within that state, thereby creating an 
incentive to locate the manufacturing 
process within Louisiana. Although the 
mechanism is different, the application of 
the credit in Maryland's income tax law has 
a similar discriminatory effect. The more a 
Maryland business can locate its value-
creating activities within Maryland the less 
it will be taxed. 
Thus, the application of the county tax to 
pass-through S corporation income sourced 
in other states that tax that income, without 
application of an appropriate credit, 
discriminates against interstate commerce.
 
Conclusion 
For the reasons explained above, the failure 
of the Maryland income tax law to allow a 
credit against the county tax for a Maryland 
resident taxpayer with respect to pass-
through income of an S corporation that 
arises from activities in another state and 
that is taxed in that state violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause of the federal 
Constitution.
 
As for relief, the Wynnes suggest in their 
brief that the Maryland county income tax, 
the credit, or some part of the Maryland tax 
scheme be “struck down.” In fact, the 
county income tax itself is not 
unconstitutional. Nor is the credit, which 
serves to ensure that the Maryland income 
tax scheme operates within constitutional 
constraints. Nor is the Maryland income tax 
law generally. What is unconstitutional is 
the application—or lack thereof—of the 
credit to the county income tax. As this 
Court explained in some detail in Blanton, a 
credit previously applied to the county 
income tax in these circumstances. The 
county income tax was only eliminated from 
the computation and application of the credit 
by a 1975 amendment of the tax code. 
Chapter 3, Laws of Maryland 1975. It is that 
amendment, when applied to the particular 
circumstances of taxpayers like the Wynnes, 
that contravenes the Constitution. On 
remand from the Circuit Court, the Tax 
Court should recalculate the Wynnes' tax 
liability in a manner consistent with this 
opinion. 
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JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT 
COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY 
AFFIRMED WITH DIRECTION TO 
REMAND TO THE TAX COURT FOR 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. 
COSTS TO BE SHARED EQUALLY BY 
THE PARTIES. 
BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ., dissent. 
GREENE, J., dissenting, in 
which BATTAGLIA, J., joins. 
I disagree with the Majority's conclusion 
that the federal Constitution's dormant 
Commerce Clause requires Maryland to 
reduce the Wynnes' county taxes. Since the 
early Nineteenth Century, the law has been: 
[T]he power of taxation is one of vital 
importance ... retained by the states.... 
[T]he power of taxing the people and 
their property[ ] is essential to the very 
existence of government, and may be 
legitimately exercised on the objects to 
which it is applicable, to the utmost 
extent to which the government may 
choose to carry it. The only security 
against the abuse of this power, is found 
in the structure of the government itself. 
In imposing a tax, the legislature acts 
upon its constituents. This is, in general, 
a sufficient security against erroneous 
and oppressive taxation. 
The Wynnes may not agree that they should 
pay the Howard County tax without a credit 
pursuant to TG § 10–703. This, however, is 
an issue for the elected officials of Howard 
County and the State, not this Court. “It is 
not a purpose of the Commerce Clause to 
protect state residents from their own state 
taxes.” The Maryland General Assembly's 
decision to apply a credit for taxes paid in 
other states to the Wynnes' state tax, and not 
their county tax, does not run afoul of the 
federal Constitution's dormant Commerce 
Clause. 
The Wynnes live in Howard County where 
they benefit from the services provided by 
that county. To pay for these services, 
Howard County, like every county in 
Maryland, including Baltimore City, 
assesses a tax. As the Majority notes, TG § 
10–703 does not permit the Wynnes to apply 
a credit for taxes paid in other states to 
reduce the Howard County tax. Rather, as 
we said in Comptroller v. Blanton, residents 
of a Maryland county are required to pay for 
that county's services by paying the county 
tax without the credit. Otherwise, “if the 
taxpayers were allowed to pay a lesser 
amount of county income tax, it ‘would have 
the possible absurd result of the [taxpayers] 
paying little or no local tax for services 
provided by the county while a neighbor 
with similar income, exemptions, and 
deductions might be paying a substantial 
local tax to support those services.’ ” 
The Majority acknowledges that Maryland 
law prohibits the Wynnes from applying a 
credit for taxes paid to other states to reduce 
their county taxes. The Majority, however, 
concludes that imposing a county tax 
without allowing for a credit pursuant to TG 
§ 10–703 violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause because Maryland's taxing scheme 
fails two prongs of the Complete Auto four-
part test, namely that it is not fairly 
apportioned, and it discriminates against 
interstate commerce. As we have said 
before, however: 
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Declaring a statute enacted by the 
General Assembly to be 
unconstitutional and therefore 
unenforceable is an extraordinary act. 
Statutes are generally presumed to be 
Constitutional and are not to be held 
otherwise unless the Constitutional 
impediment is clear. We have said 
many times that since every 
presumption favors the validity of a 
statute, it cannot be stricken down as 
void, unless it plainly contravenes a 
provision of the Constitution. 
Because of this presumption, a heavy burden 
is on the Wynnes to prove that this Court 
should not enforce Maryland law as it is 
written. 
The Majority states that before this Court 
can decide whether the dormant Commerce 
Clause has been violated, we must “assess 
first whether the dormant Commerce Clause 
is implicated by the county tax....” Contrary 
to the Majority's conclusion, however, it 
appears that the Wynnes have failed to meet 
their burden of showing that the dormant 
Commerce Clause is implicated.
 
States have the power to impose taxes that 
may result in some overlap in taxation of 
income. As the Majority notes, “[T]he 
dormant Commerce Clause will not affect 
the application of a tax unless there is actual 
or perspective competition between entities 
in an identifiable market and state action 
that either expressly discriminates against or 
places an undue burden on interstate 
commerce. This impact must be more than 
incidental.” In the present case, the Wynnes 
have failed to prove that requiring them to 
pay a county tax without a credit either 
expressly discriminates against interstate 
commerce or places more than an incidental 
burden upon interstate commerce. 
Therefore, the Wynnes have failed to prove 
that the dormant Commerce Clause is 
implicated. 
The Howard County tax, assessed without a 
credit, does not expressly discriminate 
against interstate commerce. As the 
Comptroller argues, the Howard County tax 
is directed at income earned by residents of 
Howard County, not interstate 
commerce. And while, as the Majority 
notes, the dormant Commerce Clause “is not 
limited to circumstances where physical 
goods enter the stream of commerce[,]” the 
other cases the Majority relies on all involve 
situations where, unlike the present case, the 
law was facially discriminatory. The 
Majority looks to Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 
Edwards v. California, Boston Stock 
Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n,  and Fulton 
Corp. v. Faulkner to conclude that the 
dormant Commerce Clause is implicated. In 
all four of those cases, the challenged tax 
law facially discriminated against interstate 
commerce by either first distinguishing 
between organizations and businesses that 
were involved in interstate business and 
those organizations and businesses that were 
only involved with intrastate business, and 
then imposing a disadvantage upon those 
involved in interstate transactions, or, in the 
case of Edwards, placing a restriction upon 
people moving in interstate commerce itself. 
In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, the 
challenged Maine tax law granted a general 
exemption from real estate and personal 
property taxes for charities incorporated in 
Maine, but limited that exemption for 
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organizations that mostly served non-Maine 
residents. The law, thereby, distinguished 
between groups that served people traveling 
in interstate commerce and those that only 
served Maine residents and explicitly 
benefitted the latter. In Edwards, the 
challenged law directly implicated interstate 
commerce and travel by prohibiting the 
transportation of indigent persons across 
state lines. In Boston Stock Exchange, the 
challenged New York tax law distinguished 
between sales of securities made within New 
York and those made outside New York, 
and then imposed a lower tax rate and a cap 
on taxes for in-state sales and a higher tax 
rate and no cap on taxes for out-of-state 
sales. Finally, in Fulton Corp., North 
Carolina imposed a tax on investments in 
corporations but allowed stockholders to 
reduce their tax liability based on the 
business the corporation did in North 
Carolina. In Fulton Corp., the United States 
Supreme Court noted that the tax facially 
discriminated against interstate commerce, 
and North Carolina “practically concede[d] 
as much.”  
In the present case, nothing on the face of 
the Maryland tax laws imposing a county 
tax, TG § 10–103, or the Maryland tax law 
limiting credits for taxes paid in other states 
to state taxes, TG § 10–703, discriminates 
against interstate commerce. TG § 10–
103 imposes a county tax on all residents 
with no distinction drawn based upon the 
source of the income. And, TG § 10–703, on 
its face, provides a benefit to interstate 
commerce by applying a credit to reduce the 
amount of Maryland state taxes paid by 
residents who earned income in interstate 
commerce. The only distinction drawn 
between income earned in intrastate 
commerce and income earned in interstate 
commerce pursuant to these two laws is that 
a benefit is bestowed upon interstate 
commerce through the credit that is applied 
to state taxes. This can hardly be interpreted 
as discriminating against interstate 
commerce on the face of the law. 
The fact that Maryland's tax scheme is not 
facially discriminatory is critical to the 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis. As the 
Majority notes, “[f]acially discriminatory 
state taxes are subject to the strictest 
scrutiny, and the ‘burden of justification is 
so heavy that “facial discrimination by itself 
may be a fatal defect.” ’ ” In other words, 
when a court is examining a law that, on its 
face, draws a distinction between interstate 
and intrastate commerce and imposes a 
disadvantage to the former, the burden of 
proving that the law expressly discriminates 
against interstate commerce and that the 
dormant Commerce Clause is implicated is 
met. In this case, there is no facial 
discrimination against interstate commerce, 
and thus, the burden of proving that the 
dormant Commerce Clause is implicated 
requires a higher level of proof. 
As noted above, the Wynnes have the 
burden of proving that interstate commerce 
is implicated. The Wynnes, however, fail to 
meet this burden with the arguments they 
present. In arguing that the dormant 
Commerce Clause is implicated, the Wynnes 
primarily rely on two lines of arguments, 
both of which are inapplicable to the present 
case. 
First, the Wynnes rely on our decision 
in Frey where we concluded that the 
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“Special Nonresident Tax,” or SNRT, 
implicated the dormant Commerce Clause.
 
The SNRT is applied to nonresidents doing 
business in Maryland. On its face, the SNRT 
singles out income from interstate 
commerce and applies a tax on that income. 
It is thus a “facially discriminatory state tax[ 
],” and subject to “the strictest scrutiny[.]” 
The county tax, on the other hand, draws no 
distinction between income earned in 
interstate and intrastate commerce and is not 
facially discriminatory. Therefore, unlike the 
SNRT, the county tax does not expressly 
discriminate against interstate commerce 
and our conclusion in Frey that the SNRT 
implicated the dormant Commerce Clause is 
inapplicable to the present case. 
Second, the Wynnes rely on Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Fulton Corp., and a 
case from the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, Chapman v. Comm'r of Revenue. As 
noted above, Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna and Fulton Corp. 
address facially discriminatory laws. 
Likewise, Chapman addresses a facially 
discriminatory law. The law in question 
allowed Minnesota taxpayers to take a tax 
deduction for contributions to charities 
“located in and carrying on substantially all 
of its activities within [Minnesota],” but did 
not allow a tax deduction for contributions 
to non-Minnesota charities. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court stated that “[o]n its face, the 
statute treats contributions to in-state 
charitable organizations differently from 
contributions to out-of-state charitable 
organizations,” and concluded that it was 
“facially discriminatory.” As noted above, a 
law that facially discriminates against 
interstate commerce necessarily implicates 
the dormant Commerce Clause. Maryland's 
tax scheme, which is not facially 
discriminatory, however, does not 
necessarily implicate the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Therefore, like Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna and Fulton Corp., the 
conclusion that the law 
in Chapman implicated the dormant 
Commerce Clause is inapplicable to the 
present case. 
In the absence of facial or express 
discrimination, an undue burden on 
interstate commerce must be shown. 
In Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of 
Taxation, New Jersey, the Supreme Court, in 
considering New Jersey's denial of a state 
tax deduction for federal windfall profit tax 
payments, observed that “in the absence of 
discriminatory intent or a statute directed 
specifically at economic activity that occurs 
only in a particular location ... a deduction 
denial does not unduly burden interstate 
commerce just because the deduction denied 
relates to an economic activity performed 
outside the taxing State.” The Wynnes, in 
failing to prove discriminatory intent or 
unacceptable statutory geographical 
specificity, have demonstrated neither an 
undue burden on interstate commerce nor an 
implication of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. 
The Blanton decision conclusively 
established that Maryland law applies TG § 
10–703's tax credit only to state taxes, not 
county taxes. The Wynnes asked this Court 
to conclude that settled Maryland law is 
unconstitutional under the dormant 
Commerce Clause. The presumption has 
always been that Maryland law is 
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constitutional, and the Wynnes, as 
challengers of the Maryland tax law, have 
failed to overcome that presumption by 
proving that Maryland's tax scheme 
expressly discriminates against or unduly 
burdens interstate commerce such that the 
dormant Commerce Clause is implicated. 
The Wynnes may believe that it is bad 
policy to require them to pay the Howard 
County tax without a tax credit; however, 
they have failed to prove that it is in 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
Judge BATTAGLIA joins in the views 
expressed herein. 
Opinion on Motion for Reconsideration 
by McDONALD, J. 
The Comptroller has filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration and, Alternatively, a 
Motion for Stay of Enforcement of the 
Judgment. The Wynnes opposed that 
motion. The parties filed memoranda of law 
and other materials in support of their 
respective positions. 
It appears appropriate to clarify two points 
raised in the papers submitted by the parties: 
(1) The Comptroller raised the question of 
whether he could deny application of a 
credit to the Wynnes for income taxes paid 
by an S corporation, such as Maxim, in 
another state that does not accord pass-
through treatment to S corporation income, 
but rather taxes the income of such a 
corporation in the same way that it taxes the 
income of a C corporation. The parties did 
not brief, and we did not consider, the ways 
in which other states may treat S corporation 
income other than as pass-through personal 
income of the corporation's shareholders. 
Our opinion does not foreclose different 
treatment in Maryland of income taxes paid 
in other states that are not based on pass 
through personal income. 
(2) A state may avoid discrimination against 
interstate commerce by providing a tax 
credit, or some other method of 
apportionment, to avoid discriminating 
against interstate commerce in violation of 
the dormant Commerce Clause. The 
Comptroller interprets a footnote in our 
earlier opinion to hold that a state must 
provide a tax credit. While the footnote 
might have been worded more elegantly, it 
referred primarily to the method used by the 
Legislature in the Maryland income tax; we 
did not mean to preclude other methods that 
might be utilized in other contexts. 
The Motion for Reconsideration is 
DENIED; however, we shall STAY the 
effective date of the mandate pending the 
disposition of a timely petition for certiorari 
filed by the Comptroller with the United 
States Supreme Court. 
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“Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Landmark Case on Whether States May Tax 
Income Earned in Other States” 
Forbes 
Kelly Phillips Erb 
May 28, 2014 
 
The Supreme Court had a busy day on 
Tuesday. When the dust settled, however, it 
had only granted one new case – but it was a 
big one. The nation’s highest 
court granted certiorari to Comptroller v. 
Wynne, setting the stage for a fight that 
could rewrite tax laws in states across the 
country. 
As noted before, lawyers and judges like to 
use Latin. Granting certiorari (or “granting 
cert” for the really cool hipster lawyers) 
means that the Supreme Court will hear the 
matter. 
Some cases have what’s called “original 
jurisdiction” in the Supreme Court; those 
cases, which are defined by statute (28 
U.S.C. § 1251) go straight to the Supreme 
Court. The typical case associated with 
original jurisdiction would be a dispute 
between the states. Most cases, however, 
don’t go that route. To be heard at the 
Supreme Court level without having original 
jurisdiction requires the losing party at the 
appellate level to file a petition seeking a 
review of the case. If the Supreme Court 
grants the petition and decides to hear the 
matter, it’s called a writ of certiorari. And 
that’s what happened here. 
The question presented in the Petition for 
Certiorari in Wynne is: 
Does the United States Constitution 
prohibit a state from taxing all the income 
of its residents — wherever earned — by 
mandating a credit for taxes paid on 
income earned in other states? 
Procedurally, the question found its way to 
the Supreme Court after the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland “reached the 
unprecedented conclusion” that a state is in 
violation of the Commerce Clause in the 
U.S. Constitution if it collects income taxes 
from its residents when the income was 
earned from sources in another state and is 
subject to tax by the other state. 
In this case, a married couple, the Wynnes, 
reported taxable net income of 
approximately $2.7 million. More than half 
of that amount represented a share of 
earnings in an S corporation with operations 
in several states. The Wynnes claimed a 
credit on their Maryland tax returns for taxes 
paid to 39 other states but not for any county 
or local government taxes. The State of 
Maryland denied the credits and issued a 
notice of deficiency and the Wynnes 
appealed. At a hearing, the assessment was 
affirmed. 
Eventually, the Wynnes amended their 
petition to claim that the tax credit statute 
was in violation of the Commerce Clause of 
the United State Constitution. That claim 
was rejected. At appeal, the Wynnes argued 
that the state of Maryland was 
constitutionally required to extend the credit 
for taxes paid to other states to the county as 
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well as the state, raising the question of 
whether a state had the unconditional right 
to tax all income based on residency. The 
Circuit Court agreed with the Wynnes. 
On appeal by the state, the Court of Appeals 
agreed with the Circuit Court. The Court 
wrote that, based on its belief that the 
Constitution prohibits “double taxation” of 
income earned in interstate commerce, a 
state may not tax all the income of its 
residents, wherever earned. 
That decision, it was argued by the state, 
conflicted with a number of “fundamental 
precepts” involving the “well-established 
principle” that “a jurisdiction… may tax all 
the income of its residents, even income 
earned outside the taxing jurisdiction.” 
However, in Wynne, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the Commerce Clause 
imposes restrictions on a state’s power to tax 
its own residents: in other words, Maryland 
was not allowed to tax all of its residents’ 
income if the resident paid taxes on that 
income to another State. 
The state argued that this finding was 
inconsistent with prior law and was, in a 
word, wrong. The consequences, according 
to the state’s petition, could be the 
“significant loss of revenue that will amount 
to tens of millions of dollars annually.” 
And that’s why you should care. Not only 
does this decision have consequences for 
Maryland but it “has potential repercussions 
beyond Maryland,” according to the 
petitioner. The reply brief for the petitioner 
specifically notes that “while most states 
provide full credits for income taxes paid to 
other states, many local jurisdictions do 
not.” The result, if the Wynne decision 
holds, according to the state is that “any 
jurisdiction taxing its residents’ entire 
income will face needless uncertainty about 
the viability of its tax system and its 
potential exposure to onerous refund 
claims.” 
In other words, an affirmation could cost 
local and state governments millions of 
dollars. 
The loss shouldn’t matter, according to 
Dominic Perella, a lawyer with Hogan 
Lovells who is representing the Wynnes. He 
said, about the case: “Maryland’s approach 
is unfair to people who make money in more 
than one state.” 
The question is big enough for the feds to 
weigh in. The Obama administration issued 
an amicus curiae brief in April of this year, 
supporting the petitioner’s position. Amicus 
curiae is Latin (yes, more Latin) for “friend 
of the court” and describes an argument 
made by someone who is not a specific party 
to the proceedings but believes that the 
court’s decision may affect its interest. 
Under the Rules of the Supreme Court of the 
U.S., “An amicus curiae brief that brings to 
the attention of the Court relevant matter not 
already brought to its attention by the parties 
may be of considerable help to the Court. 
An amicus curiae brief that does not serve 
this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing 
is not favored.” 
The feds argued in their brief that “though 
States often choose to grant tax credits to 
their residents for income taxes paid in other 
States, nothing in the Commerce Clause 
compels a State to offer such credits or 
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otherwise defer to other States in the 
taxation of its own residents’ income.” 
Further, “[t]he decision… may lead to 
challenges to similar tax schemes in other 
jurisdictions; and is inconsistent with 
statements made by the highest courts in 
other States.” 
The U.S. Supreme Court clearly agreed that 
this was a matter that needed to be resolved. 
Granting cert doesn’t mean that the court 
believes that the petitioner is correct: the 
regular court rules apply. There will be 
arguments and more (!) briefs before the 
Court reaches a decision. 
These matters do not move quickly: you 
shouldn’t expect oral arguments on this 
matter until fall of this year. But expect 
plenty of speculation – and interest – before 
then. 
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“Supreme Court to Hear Maryland Double Taxation Case” 
Tax Foundation 
Joseph Henchman 
May 27, 2014 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has announced that 
it will hear the appeal in Comptroller v. 
Wynne, on whether states must provide a 
credit against its own taxes for taxes a 
resident pays to another state. Maryland 
allows such a credit against its state income 
tax but not against its local county and city 
income taxes. 
The taxpayers in the case, Mr. and Mrs. 
Wynne, owned 2.4 percent of a company 
doing business in 39 states. Maryland 
residents, they paid $123,434 in income tax 
to Maryland, after applying a credit of 
$84,550 for taxes paid to other states on 
income earned outside Maryland's borders. 
Maryland disallowed the credit to the extent 
that it offset the county income tax. The Tax 
Court upheld the assessment, a Maryland 
circuit court reversed and sided with the 
Wynnes, and Maryland's highest court (the 
Court of Appeals) agreed, ruling the tax 
unconstitutional without a credit. The state 
has now appealed to the Supreme Court. 
It's hard to think of a more blatant example 
of impermissible state taxation of interstate 
commerce than Maryland's tax here. 
Maryland certainly has the authority to tax 
the Wynnes -- they are Maryland residents -- 
but gets into constitutional trouble when it 
asserts the power to tax income earned 
outside Maryland. Until this case, it has 
generally been undisputed by scholars that 
such a tax is only permissible if the state 
credits the taxpayer for taxes paid to another 
state. Otherwise, states would be able to 
subject the same income to double-, triple-, 
quadruple-, etc. levels of taxation. The net 
result of this would be to strongly 
discourage interstate investment and 
commerce of the type the Wynnes 
undertook, since only by investing within 
Maryland would income not be subject to 
gargantuan levels of taxation. 
Analyzing whether Maryland's tax is 
constitutional is a two-step process. First, 
one must ask whether the state has the 
authority to impose the tax on income. This 
is fairly well-settled, with the statute 
authorizing the tax and numerous court 
precedents allowing states to tax their 
residents however they wish, with any 
credits or deductions a matter of legislative 
grace. Second, though, one must ask 
whether the tax discriminates against 
interstate commerce. This has been 
sometimes described as an "internal 
consistency test" -- if every state had such a 
tax, would the result be discrimination 
against interstate commerce? The answer 
here is unequivocally yes. The state (and the 
U.S. Solicitor General, who was asked for 
his views) performed step one of this 
analysis but did not do step two. Their 
arguments would get an F grade in any state 
taxation class as incomplete. 
17 states have local income taxes, and while 
most provide a credit for taxes paid to 
another state, they probably do so because 
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they think they have to, constitutionally. An 
adverse ruling here will quickly result in 
taxpayers being taxed on the state income 
over and over by any state with any tax 
authority over them. Although this case 
relates to local income taxes, there is no 
logical reason why the rule should be 
different for state income taxes. 
It would have been best if the Court declined 
to hear the case and let the Maryland Court 
of Appeals ruling stand. As they have now 
agreed to hear it, the Court should take a 
strong stand against states using their tax 
systems to discriminate against interstate 
commerce. We will make such an argument 
in our amicus brief. (Both the Maryland 
Attorney General and Wynne cited our 2011 
local income tax study in their briefs to the 
Court.) 
The case is No. 13-485, Comptroller of the 
Treasury of Maryland v. Brian Wynne, et ux. 
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“The Resident Income Tax Credit: Did Maryland Misapply the Commerce 
Clause?” 
TaxAnalysts 
Robert J. Firestone 
June 2, 2014 
 
I. Introduction 
If a resident individual of State A seeks 
employment in State B, or owns income-
producing property or opens a business in 
State B, does that individual's status as 
nonresident, standing alone, constitute 
interstate commerce subjecting State B's 
nonresident income tax to the strictest 
scrutiny under the U.S. Constitution's 
dormant commerce clause? Or does the 
privileges and immunities clause of Article 
IV apply, with its heightened "substantial 
equality" level of scrutiny? 
It is clear that both constitutional provisions 
cannot apply in that instance. If the mere 
status of an individual as a nonresident 
constitutes interstate commerce and invokes 
the stricter protections of the dormant 
commerce clause, then the privileges and 
immunities clause would be eclipsed and 
effectively nullified in every instance. The 
substantial equality standard of review 
would never apply when the issue involves 
discrimination against nonresident 
individuals. 
Under basic principles of legal construction, 
express language generally controls over 
language that is implied. The dormant 
commerce clause is not an express 
constitutional provision, but has been 
implied as a means of delineating the federal 
and state powers to regulate interstate 
commerce. The dormant commerce clause, 
therefore, shouldn't be construed so broadly 
as to nullify the privileges and immunities 
clause, an express constitutional provision 
long construed to protect nonresident 
individuals. 
Also, do the two constitutional provisions 
really cover the same subjects? Does the 
scope of the dormant commerce clause, 
which protects an interstate business in its 
choice of where to locate its business 
operations,
 
also extend to the personal 
choices of nonresident individuals who 
choose to work, or otherwise earn their 
income, in a state different from where they 
live? 
It is well established that the dormant 
commerce clause protects from 
discrimination interstate business 
transactions and business location decisions, 
that is, "a State may not tax a transaction or 
incident more heavily when it crosses state 
lines than when it occurs entirely within the 
State." By contrast, an individual's choice of 
where to live is a personal decision. Federal 
income tax rules, for instance, treat the cost 
of commuting from home to work as a 
personal and not a deductible business 
expense. 
Thus, while the decision to locate 
manufacturing operations in one state 
instead of another is protected by the 
dormant commerce clause, the privileges 
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and immunities clause of Article IV protects 
nonresident individuals from discrimination, 
that is, the personal choice to live in one 
state and work in another. 
In Maryland v. Wynne, the Maryland Court 
of Appeals held that when an individual, a 
resident of Maryland, earns income in other 
states, the mere status of being a nonresident 
in those other states, within the jurisdiction 
of those other states' nonresident income tax 
laws, constitutes interstate commerce, 
implicating the dormant commerce clause. 
Although Wynne concerned the taxpayer's 
investment in an S corporation, its reasoning 
extends to all income within the scope of a 
nonresident income tax, including wages 
and salaries earned in the course of 
commuting from home to work. 
On May 27 the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
the state's petition for writ of certiorari. If 
the Court upholds Wynne, it will essentially 
nullify the privileges and immunities clause 
of Article IV. Every discrimination claim 
based on nonresidency will be easily 
restated as a dormant commerce clause 
claim. States will have far less latitude in 
structuring their personal income tax laws, 
which will no longer be subject to the 
substantial equality standard, but to the 
strictest scrutiny. The federal-state balance 
will significantly change. 
Although the issue in Wynne concerns tax 
credits, it has far broader implications. Most 
states grant their residents personal income 
tax credits for other states' nonresident 
income taxes. They do so for political 
reasons, so their voting residents will not see 
their incomes and personal wealth 
diminished by two separate tax jurisdictions 
with equally defensible claims to that 
income. 
A state's taxing jurisdiction over its 
residents, based on the special privileges of 
citizenship, is over the person, and extends 
to all of the resident's income, regardless of 
where it is earned. A state's taxing 
jurisdiction over nonresidents is narrower -- 
limited to the nonresidents' income-
producing activities and property within the 
state. A resident who earns income in 
another state that imposes a nonresident 
income tax will always be taxed twice, by 
the state of residence and by the state in 
which the income was earned. Neither state's 
jurisdictional claim is superior to the other, 
nor would favoring one state over the other 
be fair. For example, requiring the state of 
residence to credit taxes paid to other states 
would forfeit the state of residence's just 
claim to that revenue, and would treat the 
state of residence unfairly. 
The due process clause of the 14th 
Amendment does not bar the double taxation 
of income. In sum, the dormant commerce 
clause does not apply here because (1) it 
would be an unprecedented expansion of its 
scope, from protecting interstate business 
transactions and business location decisions, 
to protecting the personal choices of 
individuals who earn income in a state 
different from where they live, and (2) it 
would completely eclipse the privileges and 
immunities clause of Article IV, rendering it 
a nullity, and change the federal-state 
balance in favor of lessening the states' 
power to tax nonresidents. 
II. The Facts of Wynne 
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The Wynnes were 2.4 percent shareholders 
in a corporation, Maxim Healthcare Services 
Inc., which was engaged in a multistate 
healthcare business. Maxim made an 
election under the Internal Revenue Code to 
be taxed as an S corporation. As a result, 
Maxim paid no federal income tax, and its 
income was passed through to its 
shareholders and subject to federal income 
tax at the shareholder level. 
For the 2006 tax year, Maxim filed state 
corporate income tax returns in 39 states, 
and it allocated to each shareholder a pro 
rata share of the taxes paid to each of those 
states. The Wynnes claimed their pro rata 
share of Maxim's corporate income taxes 
paid to other states as a credit against their 
Maryland resident state and county income 
taxes. The Maryland comptroller denied the 
portion of the Wynnes' credit that applied to 
the resident county income tax. The 
resulting tax deficiency was affirmed by the 
Hearings and Appeals Bureau of the 
Comptroller's Office. 
The Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Tax 
Court, where they argued that the failure to 
grant a credit for income taxes paid to other 
states against the county income tax 
discriminated against interstate commerce, 
in violation of the dormant commerce 
clause. The tax court rejected that argument 
and affirmed the assessment. The Wynnes 
appealed to the circuit court, which reversed 
the tax court. The case was eventually 
appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals. 
III. The Maryland Appeals Court 
Decision 
The Wynnes conceded Maryland's 
jurisdiction, under the due process clause, to 
tax all of their income, regardless of where it 
was earned. The sole issue before the 
Maryland Appeals Court was whether 
Maryland's failure to grant a tax credit 
against its county income tax for taxes paid 
to other states violated the dormant 
commerce clause. 
As an initial matter, the court considered 
whether the dormant commerce clause 
applies to individuals who maintain their 
personal residences in Maryland, but earn 
income in other states that impose 
nonresident income taxes. The comptroller 
argued that the Wynnes were subject to the 
Maryland income tax on individuals because 
of their status as Maryland residents, and not 
because of their activities in Maryland or in 
other states. 
The court rejected that argument, holding 
that the Wynnes were subject to the 
Maryland income tax both because they 
were Maryland residents and "because they 
have income derived from intrastate and 
interstate activities." Because of their 
interstate activities, "other states may also 
tax some of that income because it derives 
from activities in those states." However, it 
is well established that a state's power to tax 
persons residing within the state is based 
solely on their status as citizens or residents 
and is without regard to their activities or to 
the source of their income. 
The Maryland court thus mischaracterized 
the Maryland resident income tax on 
individuals as a tax on the individual's 
activities. To the contrary, Maryland's taxing 
power over persons residing within its 
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jurisdiction is based only on their residency 
status. When Maryland taxes its residents, it 
is taxing them in their person, not their 
activities, whether conducted out-of-state or 
otherwise. If not for the Wynnes' status as 
residents, Maryland would be powerless to 
tax them on their out-of-state activities, 
which would be outside of Maryland's 
taxing jurisdiction. To the extent that the 
Maryland court's reasoning depended on its 
characterization of the resident income tax 
as a tax on interstate activities, its 
conclusion that the resident tax implicates 
interstate commerce was erroneous. 
If Maryland isn't taxing activities in other 
states, but merely the persons within its 
power, it is difficult to see how the resident 
income tax implicates interstate commerce. 
In concluding that it does, the Maryland 
court compared a Maryland resident "who 
earns substantial income from out-of-state 
activities" with "an otherwise identical 
taxpayer" who earns all of his income in 
Maryland. The court explained that "the first 
taxpayer may pay more state and local 
income taxes than the second. That creates a 
disincentive for the taxpayer -- or the S 
Corporation of which the taxpayer is an 
owner -- to conduct income-generating 
activities in other states with income taxes." 
The Maryland Court of Appeals makes 
several assumptions here that are speculative 
at best and that raise several concerns. In 
comparing a Maryland resident individual 
who earns substantial income from out of 
state with an identical taxpayer who earns 
income entirely from Maryland activities, 
even the court realizes, by its use of the 
word "may," that the first taxpayer will not 
necessarily pay more in state and local taxes 
than the second taxpayer. Not every state 
imposes a personal income tax. Thus, if the 
first taxpayer earns substantial income in a 
state that does not impose a nonresident 
income tax, then it will pay the same amount 
of state and local taxes as the taxpayer who 
earns income entirely from Maryland 
activities. 
While the factual basis for that comparison 
is speculative, it raises a greater concern -- 
the comparison between the two 
hypothetical taxpayers residing in Maryland 
depends entirely on another state's tax law, 
which is beyond the control of the Maryland 
General Assembly and in which Maryland 
has no sovereign interest. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has made it clear that the 
constitutionality of one state's tax laws can 
never depend on the tax laws in other 
states. If Maryland has full jurisdiction to 
tax its individual residents in their person on 
all of their income, regardless of where it 
was earned, does Maryland have to forfeit 
that power to another state having an equally 
founded jurisdiction over their activities, if 
that state imposes a nonresident income tax? 
Under the court's reasoning, the state of 
residency and the source state would not be 
treated as coequal sovereigns, elevating the 
power of the source state to the detriment of 
the state of residency. Moreover, the tax 
laws of the state of residency would be 
dependent on the tax laws of the source 
state. The state of residency would forfeit its 
taxing power if that other state's legislature 
enacts a nonresident income tax. 
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IV. The Maryland Resident Income Tax 
Credit Doesn't Affect Interstate 
Commerce 
In concluding that Maryland's resident 
income tax creates a disincentive for the 
taxpayer to conduct income-generating 
activities in other states with income taxes, 
the Maryland court relied on Fulton Corp. v. 
Faulkner.
 
Fulton involved a credit under 
North Carolina's intangibles property tax 
that decreased as the stock issuer did a 
greater proportion of its business outside the 
state. The Fulton Court held that "the 
intangibles tax facially discriminates against 
interstate commerce" because a "regime that 
taxes stock only to the degree that its issuing 
corporation participates in interstate 
commerce favors domestic corporations 
over their foreign competitors in raising 
capital among North Carolina residents and 
tends, at least, to discourage domestic 
corporations from plying their trades in 
interstate commerce." 
The tax credit in Fulton operated as a classic 
tariff, benefiting corporate stock issuers that 
do most of their business within North 
Carolina by burdening issuers that do most 
of their business outside of the state. The 
Maryland court erred by comparing 
Maryland's individual income tax on 
residents to the intangibles tax in Fulton. 
Unlike the intangibles tax credit, which 
decreased as the issuer corporation 
expanded its business in interstate 
commerce, the resident income tax remains 
the same, regardless of whether a Maryland 
resident earns $100,000 of income in 
Maryland or the same amount of income in 
another state. 
In order to conclude that a Maryland 
resident pays a higher tax if it earns income 
in another state, the Maryland court had to 
look past the Maryland resident income tax 
to the nonresident income tax imposed by 
another jurisdiction. Again, the 
constitutionality of Maryland's tax laws can't 
depend on the tax laws of other states. 
Unlike the intangibles tax in Fulton, the 
Maryland resident income tax doesn't create 
a disincentive for the taxpayer to conduct 
income-generating activities in other states. 
The result in Fulton didn't depend on the tax 
laws in effect in other states, but only on the 
discriminatory effect of North Carolina's 
intangibles tax standing alone. Standing 
alone, Maryland's resident income tax 
doesn't affect interstate commerce. The 
court's contrary conclusion was based on a 
reading of the dormant commerce clause 
long rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
V. The Maryland Resident Income Tax 
Doesn't Affect Interstate Travel 
A Maryland resident who travels to another 
state to earn income pays the same amount 
of Maryland resident income tax as a 
Maryland resident who earns all of his 
income in Maryland. Notwithstanding the 
Maryland court's contrary conclusion, 
Maryland's resident income tax, standing 
alone, doesn't implicate "the movement of 
people across state borders for economic 
purposes." 
The court of appeals appears to have 
read Camps Newfound v. Town of Harrison
 
as a case that applies the dormant commerce 
clause to individuals who travel or commute 
across state lines to earn income in another 
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state.Camps Newfound, however, wasn't a 
right of travel case but concerned an export 
tariff on services. In Camps Newfound, 
Maine's real property tax exemption for 
charitable organizations was limited to 
charities that principally served Maine 
residents. The taxpayer, a Christian Science 
summer camp that aggressively marketed its 
picturesque Maine facilities around the 
country, generated 95 percent of its business 
from campers residing in other states. 
Because the camp mainly served 
nonresidents, Maine denied the camp's 
property tax exemption. 
The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Maine's 
property tax exemption on the grounds that 
"it functionally serves as an export tariff that 
targets out-of-state consumers by taxing the 
businesses that principally serve them." The 
camp had aggressively reached out to 
consumers in other states, from which it 
received practically all of its campers; the 
discriminatory exemption had the practical 
effect of an export tariff on services, sharing 
the same fate as an export tariff on goods. 
In concluding that Camps Newfound is a 
right of travel case, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals apparently focused on a single 
sentence responding to an argument made 
by the town of Harrison that the property tax 
exemption does not affect interstate 
commerce. Referring to the nonresident 
campers who attended the camp, the U.S. 
Supreme Court observed that "[t]he 
attendance of these campers necessarily 
generates the transportation of persons 
across state lines that has long been 
recognized as a form of 'commerce.'" 
Camps Newfound, however, does not hold 
that Maine's property tax exemption 
interfered with the campers' right to freely 
enter and leave the state, burdening the 
campers' right of travel. That wasn't the 
issue before the Court. The Court concluded 
that Maine's property tax exemption was 
functionally equivalent to an "export tariff" 
and that its practical effect was to 
discriminate against the interstate sale of 
camp services to nonresident consumers. 
The Court's reference to the interstate travel 
of the campers was one of several facts 
identified by the Court to underscore the 
interstate nature of the transactions burdened 
by the exemption. 
The Maryland court's reading of Camps 
Newfound as a right of travel case conflicts 
with U.S. Supreme Court precedent holding 
that the right isn't protected by the dormant 
commerce clause. In Bray v. Alexandria 
Women's Health Clinic, the Court held that 
the individual right of interstate travel "does 
not derive from the negative commerce 
clause, or else it could be eliminated by 
Congress." 
Saenz v. Roe divided the right of travel into 
three components: (1) the right to enter and 
leave the state; (2) the right of a citizen of 
one state who travels to another state 
intending to return home, to enjoy the same 
"Privileges and Immunities of the Citizens 
of the several States" that she visits; and (3) 
when the traveler doesn't intend to return 
home, the right to be treated like other 
citizens of that state. 
It is the second component of the right of 
travel that is at issue in Wynne. Saenz stated 
that right isn't subject to the strict scrutiny of 
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the dormant commerce clause, but to the 
lesser substantial equality standard under the 
privileges and immunities clause. 
The Maryland court, therefore, was incorrect 
in holding that the fact that an individual 
resident of one state earns income in another 
state that imposes a nonresident income tax 
implicates the dormant commerce clause. 
Rather, the privileges and immunities clause 
protects from discrimination nonresident 
individuals who seek employment or 
otherwise seek to earn income in another 
state. The court's holding to the contrary is 
an unwarranted expansion of the dormant 
commerce clause beyond its present scope, 
which changes the federal-state balance 
under our system of federalism to the 
detriment of the states, subjecting state 
individual income tax laws to the strictest 
scrutiny, while lessening the states' authority 
to tax nonresident individuals. 
VI. Distinguishing Commercial Domicile 
From Individual Residency 
Under the unitary business principle, a state 
may not tax a corporation engaged in a 
multistate business on 100 percent of the 
corporation's income. The requirement that a 
state must apportion the income of a 
corporation derived from business 
conducted in other states is grounded in both 
the due process and commerce clauses of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
Although the commerce clause plays a role 
in apportionment, limiting multiple taxation 
by requiring a state's apportionment formula 
to be internally consistent, it is plain that the 
constitutional restrictions on 
apportionability are almost entirely 
described in due process terms. In formulary 
apportionment cases, the commerce clause 
generally plays a secondary role to due 
process, in the sense that a formula that 
taxes extraterritorial values and thus violates 
due process, also results in multiple taxation 
violating the commerce clause. 
In limited circumstances, a corporation's 
state of commercial domicile may tax the 
corporation on 100 percent of its income, 
but only if that income was earned in 
activities unrelated to its unitary 
business. Otherwise, the income of a 
multistate corporation derived from a 
unitary business must be apportioned "on 
the basis of a formula taking into account 
objective measures of the corporation's 
activities within and without the 
jurisdiction." 
It might be tempting to extend the limitation 
on a state's power to tax corporate income to 
the personal income tax, thus prohibiting 
states from taxing the income of individuals 
who reside there but earn their living in 
another state.
 
Proponents of this approach 
believe it is consistent with the dormant 
commerce clause. This reading of the clause 
requires that when two states have 
jurisdiction to tax an individual, the state of 
residence over the person and another state 
over the individual's activities, the state 
having jurisdiction over the activities should 
take precedent. 
The rationale for requiring the state where 
an individual resides to yield its taxing 
power to the state where the individual earns 
his income appears to be based on three 
assumptions: (1) that there is no reason to 
treat the taxation of individuals based on 
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personal residence differently from the 
taxation of corporations based on 
commercial domicile; (2) that individuals 
who work or otherwise earn income in other 
states acquire the equivalent of a business 
situs there, which should prevail in any 
conflict with the individual's domicile; and 
(3) although the due process clause doesn't 
prohibit the double taxation of income, the 
requirement that a multistate corporation 
apportion its income to other states is 
dictated by the commerce clause. I will 
consider each in turn. 
The notion that a corporation is a person 
capable of acquiring a domicile within a 
particular state is a legal fiction that is given 
relatively little weight under the corporate 
income tax, generally yielding to the state in 
which the income is earned under the 
unitary business principle. Consistent with 
that legal fiction is the reality that a 
corporation is, in every respect, a business 
and no aspect of its legal existence can be 
deemed personal. 
Individuals, on the other hand, are real 
persons. When a state exercises its 
jurisdiction to tax individuals who maintain 
their homes within the state, send their 
children to schools, and receive the benefits 
of "police and fire protection . . . and the 
advantages of living in a civilized 
society," the state justifiably calls on those 
individuals in their strictly personal aspect to 
share the cost of providing those services. If 
those individuals happen to commute to 
work in other states, which also have a just 
claim to tax a portion of their income, that 
should not relieve those individuals of their 
obligation to pay for all of the many services 
they receive as citizens and residents of their 
home state. 
As explained above, extending the dormant 
commerce clause to the individual income 
tax would completely eclipse the privileges 
and immunities clause of Article IV and 
render it a nullity. That issue does not arise 
in the area of corporate income taxation 
because the privileges and immunities 
clause does not apply to corporations, which 
are not citizens. 
The legal fiction that a corporation is a 
person capable of having a domicile within a 
state derives from the property tax.
 
Under 
the doctrine mobilia sequuntur personam, 
intangible property is assigned a situs at the 
place of the owner's domicile under the 
assumption that the owner controls the 
property from that location. Nevertheless, 
once the intangible acquires a business situs 
in another state, that other state also has 
jurisdiction to tax the intangible. Invoking 
the commerce clause, it is argued that the 
state where the property acquired a business 
situs has the superior claim. 
That may be, but the reasoning doesn't 
extend to the personal income taxation of 
individual residents who commute to work, 
or otherwise earn income, in other states. A 
state's power to tax an individual citizen or 
resident in his person isn't a legal fiction but 
one of three jurisdictional bases for a state to 
exert its taxing power -- over the persons, 
property, or activities within its borders. 
When an individual maintains a home in one 
state and works in another, the home state 
retains its power to demand that the 
individual contribute to the cost of 
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government, regardless of the source of his 
income. 
As explained above, the requirement that a 
multistate corporation apportion its income 
is dictated primarily by the due process 
clause. That is evident by the "minimal 
connection" and "rational relationship" 
language, which is exclusively due process 
language that appears in every unitary 
business case. The only additional 
limitation, derived exclusively from the 
commerce clause, is the requirement that an 
apportionment formula be internally 
consistent to avoid multiple taxation. 
The commerce clause does not restrict state 
apportionment formulas, except to require 
that they must be internally consistent. The 
main restriction on state apportionment 
formulas derives from due process, which 
requires that the income apportioned to a 
state must be rationally related to in-state 
activity. When two states have equal 
jurisdiction, one over the individual, the 
other over the individual's activity, the 
commerce clause does not pose an 
additional barrier to the home state's 
jurisdiction over its individual residents. 
Any other rule would deprive the home state 
of its ability to call on resident individuals to 
contribute their fair share to the cost of 
schools, police and fire protection, 
sanitation, and other services they benefit 
from as citizens and residents of their home 
state. 
VII. Conclusion 
Wynne represents a significant and 
unwarranted expansion of the dormant 
commerce clause. Currently, it protects from 
discrimination interstate business 
transactions and business location 
decisions. Wynne extends this protection to 
new territory previously the domain of the 
privileges and immunities clause of Article 
IV -- protecting the personal choices of 
individuals who earn income in a state 
different from where they reside. If the 
dormant commerce clause is extended to the 
personal income taxation of resident 
individuals, it would completely eclipse the 
privileges and immunities clause of Article 
IV, render it a nullity, and change the 
federal-state balance by reducing the states' 
power to tax nonresidents. It would also 
deprive the home state of its ability to call 
on its residents to pay their fair share of the 
cost of government and for the many 
services they enjoy as state residents. 
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Ruling Below: Association of American Railroads v. United States Department of 
Transportation, 721 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 285 (2014). 
 
Railroad association sued the Department of Transportation and others, claiming that a section of 
the Passenger Railroad Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA) requiring the 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and a federally chartered corporation providing intercity 
and commuter train services to “jointly” develop standards to evaluate the performance of the 
corporation's intercity passenger trains was unconstitutional. The United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia, James E. Boasberg, J., granted summary judgment for government. 
Association appealed. 
 
Question Presented: Whether Section 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement 
Act of 2008, which requires the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Amtrak to “jointly . 
. . develop” the metrics and standards for Amtrak’s performance that will be used in part to 
determine whether the Surface Transportation Board (STB) will investigate a freight railroad for 
failing to provide the preference for Amtrak’s passenger trains that is required by federal law, 
and provides for the STB to appoint an arbitrator if the FRA and Amtrak cannot agree on the 
metrics and standards within 180 days, effects an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power 
to a private entity. 
 
 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, Appellant 
 v.  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., Appellees 
 
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit 
Decided on July 2, 2013 
 
[Excerpt, some footnotes and citations omitted] 
 
BROWN, Circuit Judge: 
Imagine a scenario in which Congress has 
given to General Motors the power to 
coauthor, alongside the Department of 
Transportation, regulations that will govern 
all automobile manufacturers. And, if the 
two should happen to disagree on what form 
those regulations will take, then neither will 
have the ultimate say. Instead, an 
unspecified arbitrator will make the call. 
Constitutional? The Department of 
Transportation seems to think so. 
Next consider a parallel statutory scheme—
the one at issue in this case. This time, 
instead of General Motors, it is Amtrak 
(officially, the “National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation”) wielding joint regulatory 
power with a government agency. This new 
stipulation further complicates the issue. 
Unlike General Motors, Amtrak is a curious 
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entity that occupies the twilight between the 
public and private sectors. And the 
regulations it codevelops govern not the 
automotive industry, but the priority freight 
railroads must give Amtrak's trains over 
their own. Whether the Constitution permits 
Congress to delegate such joint regulatory 
authority to Amtrak is the question that 
confronts us now. 
Section 207 of the Passenger Rail 
Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 
empowers Amtrak and the Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA) to jointly develop 
performance measures to enhance 
enforcement of the statutory priority 
Amtrak's passenger rail service has over 
other trains. The Appellant in this case, the 
Association of American Railroads (AAR), 
is a trade association whose members 
include the largest freight railroads (known 
in the industry as “Class I” freight railroads), 
some smaller freight railroads, and—as it 
happens—Amtrak. Challenging the statutory 
scheme as unconstitutional, AAR brought 
suit on behalf of its Class I members against 
the four Appellees—the Department of 
Transportation, its Secretary, the FRA, and 
its Administrator (collectively, the 
“government”). We conclude § 207 
constitutes an unlawful delegation of 
regulatory power to a private entity. 
I 
A 
To reinvigorate a national passenger rail 
system that had, by mid-century, grown 
moribund and unprofitable, Congress passed 
the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970. 
Most prominently, the legislation created the 
passenger rail corporation now known as 
Amtrak, which would “employ[ ] innovative 
operating and marketing concepts so as to 
fully develop the potential of modern rail 
service in meeting the Nation's intercity 
passenger transportation requirements.” The 
act also made railroad companies 
languishing under the prior regime an offer 
they could not refuse: if these companies 
consented to certain conditions, such as 
permitting Amtrak to use their tracks and 
other facilities, they could shed their 
cumbersome common carrier obligation to 
offer intercity passenger service. Pursuant to 
statute, Amtrak negotiates these 
arrangements with individual railroads, the 
terms of which are enshrined in Operating 
Agreements. Today, freight railroads own 
roughly 97% of the track over which 
Amtrak runs its passenger service. 
Naturally, sharing tracks can cause 
coordination problems, which is why 
Congress has prescribed that, absent an 
emergency, Amtrak's passenger rail “has 
preference over freight transportation in 
using a rail line, junction, or crossing.” More 
recently, this same concern prompted 
enactment of the Passenger Rail Investment 
and Improvement Act of 2008 (“PRIIA”). 
At issue in this case is the PRIIA's § 207, 
which directs the FRA and Amtrak to 
“jointly ... develop new or improve existing 
metrics and minimum standards for 
measuring the performance and service 
quality of intercity passenger train 
operations, including cost recovery, on-time 
performance and minutes of delay, ridership, 
on-board services, stations, facilities, 
equipment, and other services.” If Amtrak 
and the FRA disagree about the composition 
of these “metrics and standards,” either 
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“may petition the Surface Transportation 
Board to appoint an arbitrator to assist the 
parties in resolving their disputes through 
binding arbitration.” “To the extent 
practicable,” Amtrak and its host rail 
carriers must incorporate the metrics and 
standards into their Operating Agreements. 
Though § 207 provides the means for 
devising the metrics and standards, § 213 is 
the enforcement mechanism. If the “on-time 
performance” or “service quality” of any 
intercity passenger train proves inadequate 
under the metrics and standards for two 
consecutive quarters, the STB may launch 
an investigation “to determine whether and 
to what extent delays or failure to achieve 
minimum standards are due to causes that 
could reasonably be addressed by a rail 
carrier over whose tracks the intercity 
passenger train operates or reasonably 
addressed by Amtrak or other intercity 
passenger rail operators.” Similarly, if 
“Amtrak, an intercity passenger rail 
operator, a host freight railroad over which 
Amtrak operates, or an entity for which 
Amtrak operates intercity passenger rail 
service” files a complaint, the STB “shall ” 
initiate such an investigation. Should the 
STB determine the failure to satisfy the 
metrics and standards is “attributable to a 
rail carrier's failure to provide preference to 
Amtrak over freight transportation as 
required,” it may award damages or other 
relief against the offending host rail carrier. 
B 
Following § 207's mandate, the FRA and 
Amtrak jointly drafted proposed metrics and 
standards, which they submitted to public 
comment on March 13, 2009. The proposal 
attracted criticism, with much vitriol 
directed at three metrics formulated to 
measure on-time performance: “effective 
speed” (the ratio of route's distance to the 
average time required to travel it), “endpoint 
on-time performance” (the portion of a 
route's trains that arrive on schedule), and 
“all-stations on-time performance” (the 
degree to which trains arrive on time at each 
station along the route). AAR, among 
others, derided these metrics as “unrealistic” 
and worried that certain aspects would 
create “an excessive administrative and 
financial burden.” The FRA responded to 
the comments, and a final version of the 
metrics and standards took effect in May 
2010. 
AAR filed suit on behalf of its Class I 
freight railroad members, asking the district 
court to declare § 207 of the PRIIA 
unconstitutional and to vacate the 
promulgated metrics and standards. The 
complaint asserted two challenges: that § 
207 unconstitutionally delegates to Amtrak 
the authority to regulate other private 
entities; and that empowering Amtrak to 
regulate its competitors violates the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The 
district court rejected these arguments, 
granting summary judgment to the 
government and denying it to AAR. AAR 
renews these constitutional claims on 
appeal. 
II 
AAR's argument takes the following form: 
Delegating regulatory authority to a private 
entity is unconstitutional. Amtrak is a 
private entity. Ergo, § 207 is 
unconstitutional. This proposed syllogism is 
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susceptible, however, to attacks on both its 
validity and soundness. In other words, does 
the conclusion actually follow from the 
premises? And, if it does, are both premises 
true? Our discussion follows the same path. 
A 
We open our discussion with a principle 
upon which both sides agree: Federal 
lawmakers cannot delegate regulatory 
authority to a private entity. To do so would 
be “legislative delegation in its most 
obnoxious form.” This constitutional 
prohibition is the lesser-known cousin of the 
doctrine that Congress cannot delegate its 
legislative function to an agency of the 
Executive Branch. This latter proposition 
finds scarce practical application, however, 
because “no statute can be entirely precise,” 
meaning “some judgments, even some 
judgments involving policy considerations, 
must be left to the officers executing the law 
and to the judges applying it.” All that is 
required then to legitimate a delegation to a 
government agency is for Congress to 
prescribe an intelligible principle governing 
the statute's enforcement. 
Not so, however, in the case of private 
entities to whom the Constitution commits 
no executive power. Although objections to 
delegations are “typically presented in the 
context of a transfer of legislative authority 
from the Congress to agencies,” we have 
reaffirmed that “the difficulties sparked by 
such allocations are even more prevalent in 
the context of agency delegations to private 
individuals.” Even an intelligible principle 
cannot rescue a statute empowering private 
parties to wield regulatory authority. Such 
entities may, however, help a government 
agency make its regulatory decisions, for 
“[t]he Constitution has never been regarded 
as denying to the Congress the necessary 
resources of flexibility and practicality” that 
such schemes facilitate. Yet precisely how 
much involvement may a private entity have 
in the administrative process before its 
advisory role trespasses into an 
unconstitutional delegation? Discerning that 
line is the task at hand. 
Preliminarily, we note the Supreme Court 
has never approved a regulatory scheme that 
so drastically empowers a private entity in 
the way § 207 empowers Amtrak. True, § 
207 has a passing resemblance to the 
humbler statutory frameworks in Currin v. 
Wallace and Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. 
v. Adkins. In Currin Congress circumscribed 
its delegations of administrative authority—
in that case, by requiring two thirds of 
regulated industry members to approve an 
agency's new regulations before they took 
effect. Adkins, meanwhile, affirmed a 
modest principle: Congress may formalize 
the role of private parties in proposing 
regulations so long as that role is merely “as 
an aid” to a government agency that retains 
the discretion to “approve [ ], disapprove[ ], 
or modif[y]” them. Like the private parties 
in Currin, Amtrak has an effective veto over 
regulations developed by the FRA. And like 
those in Adkins, Amtrak has a role in filling 
the content of regulations. But the 
similarities end there. The industries 
in Currin did not craft the regulations, while 
Adkins involved no private check on an 
agency's regulatory authority. Even more 
damningly, the agency in Adkins could 
unilaterally change regulations proposed to 
it by private parties, whereas Amtrak enjoys 
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authority equal to the FRA. Should the FRA 
prefer an alternative to Amtrak's proposed 
metrics and standards, § 207 leaves it 
impotent to choose its version without 
Amtrak's permission. No case prefigures the 
unprecedented regulatory powers delegated 
to Amtrak. 
The government also points out that the 
metrics and standards themselves impose no 
liability. Rather, they define the 
circumstances in which the STB will 
investigate whether infractions are 
attributable to a freight railroad's failure to 
meet its preexisting statutory obligation to 
accord preference to Amtrak's trains. We are 
not entirely certain what to make of this 
argument. Taken to its logical extreme, it 
would preclude all preenforcement review 
of agency rulemaking, so it is probably 
unlikely the government is pressing so 
immodest a claim.
 
If the point is merely that 
the STB adds another layer of government 
“oversight” to Amtrak's exercise of 
regulatory power, this precaution does not 
alter the analysis. Government enforcement 
power did not save the rulemaking authority 
of the private coal companies in Carter 
Coal, nor the power of private landowners 
in Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. 
v. Roberge to impose a zoning restriction on 
a neighbor's tract of land. As is often the 
case in administrative law, the metrics and 
standards lend definite regulatory force to an 
otherwise broad statutory mandate. The 
preference for Amtrak's traffic may predate 
the PRIIA, but the metrics and standards are 
what channel its enforcement. Certainly the 
FRA and Amtrak saw things that way, 
responding to one public comment by noting 
the STB “is the primary enforcement 
body of the standards.” Not only that, § 207 
directs “Amtrak and its host carriers” to 
include the metrics and standards in their 
Operating Agreements “[t]o the extent 
practicable.” The STB's involvement is no 
safe harbor from AAR's constitutional 
challenge to § 207. 
As far as we know, no court has invalidated 
a scheme like § 207's, but perhaps that is 
because no parallel exists. Unprecedented 
constitutional questions, after all, lack clear 
and controlling precedent. We nevertheless 
believe Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. 
Accounting Oversight Board offers 
guidance. There the Supreme Court deemed 
it a violation of separation of powers to 
endow inferior officers with two layers of 
good-cause tenure insulating them from 
removal by the President. Two principles 
from that case are particularly resonant. To 
begin with, just because two structural 
features raise no constitutional concerns 
independently does not mean Congress may 
combine them in a single statute. Free 
Enterprise Fund deemed invalid a regime 
blending two limitations on the President's 
removal power that, taken separately, were 
unproblematic: the establishment of 
independent agencies headed by principal 
officers shielded from dismissal without 
cause, and the protection of certain inferior 
officers from removal by principal officers 
directly accountable to the President. So 
even if the government is right that § 207 
merely synthesizes elements approved 
by Currin and Adkins, that would be no 
proof of constitutionality. 
As for the second principle, Free Enterprise 
Fund also clarifies that novelty may, in 
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certain circumstances, signal 
unconstitutionality. That double good-cause 
tenure, for example, lacked an antecedent in 
the history of the administrative state was 
one reason to suspect its legality: 
“Perhaps the most telling indication of 
the severe constitutional problem with 
the PCAOB is the lack of historical 
precedent for this entity. Neither the 
majority opinion nor the PCAOB nor 
the United States as intervenor has 
located any historical analogues for this 
novel structure. They have not 
identified any independent agency other 
than the PCAOB that is appointed by 
and removable only for cause by 
another independent agency.” 
In defending § 207, the government 
revealingly cites no case—nor have we 
found any—embracing the position that a 
private entity may jointly exercise 
regulatory power on equal footing with an 
administrative agency. This fact is not 
trivial. Section 207 is as close to the 
blatantly unconstitutional scheme in Carter 
Coal as we have seen. The government 
would essentially limit Carter Coal to its 
facts, arguing that “[n]o more is 
constitutionally required” than the 
government's “active oversight, 
participation, and assent” in its private 
partner's rulemaking decisions. This 
proposition—one we find nowhere in the 
case law—vitiates the principle that private 
parties must be limited to an advisory or 
subordinate role in the regulatory process. 
To make matters worse, § 207 fails to meet 
even the government's ad hoc standard. 
Consider what would have happened if 
Amtrak and the FRA could not have reached 
an agreement on the content of the metrics 
and standards within 180 days of the 
PRIIA's enactment. Amtrak could have 
“petition[ed] the Surface Transportation 
Board to appoint an arbitrator to assist the 
parties in resolving their disputes through 
binding arbitration.” And nothing in the 
statute precludes the appointment of a 
private party as arbitrator.
 
That means it 
would have been entirely possible for 
metrics and standards to go into effect that 
had not been assented to by a single 
representative of the government. Though 
that did not in fact occur here, § 207's 
arbitration provision still polluted the 
rulemaking process over and above the other 
defects besetting the statute. As a formal 
matter, that the recipients of illicitly 
delegated authority opted not to make use of 
it is no antidote. It is Congress's decision to 
delegate that is unconstitutional. As a 
practical matter, the FRA's failure to reach 
an agreement with Amtrak would have 
meant forfeiting regulatory power to an 
arbitrator the agency would have had no 
hand in picking. Rather than ensuring 
Amtrak would “function subordinately” to 
the FRA, this backdrop stacked the deck in 
favor of compromise. Even for government 
agencies, half an apple is better than none at 
all. 
We remain mindful that the Constitution 
“contemplates that practice will integrate the 
dispersed powers into a workable 
government.” But a flexible Constitution 
must not be so yielding as to become 
twisted. Unless it can be established that 
Amtrak is an organ of the government, 
therefore, § 207 is an unconstitutional 
delegation of regulatory power to a private 
party. 
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B 
Now the crucial question: is Amtrak indeed 
a private corporation? If not—if it is just one 
more government agency—then the 
regulatory power it wields under § 207 is of 
no constitutional moment. 
Many of the details of Amtrak's makeup 
support the government's position that it is 
not a private entity of the sort described 
in Carter Coal. Amtrak's Board of Directors 
includes the Secretary of Transportation (or 
his designee), seven other presidential 
appointees, and the President of Amtrak. 
The President of Amtrak—the one Board 
member not appointed by the President of 
the United States—is in turn selected by the 
eight other members of the Board. Amtrak is 
also subject to the Freedom of Information 
Act. Amtrak's equity structure is similarly 
suggestive. As of September 30, 2011, four 
common stockholders owned 9,385,694 
outstanding shares, which they acquired 
from the four railroads whose intercity 
passenger service Amtrak assumed in 1971. 
At the same time, however, the federal 
government owned all 109,396,994 shares 
of Amtrak's preferred stock, each share of 
which is convertible into 10 shares of 
common stock. And, all that stands between 
Amtrak and financial ruin is congressional 
largesse. 
That being said, Amtrak's legislative origins 
are not determinative of its constitutional 
status. Congress's power to charter private 
corporations was recognized early in our 
nation's history. And, as far as Congress was 
concerned, that is exactly what it was doing 
when it created Amtrak. As Congress 
explained it, Amtrak “shall be operated and 
managed as a for-profit corporation” and “is 
not a department, agency, or instrumentality 
of the United States Government.” We have 
previously taken Congress at its word and 
relied on this declaration in deciding 
whether the False Claims Act applies to 
Amtrak. Amtrak agrees: “The National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation, also known 
as Amtrak, is not a government agency or 
establishment [but] a private corporation 
operated for profit.” And, somewhat 
tellingly, Amtrak's website is www.amtrak. 
com—not www.amtrak.gov. 
How to decide? Since, in support of its 
claim that Amtrak is a public entity, the 
government looks past labels to how the 
corporation functions, it is worth examining 
what functional purposes the public-private 
distinction serves when it comes to 
delegating regulatory power. We identify 
two of particular importance. First, 
delegating the government's powers to 
private parties saps our political system of 
democratic accountability. This threat is 
particularly dangerous where both Congress 
and the Executive can deflect blame for 
unpopular policies by attributing them to the 
choices of a private entity. This worry is 
certainly present in the case of § 207, since 
Congress has expressly forsworn Amtrak's 
status as a “department, agency, or 
instrumentality of the United States 
Government.” Dislike the metrics and 
standards Amtrak has concocted? It's not the 
federal government's fault—Amtrak is a 
“for-profit corporation.” 
Second, fundamental to the public-private 
distinction in the delegation of regulatory 
authority is the belief that disinterested 
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government agencies ostensibly look to the 
public good, not private gain. For this 
reason, delegations to private entities are 
particularly perilous. Carter 
Coal specifically condemned delegations 
made not “to an official or an official body, 
presumptively disinterested, but to private 
persons whose interests may be and often 
are adverse to the interests of others in the 
same business.” Partly echoing the 
Constitution's guarantee of due process, this 
principle ensures that regulations are not 
dictated by those who “are not bound by any 
official duty,” but may instead act “for 
selfish reasons or arbitrarily.” More recent 
decisions are also consistent with this view. 
Amtrak may not compete with the freight 
railroads for customers, but it does compete 
with them for use of their scarce track. Like 
the “power conferred upon the majority ... to 
regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority” 
in Carter Coal, § 207 grants Amtrak a 
distinct competitive advantage: a hand in 
limiting the freight railroads' exercise of 
their property rights over an essential 
resource. 
Because Amtrak must “be operated and 
managed as a for-profit corporation,” the 
fact that the President has appointed the bulk 
of its Board does nothing to exonerate its 
management from its fiduciary duty to 
maximize company profits. Also consistent 
with this purpose, “Amtrak is encouraged to 
make agreements with the private sector and 
undertake initiatives that are consistent with 
good business judgment and designed to 
maximize its revenues and minimize 
Government subsidies.” Yet § 207 directs 
Amtrak and its host carriers to incorporate 
the metrics and standards in their Operating 
Agreements. So to summarize: Amtrak must 
negotiate contracts that will maximize its 
profits; those contracts generally must, by 
law, include certain terms; and Amtrak has 
the power to define those terms. Perverse 
incentives abound. Nothing about the 
government's involvement in Amtrak's 
operations restrains the corporation from 
devising metrics and standards that inure to 
its own financial benefit rather than the 
common good. And that is the very essence 
of the public-private distinction when a 
claim of unconstitutional delegation arises. 
No discussion of Amtrak's status as a private 
or public institution would be complete, 
however, without an examination of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Lebron v. 
National Railroad Passenger Corp. There 
the Court held that Amtrak “is part of the 
Government for purposes of the First 
Amendment.” Otherwise, the majority 
cautioned, the government could “evade the 
most solemn obligations imposed in the 
Constitution by simply resorting to the 
corporate form.” What the Court did not do 
in Lebron was conclude that Amtrak 
counted as part of the government for all 
purposes. On some questions—Does the 
Administrative Procedure Act apply to 
Amtrak? Does Amtrak enjoy sovereign 
immunity from suit?—Congress's disclaimer 
of Amtrak's governmental status is 
dispositive. This makes sense: Congress has 
the power to waive certain governmental 
privileges, like sovereign immunity, that are 
within its legislative control; but it cannot 
circumvent the Bill of Rights by simply 
dubbing something private. 
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Whether § 207 effects an unconstitutional 
delegation is a constitutional question, not a 
statutory one. But just 
because Lebron treated Amtrak as a 
government agency for purposes of the First 
Amendment does not dictate the same result 
with respect to all other constitutional 
provisions. To view Lebron in this way 
entirely misses the point. In Lebron, viewing 
Amtrak as a strictly private entity would 
have permitted the government to avoid a 
constitutional prohibition; in this case, 
deeming Amtrak to be just another 
governmental entity would allow the 
government to ignore a constitutional 
obligation. Just as it is impermissible for 
Congress to employ the corporate form to 
sidestep the First Amendment, neither may 
it reap the benefits of delegating regulatory 
authority while absolving the federal 
government of all responsibility for its 
exercise. The federal government cannot 
have its cake and eat it too. In any 
event, Lebron 's holding was comparatively 
narrow, deciding only that Amtrak is an 
agency of the United States for the purpose 
of the First Amendment. It did not opine on 
Amtrak's status with respect to the federal 
government's structural powers under the 
Constitution—the issue here. 
This distinction is more than academic. 
When Lebron contrasted “the constitutional 
obligations of Government” from “the 
‘privileges of the government,’ ” it was not 
drawing a distinction between questions that 
are constitutional from those that are not. 
Any “privilege” of the federal government 
must also be anchored in the 
Constitution. As our federal government is 
one of enumerated powers, the 
Constitution's structural provisions are the 
source of Congress's power to act in the first 
place. And, generally speaking, these 
provisions authorize action without 
mandating it. Congress's power to regulate 
interstate commerce, for example, does not 
dictate the enactment of this or that bill 
within its proper scope. By contrast, 
individual rights are “affirmative 
prohibitions” on government action that 
become relevant “only where the 
Government possesses authority to act in the 
first place.” While often phrased in terms of 
an affirmative prohibition, Congress's 
inability to delegate government power to 
private entities is really just a function of its 
constitutional authority not extending that 
far in the first place. In other words, rather 
than proscribing what Congress cannot do, 
the doctrine defines the limits of what 
Congress can do. And, by designing Amtrak 
to operate as a private corporation—to seek 
profit on behalf of private interests—
Congress has elected to deny itself the 
power to delegate it regulatory authority 
under § 207. 
We therefore hold that Amtrak is a private 
corporation with respect to Congress's 
power to delegate regulatory authority. 
Though the federal government's 
involvement in Amtrak is considerable, 
Congress has both designated it a private 
corporation and instructed that it be 
managed so as to maximize profit. In 
deciding Amtrak's status for purposes of 
congressional delegations, these declarations 
are dispositive. Skewed incentives are 
precisely the danger forestalled by 
restricting delegations to government 
instrumentalities. And as a private entity, 
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Amtrak cannot be granted the regulatory 
power prescribed in § 207. 
III 
We conclude § 207 of the PRIIA 
impermissibly delegates regulatory authority 
to Amtrak. We need not reach AAR's 
separate argument that Amtrak's 
involvement in developing the metrics and 
standards deprived its members of due 
process. Accordingly, the judgment of the 
district court is 
Reversed.
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 “Supreme Court to Review Amtrak Role in Setting Rail Regulations: High 
Court to Hear Challenge by Freight Railroads” 
The Wall Street Journal 
Brent Kendall 
June 23, 2014 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday said it 
would decide whether Amtrak should be 
allowed to participate in the development of 
rail performance measures with a 
government agency. 
Congress set up the arrangement in a 2008 
law that allowed Amtrak to work with the 
Federal Railroad Administration to set 
metrics and minimum standards for 
assessing the performance of the passenger 
rail service. Those standards are supposed to 
be incorporated into Amtrak's operating 
agreements with the freight railroad 
companies, which host Amtrak trains on 
their tracks. 
Freight railroads potentially can be 
penalized if Amtrak fails to meet 
performance standards because the freights 
didn't give Amtrak trains priority use of the 
rail lines. 
The railroads found the adopted 
performance metrics to be unrealistic and 
said the law's grant of authority to Amtrak 
was unprecedented and untenable. They 
argued that Congress violated the 
Constitution by delegating authority to a 
private entity. 
A federal appeals court in Washington, 
D.C., agreed. 
The appeals court acknowledged that 
Amtrak "is a curious entity" that straddles 
the public and private sectors, but it noted 
that Amtrak was a for-profit corporation. It 
struck down the arrangement as 
unconstitutional, suggesting the unusual 
setup wasn't much different than giving 
General Motors authority to help write 
government regulations that would govern 
all auto makers. 
The Justice Department asked the Supreme 
Court to review the case, saying the 
government retained sufficient control over 
the Amtrak performance standards to avoid 
any constitutional concerns. 
The Supreme Court will consider the case, 
Department of Transportation v. Association 
of American Railroads, during its next term, 
which begins in October. 
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“Supreme Court to Consider USDOT vs. AAR re: Amtrak” 
RailwayAge 
William C. Vantuono 
June 24, 2014 
 
In 2008, Congress passed PRIIA (Passenger 
Rail Improvement and Investment Act). 
Among its many provisions, it allows 
Amtrak to work with the Federal Railroad 
Administration to set metrics and minimum 
standards for assessing passenger rail 
service performance. Those standards are 
meant to be incorporated into Amtrak's 
operating agreements with its host freight 
railroads. 
Freight railroads can be penalized if Amtrak 
fails to meet its own performance standards, 
particularly if Amtrak trains have not been 
given priority on the freight rights-of-way it 
uses. The Association of American 
Railroads strongly objected, calling the law 
unrealistic and saying that giving authority 
to Amtrak to participate in the development 
of rail performance measures with a 
government agency was unprecedented and 
untenable. They argued that Congress 
violated the Constitution by delegating 
authority to a private entity. 
A federal DC Circuit appeals court in 
Washington D.C. agreed, calling Amtrak “a 
curious entity” that straddles the public and 
private sectors, but still a for-profit 
corporation. It struck down the PRIIA 
provision as unconstitutional, suggesting the 
unusual setup was equivalent to giving 
General Motors authority to help write 
government regulations that would govern 
all auto makers. 
At the request of the U.S. Department of 
Justice, the U.S. Supreme Court will 
consider the case, Department of 
Transportation vs. Association of American 
Railroads, during its next term, which 
begins in October. DOJ said the government 
should retain sufficient control over Amtrak 
performance standards to avoid any 
constitutional concerns. 
“The issue in the case is whether PRIIA 
Section 207, which required the FRA and 
Amtrak to jointly develop metrics, is an 
unconstitutional delegation of Congress’ 
legislative power to a private entity,” says 
Kevin Sheys, a railroad attorney with 
Nossaman LLP of Washington, D.C. “The 
metrics have many purposes, but the 
important one for this case is that they could 
be used to measure whether the freights 
were meeting their statutory obligation to 
give preference to Amtrak’s passenger 
trains.” 
“The Supreme Court will need to grapple 
with whether Amtrak is a private entity for 
purposes of PRIIA Section 207 and, if so, 
whether Amtrak had too much influence 
over the development of the metrics,” Sheys 
observes. “The USDOT will argue that 
Amtrak is not a private entity for 207 
purposes and in any case it did not have too 
much influence over the development of the 
metrics. The freights, represented by the 
AAR, believe the DC Circuit properly 
decided the case and probably will make a 
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second argument (not reached by the DC 
Circuit) that the metrics violate their Fifth 
Amendment due process rights.” 
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 “Amtrak Barred From Regulating Freight Railroads on Delays” 
Bloomberg 
Angela Greiling Keane & Tom Schoenberg 
July 3, 2013 
 
Amtrak, the U.S. long-distance passenger 
railroad, lost its power to assess blame when 
its trains are delayed and to have a say in 
whether freight railroads causing those 
holdups are penalized. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington 
yesterday ruled the taxpayer-supported 
service is a private company to which 
Congress improperly gave regulatory power 
over freight railroads such as Union Pacific 
Corp. (UNP) and Warren Buffett’s 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe. 
The court threw out a law passed to enforce 
a requirement, dating to Amtrak’s creation 
in 1970, that freight trains give priority to 
passenger trains on tracks they share, which 
they do in most of the U.S. 
“If freight railroads perceive they no longer 
face penalties for giving freight trains 
priority over passenger trains, and the 
passenger-train delays are extensive, the 
result could be a de-facto imploding of 
Amtrak,” said Frank Wilner, a transportation 
economist and author of “Amtrak: Past, 
Present and Future,” published last year. 
The case involves on-time performance 
standards and enforcement mechanisms 
established under the Passenger Rail 
Investment and Improvement Act of 2008. 
Amtrak, based in Washington, tracks and 
publishes, in monthly reports on its website, 
how many minutes its trains are delayed 
each month and assigns causes. It cited 
freight-train interference as the most 
common type of delay over the past 12 
months. 
During April, it said, such interference was 
responsible for about 55,000 minutes of 
delays, or 14.9 percent of the total. 
Canadian National Railway Co. (CNI) was 
held responsible for the most delays in the 
12 months ending in April. 
General Motors 
If Amtrak trains don’t meet the on-time 
performance standards set by the company 
and its regulators, the U.S. Surface 
Transportation Board can investigate the 
railroads whose tracks they use and assess 
damages. 
The court ruled the law unconstitutional for 
giving Amtrak a say in setting the metrics 
that could lead to penalties. U.S. Circuit 
Judge Janice Rogers Brown said that was 
akin to the government giving General 
Motors Co. (GM) the power to regulate 
automobile manufacturers. 
“It appears that the current metrics and 
standards are invalid until Congress rewrites 
the law,” said Ross Capon, president of the 
National Association of Railroad 
Passengers, a Washington-based advocacy 
group, in an interview. 
Steve Kulm, a spokesman for Amtrak, 
declined to comment. 
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Delays Reduced 
The U.S. Federal Railroad Administration, 
which wrote the standards, said they’ve been 
a useful tool to reduce Amtrak delays. 
“Since the establishment of the metrics and 
standards in 2010, delays have been reduced 
each successive year, culminating in a 
historic best for Amtrak in 2012,” said 
Kevin Thompson, a spokesman for the 
agency. “But there is still need for additional 
improvement.” 
The Transportation Department inspector 
general in 2008 found Amtrak’s on-time 
performance of 30 percent on long-distance 
routes in 2006 reduced the railroad’s 
revenue and increased the demand for 
taxpayer subsidies. 
The Association of American Railroads, 
whose members include freight railroads 
and Amtrak, sued the U.S. Transportation 
Department in 2011 arguing that the 
standards, which Amtrak drafted with 
Federal Railroad Administration, forced 
freight railroads to substantially alter their 
business operations, at times by delaying 
their own freight traffic. 
Bilateral Contracts 
The rail association, based in Washington, 
hailed the ruling. 
“Freight railroads recognize Amtrak wants 
to run trains on time, and they work closely 
with Amtrak to help make this happen,” Ed 
Hamberger, the group’s chief executive 
officer, said in an e-mailed statement. 
“However, freight railroads believe setting 
and measuring schedules and on-time 
performance metrics should not be done 
through a one-size-fits all approach at the 
federal level, but addressed jointly through 
private bilateral contracts that take into 
account the facts and circumstances of 
particular routes.” 
The case is Association of American 
Railroads v. U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 12-5204, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia 
(Washington). 
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“A New Private Delegation Doctrine?” 
Reason Foundation 
Alexander Volokh 
August 1, 2013 
 
On July 2, 2013, in Ass’n of American 
Railroads v. DOT, the D.C. Circuit struck 
down a delegation of authority to Amtrak in 
§ 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and 
Improvement Act of 2008, holding that the 
statute unconstitutionally delegated 
regulatory power to a private party. This is a 
significant case for several reasons. 
First, it’s potentially significant in terms of 
constitutional doctrine. In holding that 
private delegations of regulatory authority 
are illegitimate, the case seems to go against 
the conventional wisdom, which is that there 
is no special doctrine for private delegations 
by Congress: the Nondelegation Doctrine 
applies equally to public and private 
recipients of delegated congressional 
authority by Congress. Moreover, this 
conventional wisdom is probably right. The 
D.C. Circuit’s decision may yet be correct 
under the Due Process Clause, but the D.C. 
Circuit deliberately refused to choose 
whether this delegation implicated the 
Nondelegation Doctrine or the Due Process 
Clause. 
Second, it's potentially significant in terms 
of its real-world effect on delegations to 
private parties—though, again, much 
depends on precisely why the delegation is 
unconstitutional. If the decision rests on the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, it only affects 
federal delegations; but if it rests on the Due 
Process Clause, it also affects the much 
broader set of state delegations. 
Third, in holding, based on a multi-factor 
analysis, that Amtrak is a private actor, it 
provides yet another example of how the 
public-private distinction is fuzzy, and an 
entity that is public for one reason might be 
private for another. 
Amtrak, formally called the National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation, was created 
by statute in 1970. Faced with competition 
from other modes of transport, railroads that 
offered passenger service had been incurring 
heavy losses; many of these railroads had 
petitioned the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, which at the time regulated 
railroads, for permission to stop providing 
passenger service. With the passage of the 
statute, a railroad could transfer its 
passenger service responsibilities to Amtrak 
if it agreed to a number of conditions, one of 
which was to grant Amtrak the use of its 
tracks and other facilities. The statute 
provides that, except in an emergency, an 
Amtrak passenger car has precedence over 
another railroad's freight car when they both 
need to use the same facilities. Most 
railroads agreed to these conditions, which 
were enshrined in a series of bilateral 
operating agreements. 
Fast forward a few decades, to when 
Congress passed the Passenger Rail 
Investment and Improvement Act of 2008. 
One section of the new statute, § 207, 
required the Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA) and Amtrak to 
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“jointly . . . develop new or improve existing 
metrics and minimum standards for 
measuring the performance and service 
quality of intercity passenger train 
operations, including cost recovery, on-time 
performance and minutes of delay, ridership, 
on-board services, stations, facilities, 
equipment, and other services.” These 
performance measures aren’t of merely 
academic interest. Amtrak and its 
contractual partners are required to 
incorporate the measures into their operating 
agreements “[t]o the extent practical.” 
Perhaps more seriously, if “on-time 
performance” or “service quality” is 
substandard for two consecutive quarters, 
the Surface Transportation Board (STB), an 
independent agency housed in the 
Department of Transportation, is allowed to 
start an investigation (and is required to do 
so, if a complaint is filed) to check whose 
fault it is, and can assess damages against 
the host railroad if the problems are due to 
the railroad’s failure to grant preference to 
Amtrak trains. 
These metrics and standards are supposed to 
be developed “jointly” by Amtrak and the 
FRA. If they can’t agree, they can petition 
the STB to appoint an arbitrator, whose 
decision will be binding. Amtrak thus has 
equal authority with the FRA on this issue; 
the FRA has to get Amtrak’s consent in 
developing the metrics and standards (or it 
has to abide by the decision of an arbitrator, 
who might also end up being private). The 
Association of American Railroads sued, 
charging that this sort of private delegation 
is invalid; and the D.C. Circuit agreed. 
First, the D.C. Circuit noted, “[f]ederal 
lawmakers cannot delegate regulatory 
authority to a private entity.” The 
Nondelegation Doctrine states that when 
Congress delegates power to a government 
agency, all that’s required is that Congress 
provide an “intelligible principle” to limit 
the agency’s discretion. But, said the D.C. 
Circuit, “[e]ven an intelligible principle 
cannot rescue a statute empowering private 
parties to wield regulatory authority.” To 
illustrate this point, the D.C. Circuit cited 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936). The New 
Deal-era Congress had established a 
National Bituminous Coal Commission and 
required the organization of 23 “coal 
districts.” Within each coal district, all coal 
producers would be bound by any collective 
bargaining agreements agreed to by a 
majority of producers (representing two-
thirds of total tonnage) and representatives 
of a majority of workers. In other words, 2/3 
of the coal industry could, by its collective 
bargaining activity, legally bind the 
remaining 1/3 of the industry. (This reliance 
on massive binding industry self-regulation 
was classic New Deal procedure.) The 
Supreme Court struck this down: “The 
power conferred upon the majority is, in 
effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an 
unwilling minority. This is legislative 
delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it 
is not even delegation to an official or an 
official body, presumptively disinterested, 
but to private persons whose interests may 
be and often are adverse to the interests of 
others in the same business. The delegation 
is clearly arbitrary, and clearly a denial of 
rights safeguarded by the due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.” 
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To the D.C. Circuit, the question thus 
became: “precisely how much involvement 
may a private entity have in the 
administrative process before its advisory 
role trespasses into an unconstitutional 
delegation?” The court distinguished two 
relatively old cases where the Supreme 
Court had upheld private 
delegations: Currin v. Wallace (1939) 
and Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. 
Adkins (1940). In Currin, an agency wrote 
regulations for tobacco auction markets, but 
they wouldn’t take effect unless two-thirds 
of the industry approved. The Supreme 
Court held that this was unobjectionable, 
because (unlike in Carter Coal) private 
parties did no more than hold the on-off 
switch for regulations that were written by 
the government. In Adkins, the fact pattern 
was reminiscent of Carter Coal: in fact, 
Congress had reenacted the same statute that 
the Supreme Court had struck down 
in Carter Coal, with the exception that now 
the government agency wrote the 
regulations for the industry based on the 
industry’s recommendation. The Supreme 
Court upheld this scheme, since now the 
industry was merely subordinate to the 
government agency. (The possible reality 
that the agency might just rubber-stamp the 
industry’s recommendations was irrelevant 
to the analysis: what was important was that 
the agency had the legal authority to modify 
the recommendations if it wanted to.) 
The Amtrak case, though, went far 
beyond Currin or Adkins and was more 
similar to Carter Coal: Amtrak had an 
“effective veto” over FRA regulations and, 
in fact, enjoyed “authority equal to the 
FRA.” This really was a case where a 
private actor could control the regulations 
that governed the rest of the railroad 
industry, choosing a set of performance 
measures that would tend to make it look 
good relative to its competitors—and if the 
FRA refused to accede to Amtrak’s 
demands, the regulations would be written 
by an arbitrator chosen by the STB who 
could, for all we know, also be a private 
party. 
Not so fast, though; one might legitimately 
argue that Amtrak isn’t private. The hazard 
with all such doctrines that draw a bright 
line between public and private is that, in 
reality, the line is somewhat fuzzy, 
especially in an age where contracting out of 
government services and pervasive 
regulation of the private sector are 
widespread. 
So let’s tally up the indicia of privateness 
and publicness. On the public side, Amtrak’s 
Board of Directors has nine members, one of 
whom is the Secretary of Transportation and 
seven of whom are presidential appointees; 
the ninth, the President of Amtrak, is elected 
by the other eight. Amtrak has some private 
shareholders, but almost all its stock is 
preferred stock held by the federal 
government. The D.C. Circuit noted that 
Amtrak gets substantial subsidies from the 
federal government—though the amount of 
government money one gets generally isn’t 
relevant to whether one is public or private. 
Notably, still on the public side, there’s a 
Supreme Court case, Lebron v. National 
Railroad Passenger Corp. (1995). 
In Lebron, Amtrak was sued, mostly on First 
Amendment grounds, for refusing to display 
a political advertisement in New York’s 
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Penn Station. First Amendment rights, like 
many other constitutional rights, only apply 
against “state actors,” so the question was 
whether Amtrak was a state actor. The 
Supreme Court held that “where, as here, the 
Government creates a corporation by special 
law, for the furtherance of governmental 
objectives, and retains for itself permanent 
authority to appoint a majority of the 
directors of that corporation, the corporation 
is part of the Government for purposes of 
the First Amendment.” 
On the private side, the 1970 statute 
specifies that Amtrak “is not a department, 
agency, or instrumentality of the United 
States Government.” The statute also 
commands that Amtrak “shall be operated 
and managed as a for-profit corporation.” 
Relatedly, by statute, “Amtrak is encouraged 
to make agreements with the private sector 
and undertake initiatives that are consistent 
with good business judgment and designed 
to maximize its revenues and minimize 
Government subsidies.” Amtrak itself 
announces that it’s “not a government 
agency or establishment [but] a private 
corporation operated for profit.” The D.C. 
Circuit attaches some significance 
(“somewhat tellingly”) to the fact that 
Amtrak’s URL is amtrak.com—not 
amtrak.gov—but this doesn’t really seem all 
that telling, as one could make a similar 
claim about the U.S. Postal Service at 
usps.com. 
To decide the issue, the D.C. Circuit looked 
to “what functional purposes the public-
private distinction serves when it comes to 
delegating regulatory power.” One purpose 
is accountability: a private delegation dilutes 
democratic accountability, because when 
power is delegated to a private organization, 
the government is no longer blamed for that 
organization’s decisions. (Perhaps; but if 
something goes wrong, why can’t the voters 
blame the government for the initial decision 
to delegate?) Another purpose is the 
distinction between the public good and 
private gain: public recipients of delegated 
power are “presumptively disinterested” and 
are bound by “official duty,” whereas 
private recipients may act “for selfish 
reasons or arbitrarily.” (Perhaps; but doesn’t 
this display an overly optimistic view of the 
motivations of public employees?) In the 
D.C. Circuit’s view, these considerations cut 
in favor of treating Amtrak as private: the 
statutory command that it be “managed as a 
for-profit corporation” requires that it seek 
its private good, not the public good, and 
Congress’s and Amtrak’s consistent labeling 
of Amtrak as private tends to distance 
Amtrak’s decisions from democratic 
accountability. (The court distinguished 
Lebron on the grounds that being a state 
actor for First Amendment purposes doesn’t 
mean one is a state actor for all purposes.) 
Section 207 thus delegates regulatory power 
to a private party, and is thus invalid. 
One interesting aspect of Ass’n of American 
Railroads v. DOT is the idea that Amtrak 
can be private for the purposes of structural 
provisions like the Nondelegation Doctrine, 
even though it is public for the purposes of 
individual-rights provisions like the First 
Amendment. This is possible, though the 
D.C. Circuit’s multi-factor analysis isn’t 
exactly overwhelming. 
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A more interesting aspect of the case is what 
the court relegates to a footnote and refuses 
to decide. Recall the Carter Coal precedent 
from 1936, where giving businesses the 
power to regulate their competitors was 
characterized as “legislative delegation in its 
most obnoxious form.” Carter Coal is, 
unfortunately, less than crystal-clear on the 
precise source of the unconstitutionality. 
Since it mentions “legislative delegation,” 
one could think of it (as the D.C. Circuit 
did) as a Nondelegation Doctrine decision. 
Nondelegation challenges rest on the 
Vesting Clause of Article I of the federal 
constitution, which vests all legislative 
power in Congress (“All legislative powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
of the United States.”). Congress must 
exercise its own legislative power, but it’s 
allowed to delegate limited authority as long 
as the delegation is accompanied by some 
“intelligible principle” to limit the agency’s 
discretion. 
But Carter Coal also says that the 
delegation is “clearly a denial of rights 
safeguarded by the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment” (“[N]or shall any person 
. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law”). 
So is this a Nondelegation Doctrine decision 
or a Due Process Clause decision? The D.C. 
Circuit wasn’t that interested in precisely 
what part of the Constitution was being 
violated. It wrote, in a footnote, that “the 
distinction evokes scholarly interest,” but 
the parties in this case didn’t press the point, 
and “neither court nor scholar has suggested 
a change in the label would effect a change 
in the inquiry.” 
But reading Carter Coal as a Due Process 
opinion, and likewise grounding the Amtrak 
challenge in the Due Process Clause, makes 
more sense. The focus of a nondelegation 
challenge should be on how much power 
Congress has given up—has it actually 
given up legislative power, or has it merely 
allowed someone to fill gaps and 
ambiguities?—not on the identity of the 
recipient of the delegation. The Due Process 
Clause, on the other hand, is concerned with 
fair treatment, and the idea that financially 
biased decisionmakers (whether public or 
private) are illegitimate has been a staple of 
Due Process doctrine for a long time. Claims 
of bias, whether it’s a public official who 
has prejudged an issue or a private 
organization that can lose money depending 
on how it wields its power, thus fit more 
naturally into a Due Process framework than 
into a nondelegation framework. 
Moreover, the distinction matters for future 
cases. A nondelegation holding based on 
Article I’s Vesting Clause would enforce 
the federal separation of powers by 
preventing Congress from getting rid of 
some of its legislative authority, and so it 
would only govern federal delegations. 
These separation of powers constraints are 
irrelevant for the states. The federal 
constitution doesn’t require that states have 
the same separation of powers as the federal 
government: states could adopt 
parliamentary democracy or engage in any 
number of structural experiments forbidden 
to the federal government, provided they 
comply with certain minimal guarantees like 
“one-person, one-vote” or having a 
“republican form of government.” 
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A Due Process challenge would be quite 
different: like the First Amendment and 
most other Bill of Rights provisions, the Due 
Process Clause now applies against the 
states, so a Due Process holding would also 
constrain state delegations and would 
therefore have a much wider sweep. Under 
the Due Process Clause, the court wouldn’t 
do the public/private inquiry that was on 
display here; rather, it would look to 
whether Amtrak was a state actor using the 
substantial body of state action doctrine. But 
this question was already resolved in 1995 
by the Lebron case: yes, Amtrak is a state 
actor. (Lebron arose in a First Amendment 
context, but it turns out that the Due Process 
Clause, as well as various other individual-
rights provisions, turns on the same state 
action question, so any finding of state 
action for First Amendment purposes carries 
over directly to the Due Process Clause.) 
Finding that Amtrak is a state actor doesn’t 
mean there’s a Due Proces violation; it’s 
only a threshold step that means that Due 
Process protections apply. To find out 
whether the Due Process Clause was 
violated, the relevant inquiry would be the 
extent of Amtrak’s financial bias. And given 
the statutory command that Amtrak act to 
maximize its profits, one could legitimately 
conclude that it couldn’t, without an 
unconstitutional conflict of interest, regulate 
the rest of the railroad industry—thus 
arriving at the same bottom line as the D.C. 
Circuit. 
The D.C. Circuit thus seems incorrect when 
it says that public delegations of regulatory 
authority are merely evaluated by the 
“intelligible framework” test while private 
delegations are per se illegitimate. Rather, 
all federal delegations (public or private) are 
evaluated by the “intelligible principle” test, 
while all delegations of any kind (state or 
federal, public or private) are scrutinized for 
conflicts of interest under the Due Process 
Clause, and perhaps private delegations 
might be more vulnerable because conflicts 
of interest are more likely to arise there. 
This, then, is the open issue at the heart of 
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion. The true reach of 
this decision is yet to be determined. 
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Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl 
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Ruling Below: Direct Marketing Association v. Barbara Brohl, 735 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2013), 
cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 2901 (2014). 
Association of mail and online retailers brought action against Executive Director of Colorado 
Department of Revenue, challenging the constitutionality of notice and reporting requirements 
that state imposed on retailers that did not collect taxes on sales to Colorado purchasers. The 
United States District Court for the District of Colorado, Robert Blackburn, J., granted summary 
judgment to association and permanently enjoined enforcement of requirements on ground that 
they violated Commerce Clause. Defendant appealed. 
Question Presented: Whether the Tax Injunction Act, which provides that “[t]he district courts 
shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law 
where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State,” bars federal 
court jurisdiction over a suit brought by non-taxpayers to enjoin the informational notice and 
reporting requirements of a state law that neither imposes a tax, nor requires the collection of a 
tax, but serves only as a secondary aspect of state tax administration. 
 
 
DIRECT MARKETING ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Barbara BROHL, in her capacity as Executive Director, Colorado Department of Revenue, 
Defendant-Appellant, and Multistate Tax Commission, Amicus-Curiae. 
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit 
Decided on August 20, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
MATHESON, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal arises from Colorado's efforts to 
collect sales and use taxes during the 
expansion of e-commerce.  
Appellant Barbara Brohl, Executive Director 
of the Colorado Department of Revenue (the 
"Department"), appeals from an order 
enjoining the enforcement of state notice 
and reporting requirements imposed on 
retailers who do not collect taxes on sales to 
Colorado purchasers ("non-collecting 
retailers"), Most, if not all, of these non-
collecting retailers sell products to Colorado 
purchasers by mail or online.  
Appellee Direct Marketing Association 
("DMA") — a group of businesses and 
organizations that market products via 
catalogs, advertisements, broadcast media, 
and the Internet — urges us to uphold the 
district court's determination that Colorado's 
notice and reporting obligations are 
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unconstitutional. The district court 
concluded that Colorado's requirements for 
non-collecting retailers discriminated 
against and placed undue burdens on 
interstate commerce, in violation of the 
Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution. It therefore entered a 
permanent injunction prohibiting 
enforcement of the state requirements.  
The issue in this appeal is whether 
Colorado's notice and reporting obligations 
for non-collecting retailers violate the 
Commerce Clause. However, we do not 
reach that merits question. Because the Tax 
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, deprived 
the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin 
Colorado's tax collection effort, we remand 
to the district court to dismiss DMA's 
Commerce Clause claims.  
I BACKGROUND  
A. Colorado's Sales and Use Taxes  
Colorado imposes a 2.9 percent tax on the 
sale of tangible goods within the state. 
Retailers with a physical presence in the 
state are required by law to collect sales tax 
from purchasers  and remit it to the 
Department. The sales tax statute imposes 
additional duties on Colorado retailers such 
as recordkeeping, and penalties for deficient 
remittance of sales tax. 
If Colorado purchasers have not paid sales 
tax on tangible goods — as occurs in some 
online and mail-order purchases from 
retailers with no in-state physical presence 
— they must pay a 2.9 percent use tax "for 
the privilege of storing, using, or 
consuming" the goods in Colorado. The use 
tax complements the sales tax and is 
"prevent[] consumers of retail products from 
purchasing out of state in order to avoid 
paying a Colorado sales tax."  
Although Colorado's sales and use taxes 
have equivalent rates, they are collected 
differently. Whereas retailers with a physical 
presence in the state must collect and remit 
sales tax to the Department, the onus is on 
the purchaser to report and pay use tax. This 
difference results from the Supreme Court's 
bright-line rule in Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota. In Quill, the Court reaffirmed that it 
is unconstitutional under the "negative" or 
"dormant" aspect of the Commerce Clause 
for a state to require a retailer with no in-
state physical presence to collect the state's 
sales or use taxes. Because Quill prohibits 
Colorado from forcing retailers with no in-
state physical presence to collect and remit 
taxes on sales to Colorado consumers, the 
state requires its residents to report and pay 
use taxes to the Department with their 
income tax returns. The failure to report and 
pay use tax is a criminal offense.  
Nonetheless, use tax collection is elusive. 
Most Colorado residents do not report or 
remit use tax despite the legal obligation to 
do so. A 2010 report submitted as part of 
this litigation estimated that Colorado state 
and local governments would lose $172.7 
million in 2012 because of residents' failure 
to pay use tax on e-commerce purchases 
from out-of-state, non-collecting retailers.  
B. Notice and Reporting Requirements  
To increase use tax collection, in 2010 the 
Colorado legislature enacted statutory 
requirements for non-collecting retailers. 
The statute and its implementing regulations 
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impose three principal obligations on non-
collecting retailers whose gross sales in 
Colorado exceed $100,000; they must (1) 
provide transactional notices to Colorado 
purchasers, (2) send annual purchase 
summaries to Colorado customers, and (3) 
annually report Colorado purchaser 
information to the Department.  
Under the first requirement, non-collecting 
retailers must "notify Colorado purchasers 
that sales or use tax is due on certain 
purchases . . . and that the state of Colorado 
requires the purchaser to file a sales or use 
tax return." The notice must be included in 
every transaction with a Colorado purchaser, 
and shall inform the purchaser that (1) the 
retailer has not, collected sales or use tax, 
(2) the purchase is not exempt from 
Colorado sales or use tax, and (3) Colorado 
law requires the purchaser to file a sales or 
use tax return and to pay tax owed. 
According to the Department, the 
transactional notice "serves to educate 
consumers about their state use tax liability 
with the aim of increasing voluntary 
compliance."  
Under the second requirement, non-
collecting retailers must mail annual notices 
to Colorado customers who purchased more 
than $500 in goods from them in the 
preceding calendar year. The summary must 
be sent by January 31 of each year and the 
envelope containing it must be "prominently 
marked with the words 'Important tax 
document enclosed.'" The summary must 
inform Colorado consumers of purchase 
dates, items bought, and the amount of each 
purchase made in the preceding calendar 
year. The annual summary tells purchasers 
they have a duty to "file a sales or use tax 
return at the end of every year" in Colorado 
and must inform customers that the retailer 
is required to report to the Department the 
customers' total purchase amounts from the 
preceding calendar year. According to the 
Department, the annual summary "arms the 
consumer with accurate information to 
facilitate reporting and paying the use tax."  
Third, non-collecting retailers must annually 
report information on Colorado purchasers 
to the Department. The annual report shall 
include purchasers' names, billing addresses, 
shipping addresses, and total purchase 
amounts for the previous calendar year. 
According to the Department, this customer 
information report "allows [it] to pursue 
audit and collection actions against 
taxpayers who fail to pay the tax" and "is 
designed to increase voluntary consumer 
compliance with state tax laws because 
consumers know that a third party has 
reported their taxable activity to the taxing 
authority."  
Non-collecting retailers who do not comply 
with any one of Colorado's notice and 
reporting obligations are subject to penalties. 
Alternatively, retailers may choose to collect 
and remit sales tax from Colorado 
purchasers to forgo the notice and reporting 
obligations.  
C. Procedural History  
In June 2010, DMA sued the Department's 
executive director, challenging the 
constitutionality of Colorado's notice and 
reporting requirements. Claims I and II of 
DMA's complaint alleged that Colorado's 
statutory and regulatory obligations are 
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unconstitutional under the Commerce 
Clause because they (1) discriminate against 
interstate commerce ("Discrimination 
Claim"), and (2) impose undue burdens on 
interstate commerce ("Undue Burden 
Claim").  
The district court granted DMA a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting the 
enforcement of the notice and reporting 
requirements. The parties then agreed to an 
expedited process for resolving the two 
Commerce Clause claims and filed cross-
motions for summary judgment on those 
claims.  
On March 30, 2012, the district court 
granted DMA's motion for summary 
judgment and denied the Department's 
motion for summary judgment. On the 
Discrimination Claim, the court concluded 
that the notice and reporting requirements 
facially discriminate against interstate 
commerce. It held these requirements are 
unconstitutional because "[t]he record 
contains essentially no evidence to show that 
the legitimate interests advanced by the 
[Department] cannot be served adequately 
by reasonable nondiscriminatory 
alternatives."  
On the Undue Burden Claim, the district 
court relied on Quill's bright-line rule that 
state governments cannot constitutionally 
require businesses without an in-state 
physical presence to collect and remit sales 
or use taxes. The district court 
acknowledged that Colorado's notice and 
reporting requirements do not obligate out-
of-state retailers to collect and remit taxes. 
But it reasoned that the notice and reporting 
requirements place burdens on out-of-state 
retailers that "are inextricably related in kind 
and purpose to the burdens condemned in 
Quill" These burdens, the district court 
concluded, would unconstitutionally 
interfere with interstate commerce.  
In the same order, the court entered a 
permanent injunction prohibiting 
enforcement of the notice and reporting 
requirements. In granting injunctive relief, 
the district court said DMA had achieved 
actual success on the merits because the 
court had granted summary judgment on the 
Discrimination and Undue Burden Claims.  
Because DMA's non-Commerce Clause 
claims remained unresolved, the district 
court said it would "address in a separate 
order the parties' request that [it] certify this 
order as a final judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
54(b)," from which the Department could 
appeal. However, the Department filed its 
notice of appeal before the district court 
certified the order as final under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). We nevertheless may 
consider the Department's appeal from the 
district court's entry of a permanent 
injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) 
(providing jurisdiction over interlocutory 
orders granting injunctions).  
II. DISCUSSION  
The issue on appeal is whether Colorado's 
notice and reporting requirements for non-
collecting retailers violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Before addressing that 
issue, however, we must determine whether 
the Tax Injunction Act ("TLA") precludes 
federal jurisdiction over DMA's claims. We 
conclude that it does and do not reach the 
merits of this appeal.  
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A. Tax Injunction Act  
The TIA provides that "district courts shall 
not enjoin, suspend or restrain the 
assessment, levy or collection of any tax 
under State law where a plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of 
such State." " The statute has its roots in 
equity practice, in principles of federalism, 
and in recognition of the imperative need of 
a State to administer its own fiscal 
operations." It therefore serves as a "broad 
jurisdictional barrier" that "limit[s] 
drastically federal district court jurisdiction 
to interfere with so important a local 
concern as the collection of taxes." Because 
the TIA is a jurisdictional limitation, we 
must determine whether it prohibits our 
consideration of this appeal regardless of 
whether it was raised in the district court.  
The TIA prohibits our jurisdiction if (1) 
DMA's action seeks to "enjoin, suspend or 
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of 
any tax under State law," and (2) "a plain, 
speedy and efficient remedy may be had in 
the courts of such State," id. We address 
these issues in turn.  
1. Does DMA seek to enjoin, suspend, or 
restrain the assessment, levy or collection 
of a state tax?  
The TIA divests federal district courts of 
jurisdiction over actions that seek to "enjoin, 
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or 
collection of any tax under State law." This 
broad language prohibits federal courts from 
interfering with state tax administration 
through injunctive relief, declaratory relief, 
or damages awards. The TIA "does not limit 
any substantive rights to enjoin a state tax 
but requires only that they be enforced in a 
state court rather than a federal court."  
In its brief, DMA argues the TIA does not 
preclude federal jurisdiction here because 
DMA (1) is not a taxpayer seeking to avoid 
a tax, and (2) challenges notice and 
reporting requirements, not a tax 
assessment.  
a. Non-taxpayer lawsuits  
DMA argues it is not a taxpayer seeking to 
avoid state taxes and thus the TIA does not 
apply. Its argument rests on Hibbs v. Winn, 
where the Supreme Court stated that the TIA 
is triggered when "state taxpayers seek 
federal-court orders enabling them to avoid 
paying state taxes." Relying on our 
precedent interpreting Hibbs, we disagree 
that the TIA applies only when taxpayers 
seek to avoid a state tax in federal court  
The plaintiffs in Hibbs were Arizona 
taxpayers who brought an Establishment 
Clause challenge in federal court to a state 
tax credit for contributions to "school tuition 
organizations." The plaintiffs did not 
challenge a tax imposed on them, but a tax 
benefit to others. The Supreme Court 
determined the TIA did not bar such a 
lawsuit.  
The Court observed that Congress enacted 
the TIA to "direct[] taxpayers to pursue 
refund suits instead of attempting to restrain 
[state tax] collections" through federal 
lawsuits. "In short," the Court said, 
"Congress trained its attention on taxpayers 
who sought to avoid paying their tax bill by 
pursuing a challenge route other than the 
one specified by the taxing authority." 
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Beyond this discussion of taxpayer lawsuits, 
the Hibbs Court explained that the TIA 
applies to federal court relief that "would . . . 
operate[] to reduce the flow of state tax 
revenue" — i.e., federal lawsuits that would 
inhibit state tax assessment, levy, or 
collection. According to the statute's 
legislative history, Congress enacted the 
TIA with "state-revenue-protective 
objectives," including prohibiting 
"taxpayers, with the aid of a federal 
injunction, from withholding large sums, 
thereby disrupting state government 
finances." The Court noted that the Hibbs 
plaintiffs did not challenge a state-revenue-
producing measure — they sought to 
invalidate a tax credit the state gave to 
taxpayers — and that nothing in the TIA 
prohibited a third party from challenging a 
state tax benefit in federal court..  
Although Hibbs states that the TIA applies 
to "cases in which state taxpayers seek 
federal-court orders enabling them to avoid 
paying state taxes," we have not interpreted 
it as holding that the TIA applies only to 
taxpayer suits. For instance, in Hill v. Kemp, 
we applied the TIA outside the context of a 
taxpayer seeking to avoid taxes. In Hill, 
Oklahoma motorists and abortion-rights 
supporters sought to enjoin Oklahoma's 
statutory scheme for specialty vehicle 
license plates. The plaintiffs argued that 
Oklahoma unconstitutionally discriminated 
against their viewpoint by giving more 
favorable terms and conditions to drivers 
who wanted specialty plates with anti-
abortion messages.  
We agreed with the district court that the 
TIA barred the plaintiffs' challenge because 
Oklahoma's specialty license plate scheme 
imposed revenue-generating charges, which 
we viewed as taxes. To enjoin the "entire 
specialty plate regime . . . or even to enjoin a 
portion of it," we said, "would deny 
Oklahoma the use of significant funds" used 
for a variety of state initiatives. Such a result 
"would implicate exactly the sort of 
federalism problems the TIA was designed 
to ameliorate."  
The plaintiffs in Hill argued that, under 
Hibbs, the TIA did not apply because they 
did not "challenge an assessment imposed 
on them, but rather assessments imposed on 
and paid by other persons or entities" — i.e., 
they were not taxpayers trying to avoid a 
tax. We disagreed with this reading of 
Hibbs. We saw "[n]othing in the language of 
the TIA indicat[ing] that our jurisdiction to 
hear challenges to state taxes can be turned 
like a spigot, off when brought by taxpayers 
challenging their own liabilities and on 
when brought by third parties challenging 
the liabilities of others."  
We acknowledged that in Hibbs the Court 
"did point out that TIA cases typically 
involve challenges brought by state 
taxpayers seeking to avoid their own state 
tax liabilities." But we noted that some 
lower-court cases applied the TIA to suits by 
third parties who sought to disrupt state tax 
collection and that the Hibbs Court did not 
criticize these decisions. We interpreted 
Hibbs as holding that the "essential problem 
with the defendant's assertion that the TIA 
barred the suit . . . lay in the fact that the 
plaintiff[s] . . . simply did not seek to enjoin 
the levy or collection of any tax . . . but 
instead sought to challenge the provision of 
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a tax credit." The upshot of Hibbs, we said, 
is that "giving away a tax credit is a very 
different thing than assessing, levying or 
collecting a tax." The nature of the plaintiff 
was not the "essential and dispositive 
distinction under the Supreme Court's 
teaching in Hibbs."  
Accordingly, we have not interpreted Hibbs 
as holding that the TIA applies only when 
taxpayers seek to avoid a state tax. Rather, 
the key question is whether the plaintiff's 
lawsuit seeks to prevent "the State from 
exercising its sovereign power to collect . . . 
revenues." This interpretation adheres to 
Hibbs's instruction that the primary purpose 
of the TIA is to "shield[] state tax 
collections from federal-court restraints."  
Contrary to DMA's position, it cannot avoid 
the TIA merely because it is not a taxpayer 
challenging tax payment.  
b. Notice and reporting obligations  
DMA next argues that it seeks to avoid 
notice and reporting obligations, not a tax. It 
insists that "[t]he fact that such obligations 
relate to use tax owed by Colorado 
consumers does not bring the DMA's suit . . 
. under the umbrella of the TIA as a suit 
seeking to enjoin the collection of a state 
tax."  
But the TIA bars more than suits that would 
enjoin tax collection. It also prohibits federal 
lawsuits that would "restrain the . . . 
collection" of a state tax. The issue is 
whether DMA's attack on Colorado's notice 
and reporting obligations would "restrain" 
Colorado's tax collection.  
i. Suits that restrain tax collection  
In enacting the TIA, Congress chose to 
prohibit three forms of interference with 
state tax collection: "enjoin[ing], 
suspend[ing], or restrain[ing.]" Its use of the 
disjunctive "or" suggests each term has a 
distinct meaning. The terms "enjoin" and 
"suspend" suggest entirely arresting tax 
collection, but "restrain" has a broader 
ordinary meaning.  
Under most definitions, "restrain" means to 
limit, restrict, or hold back. We accept this 
ordinary meaning of "restrain," cognizant of 
the Supreme Court's instruction that the TIA 
is a broad jurisdictional prohibition.  
A lawsuit seeking to enjoin state laws 
enacted to ensure compliance with and 
increase use tax collection, like DMA's 
challenge here, would "restrain" state tax 
collection. Such a lawsuit, if successful, 
would limit, restrict, or hold back the state's 
chosen method of enforcing its tax laws and 
generating revenue. Federalism concerns, 
which the TIA seeks to avoid, arise not only 
when a state tax is challenged in federal 
court, but also when the means for collecting 
a state tax are targeted there. The TIA's use 
of the term "restrain" allows federal courts 
to weed out lawsuits, such as DMA's, that 
attempt to undermine state tax collection.  
Although DMA does not directly challenge 
a tax, it contests the way Colorado wishes to 
collect use tax. This court has said that the 
TIA "cannot be avoided by an attack on the 
administration of a tax as opposed to the 
validity of the tax itself." In making this 
statement, we agreed with Czajkowski v. 
Illinois, which applied the TIA to a 
challenge to state cigarette tax enforcement, 
even though it was "arguable that plaintiffs 
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[were] only seeking to enjoin the state from 
using unconstitutional methods and 
procedures to collect the taxes, rather than 
the collection of taxes itself."  
We acknowledge that DMA's suit is unlike 
TIA cases in which a plaintiff asks a federal 
court to invalidate and enjoin a state tax. 
Even if DMA's constitutional attack on the 
notice and reporting obligations were 
successful, Colorado consumers would still 
owe use taxes by law. But the state-chosen 
method to secure those taxes would be 
compromised, curbing Colorado's ability to 
collect revenue. The inquiry under the TIA 
is whether DMA's lawsuit would restrain 
state tax collection. Although DMA's 
lawsuit differs from the prototypical TIA 
case, its potential to restrain tax collection 
triggers the jurisdictional bar.  
DMA suggests that the obligations imposed 
on non-collecting retailers merely "relate to 
use tax owed by Colorado consumers." We 
disagree with DMA's characterization and 
attempt to distance the notice and reporting 
obligations from the collection of a state tax. 
Colorado enacted the notice and reporting 
obligations to increase taxpayers' 
compliance with use tax laws and thereby 
increase use tax collection. Even the title of 
the bill that later became law reflects its tax 
collection purpose: "An Act Concerning the 
Collection of Sales and Use Taxes on Sales 
Made by Out-of-State Retailers." One of the 
challenged requirements, the annual 
customer information reports sent to the 
Department, would aid the Department's 
auditing of taxpayers, a significant tax 
collection mechanism. Indeed, the tax 
collection goal of the notice and reporting 
requirements is apparent because out-of-
state retailers who voluntarily collect tax on 
Colorado purchases are exempt.  
The purposes of the TIA apply both to a 
lawsuit that would directly enjoin a tax and 
one that would enjoin a procedure required 
by the state's tax statutes and regulations that 
aims to enforce and increase tax collection. 
Either action interferes with state revenue 
collection and falls within the "traditional 
heartland of TIA cases" that dismiss federal 
lawsuits to protect state coffers.  
Other courts have applied the TIA to attacks 
on tax collection methods, rather than taxes 
themselves. In Gass v. County of Allegheny, 
the Third Circuit held that the TIA barred a 
lawsuit challenging a state tax appeals 
procedure. Although the appellant argued 
that its lawsuit did not affect the state's 
ability to collect tax, the appellate court 
concluded that the "appeal process is 
directed to the . . . ultimate goal and 
responsibility of determining the proper 
amount of tax to assess" and thus fell within 
the TIA.  
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has applied the 
TIA to bar a suit that would have prohibited 
disclosure of tax information to state taxing 
authorities. The lawsuit sought to withhold 
"earnings records and other tax related 
information to the Idaho and Montana taxing 
authorities." As here, the taxpayer would 
have continued to owe tax, but the states 
would have been deprived of the means to 
calculate and collect it. The Ninth Circuit 
said, "[t]he fact that the injunction would 
restrain assessment indirectly rather than 
directly does not make the [TIA] 
inapplicable." The Ninth Circuit has since 
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explained that whether the TIA applies 
depends on "the effect of federal litigation 
on the state's ability to collect revenues, and 
will only bar the adjudication of a federal 
constitutional claim in federal court if a 
judgment for the plaintiffs will hamper a 
state's ability to raise revenue." We have 
little problem concluding that DMA's 
lawsuit would hamper Colorado's ability to 
raise revenue.  
ii. DMA's additional arguments  
DMA responds that the Supreme Court has 
cautioned that the TIA is not a "sweeping 
congressional direction to prevent federal-
court interference with all aspects of state 
tax administration." We have acknowledged 
this point, and continue to do so here. But in 
making this pronouncement, the Supreme 
Court was distinguishing between federal 
lawsuits that would not curb state revenue 
collection, and therefore would not fall 
within the TIA, and "[f]ederal-court relief 
[that] . . . [would] reduce the flow of state 
tax revenue," and thus trigger the TIA. 
DMA's Commerce Clause claims fall within 
the latter category.  
DMA also cites two federal circuit court 
cases to argue that our interpretation of the 
TIA is overly broad: United Parcel Service 
Inc. v. Flores-Galarza ("UPS"), and Wells v. 
Malloy.  
In UPS, the First Circuit addressed whether 
the Butler Act, a close relative of the TIA, 
deprived it of jurisdiction over a challenge 
to Puerto Rico's interstate package delivery 
scheme. The Butler Act provides that "[n]o 
suit for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax imposed 
by the laws of Puerto Rico shall be 
maintained in the United States District 
Court for the District of Puerto Rico." UPS 
challenged Puerto Rico's statutory scheme 
prohibiting an interstate carrier from 
delivering a package unless the recipient 
presented a certificate of excise tax 
payment. Alternatively, interstate carriers 
could prepay excise tax and seek 
reimbursement from package recipients, but 
this option imposed expensive and 
burdensome statutory and regulatory 
obligations.  
The First Circuit determined the Butler Act 
did not bar UPS's action. It reasoned that 
"UPS sought to enjoin only those provisions 
. . . that prohibit or interfere with the 
delivery of packages. UPS did not challenge 
the amount or validity of the excise tax, nor 
the authority of the Secretary to assess or 
collect it." The court also said that Puerto 
Rico's package "delivery ban targets third 
parties instead of those who owe the tax." It 
found that Puerto Rico's laws produced 
excise tax revenue "indirectly through a 
more general use of coercive power" and did 
not create "a system of tax collection within 
the meaning of the Butler Act."  
Even if UPS counsels against applying the 
TIA here, we decline to follow it. Much of 
UPS's reasoning conflicts with our own 
binding case law. For instance, UPS found it 
important that the plaintiff did "not 
challenge the amount or validity of the 
excise tax," but we have said the TIA 
"cannot be avoided by an attack on the 
administration of a tax as opposed to the 
validity of the tax itself." The UPS court 
also declined to apply the Butler Act 
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because Puerto Rico's laws targeted third 
parties, not taxpayers. But, as discussed 
above, we recognized in Hill that the TIA 
can apply to third-party lawsuits that enjoin, 
suspend, or restrain tax collection. Indeed, 
much of the reasoning in UPS would have 
counseled against applying the TIA to the 
license plate lawsuit in Hill.  
DMA also cites Wells v. Malloy. In Wells, 
the plaintiff sought to enjoin a Vermont 
provision that required suspension of his 
driver's license for failure to pay motor 
vehicle taxes. The plaintiff did not dispute 
owing taxes. The district court determined 
the TIA barred the action, but the Second 
Circuit disagreed.  
The court concluded the plaintiff was not 
seeking to restrain the collection of a tax. It 
said, '"Collection,' of course, could be read 
broadly to include anything that a state has 
determined to be a likely method of securing 
payment." But the court interpreted 
"collection" to mean "methods similar to 
assessment and levy . . . that would produce 
money or other property directly, rather than 
indirectly through a more general use of 
coercive power."  
Like Wells, we do not interpret the TIA as 
applying to any action challenging a state 
law that could possibly secure tax payment. 
But here DMA challenges laws enacted to 
notify consumers of their duty to pay use tax 
and to garner information on consumer 
purchases to ensure tax compliance through 
audits. Its lawsuit targets measures that 
attempt to ensure tax compliance in the first 
instance, not sanctions imposed after a 
taxpayer has admittedly refused to pay 
taxes. Colorado's laws are not a reactive and 
punitive "general use of coercive power" to 
entice tax payment from individuals who 
admittedly refuse to pay, and we therefore 
do not think Wells applies here.  
Finally, we mention one recent 
development. After oral argument in this 
case, this court considered the application of 
the Anti-Injunction Act ("AIA"),  in Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius. Using 
somewhat similar language to the TIA, the 
AIA states that "no suit for the purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of 
any tax shall be maintained in any court by 
any person, whether or not such person is 
the person against whom such tax was 
assessed." Whereas the TIA protects state 
tax measures, the AIA "protects the [federal] 
Government's ability to collect a consistent 
stream of revenue, by barring litigation to 
enjoin or otherwise obstruct the collection of 
taxes."  
In Hobby Lobby, two corporations 
challenged a federal requirement that they 
provide employees with health insurance 
coverage for certain contraceptive methods. 
Failure to comply with the federal 
requirement exposed the corporations to a 
"tax" under 26 U.S.C. § 4980. We 
considered whether the AIA barred the 
corporations' action because their suit might 
enjoin a tax on them for non-compliance 
with the health care coverage requirement.  
We explained that the corporations were 
"not seeking to enjoin the collection of taxes 
or the execution of any IRS regulation; they 
[were] seeking to enjoin the enforcement, by 
whatever method, of one HHS regulation" 
regarding contraceptive coverage. The "tax 
[was] just one of many collateral 
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consequences" of noncompliance with the 
federal contraceptive-coverage requirement. 
Moreover, "[t]he statutory scheme ma[de] 
clear that the tax at issue [was] no more than 
a penalty for violating regulations . . . and 
the AIA does not apply to the exaction of a 
purely regulatory tax."  
Our position in this appeal is consistent with 
the analysis in Hobby Lobby. The 
corporations in Hobby Lobby challenged a 
health insurance regulation and a possible 
penalty for failing to comply with that 
regulation. To the extent that the penalty 
constituted a "tax" under the AIA, an issue 
that this court seemed to doubt in Hobby 
Lobby, it was a "more general use of 
coercive power," and fell outside the bounds 
of the AIA.  
Here, DMA challenges notice and reporting 
requirements in Colorado's sales and use tax 
statutory scheme. These requirements are 
not a coercive use of power or punitive in 
nature — they are the state's chosen means 
of enforcing use tax collection in the first 
instance. And the state's use tax is 
indisputably a "tax" under the TIA. The 
revenue-generating, non-punitive purpose of 
the notice and reporting obligations places 
them squarely within the TIA's protection.  
DMA's action seeks to restrain the collection 
of sales and use taxes in Colorado. The 
state's notice and reporting obligations, 
while not taxes themselves, were enacted 
with the sole purpose of increasing use tax 
collection. Indeed, the obligations for non-
collecting retailers are a substitute for 
requiring these same retailers to collect sales 
and use taxes at the point of sale, an 
approach the Colorado legislature deemed 
foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision 
in Quill. Having determined that DMA's 
action falls within the TIA's prohibition on 
federal lawsuits that would "enjoin, suspend 
or restrain the assessment, levy or collection 
of any tax under State law," we proceed to 
the statute's second element.  
2. Does DMA have a plain, speedy, and 
efficient remedy in Colorado?  
For the TIA to apply, DMA must also have a 
"plain, speedy and efficient remedy . . . in 
the courts of [Colorado]." This part of the 
TIA requires that Colorado law offer a "full 
hearing and judicial determination" on its 
claims. We must be convinced that Colorado 
law provides DMA with sufficient process 
to challenge the notice and reporting 
requirements.  
As previously discussed, Congress intended 
for the TIA to impose a "broad jurisdictional 
barrier" that "limit[s] drastically federal 
district court jurisdiction to interfere with so 
important a local concern as the collection 
of taxes." The TIA's "plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy" provision is therefore 
interpreted "narrowly" to "be faithful to 
[this] congressional intent." Our narrow 
inquiry asks only whether the "state-court 
remedy . . . meets certain minimal 
procedural criteria." The TIA does not 
require that the state provide the best or 
speediest remedy. And "the likelihood of [a] 
plaintiff's success in the state court is not a 
factor . . . when determining whether the 
jurisdictional prohibition of [the TIA] 
applies."  
DMA does not challenge the process 
available to it in Colorado. Colorado state 
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courts can and do grant relief in cases 
challenging the constitutionality of tax 
measures. Further, Colorado courts have 
considered Commerce Clause challenges 
involving taxes. Circuit courts have 
routinely said that such available process in 
state court satisfies the TIA's "plain, speedy 
and efficient remedy" element.  
We are hesitant, however, to stop our 
analysis there. The Supreme Court in Hibbs 
suggested that the TIA does not refer to 
general process available in state court. The 
Court said that a "plain, speedy and efficient 
remedy" under 28 U.S.C. § 1341 is "not one 
designed for the universe of plaintiffs who 
sue the State. Rather, it [is] a remedy  
tailormade for taxpayers." It then cited to 
decisions in which taxpayers were allowed 
to protest taxes in state court after first 
seeking a refund under state administrative 
law. Although the Hibbs Court was not 
deciding any issue specifically dealing with 
the "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" 
language of the TIA, its brief discussion 
suggests that the statutory language may 
contemplate something more than the 
general availability of a remedy to "the 
universe of plaintiffs who sue the State." 
As discussed earlier, in Hill v. Kemp, this 
court determined that the TIA may bar third-
party non-taxpayer lawsuits, despite the 
Hibbs Court's discussion of taxpayer 
lawsuits. In Hill, the plaintiffs had a "plain, 
speedy and efficient" remedy in state court 
because Oklahoma tax statutes provided "a 
general right to protest taxes before the Tax 
Commission," as well as a right of action to 
remedy grievances for any state tax law that 
is contrary to federal law or the Constitution.  
Thus, in Hill, the plaintiffs could seek a 
remedy under specific state tax laws. This 
was consistent with Hibbs in that these 
remedies were not available to the universe 
of plaintiffs suing the state. Accordingly, we 
address whether Colorado's tax laws 
similarly provide a more specific remedy to 
DMA: How can DMA or the remote 
retailers it represents challenge Colorado's 
statutory scheme outside of filing an action 
in state court for injunctive or declaratory 
relief?  
DMA complains that Colorado's laws force 
remote retailers to choose between obeying 
the notice and reporting requirements and 
remitting sales tax to the Department. Much 
like a taxpayer who seeks to challenge a 
state tax but must first pay the tax and seek a 
refund under state law, a remote retailer 
could choose to remit sales tax and then seek 
a refund. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 39-26-703(2.5)(a) 
allows retailers to "file any claim for refund 
with the executive director of the department 
of revenue." In pursuing the refund, the 
retailer could argue that Colorado laws 
unconstitutionally coerce it to choose 
between collecting a sales tax and 
complying with the notice and reporting 
requirements, the same Commerce Clause 
argument it brings here. The director then 
would "promptly examine such claim and . . 
. make a refund or allow a credit to any 
[retailer] who establishes that such [retailer] 
overpaid the tax due." If the retailer is 
"aggrieved at the final decision," it may seek 
review in the state district courts.  
Another remedy for a remote retailer is to 
challenge any penalties it incurs for failing 
to comply with the notice and reporting 
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obligations. Under Colo. Rev. Stat § 39-21-
103, a taxpayer may dispute a tax owed to 
the Department after receiving a notice of 
deficiency and may request a hearing. 
Although this provision discusses tax 
deficiencies, it also contemplates disputes 
involving penalties owed to the Department. 
This provision also contemplates the 
taxpayer and the executive director agreeing 
that "a question of law arising under the 
United States or Colorado constitutions" is 
implicated in the dispute, bypassing a 
hearing, and going "directly to the district 
court."  
We are satisfied that Colorado provides 
avenues for remote retailers to Challenge the 
scheme allegedly forcing them to choose 
between collecting sales tax and complying 
with the notice and reporting requirements. 
Colorado's administrative remedies provide 
for hearings and appeals to state court, as 
well as ultimate review in the United States 
Supreme Court. Whether DMA or a remote 
retailer it represents files a similar lawsuit in 
state court seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief, or whether it follows 
Colorado's administrative tax procedures, a 
plain, speedy, and efficient remedy is 
available in Colorado.  
III. CONCLUSION  
The TIA divested the district court of 
jurisdiction over DMA's Commerce Clause 
claims, and we therefore have no 
jurisdiction to reach the merits of this 
appeal. We remand for the district court to 
dismiss DMA's Commerce Clause claims 
for lack of jurisdiction, dissolve the 
permanent injunction entered against the 
Department, and take further appropriate 
action consistent with this opinion 
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“High Court to Hear Appeal Over Colorado 'Amazon Tax' Law” 
Law360 
Drew Singer 
July 1, 2014 
The Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed to 
hear a case challenging Colorado’s so-called 
Amazon tax law, taking up the issue of 
whether federal judges have the power to 
decide whether states may impose reporting 
requirements on out-of-state retailers as part 
of their tax laws. The closely watched case 
gives Supreme Court justices the chance to 
clarify the scope of the Tax Injunction Act’s 
jurisdiction. The TIA, in general, prevents 
federal courts from interfering with state tax 
collection regimes. The Direct Marketing 
Association, a trade association of direct-
marketing retailers, asked the high court in 
February to review the Tenth Circuit’s use 
of the law. 
“Jurisdictional cases are always important 
because it's essential for the appellate court 
system, and ultimately the Supreme Court, 
to indicate when you can go to federal 
court,” association attorney George S. 
Isaacson of Brann & Isaacson said in March. 
“And when you have [a court] expanding 
the scope of the TIA without any clear 
guidance, it's unsettling to businesses who 
want to be able to have certainty in pursuing 
claims in federal court.” 
The dispute stems from a 2010 Colorado 
law requiring remote retailers selling to in-
state customers to comply with a number of 
notice and reporting obligations intended to 
beef up the state's use-tax collections. 
The DMA filed a complaint challenging the 
constitutionality of Colorado’s law shortly 
after it was adopted, arguing that the new 
regulations, which don't apply to retailers 
located in Colorado, discriminate against 
out-of-state retailers. U.S. District Judge 
Robert E. Blackburn agreed, ruling that 
Colorado's reporting requirements strained 
interstate commerce in violation of the U.S. 
Constitution's Commerce Clause. 
But, on appeal, the Tenth Circuit overturned 
the decision on procedural grounds. The 
appeals court said Judge Blackburn was 
precluded from considering the merits of 
DMA's complaint because the district court 
lacked jurisdiction under the TIA. 
“The TIA divested the district court of 
jurisdiction over DMA’s Commerce Clause 
claims, and we therefore have no 
jurisdiction to reach the merits of this 
appeal,” the Tenth Circuit said. The appeals 
court, citing a lack of jurisdiction, directed 
Judge Blackburn to throw out DMA's 
Commerce Clause claims. 
Now before the Supreme Court, the DMA 
says in its petition that the constitutional 
question presented in its complaint does not 
fall under the purview of the TIA because it 
is not challenging Colorado's tax per se. 
Instead, DMA argues, its challenge avoids 
the tax question and targets only the state 
law's reporting requirements. 
352 
 
“It is the nontax, notice and reporting 
obligations imposed on noncollecting 
retailers under the act that place the DMA's 
challenge outside the scope of the TIA,” 
DMA says in its petition. 
Isaacson said jurisdictional questions over 
the TIA were not originally raised in the 
state's appeal. He said the appeals court 
decision conflicts with prior rulings in the 
First and Second circuits. 
Colorado's regulations require three things: 
First, out-of-state retailers must send 
“transactional notices” to their Colorado 
buyers notifying them that they must file 
state sales- or use-tax returns declaring items 
purchased from those retailers. 
Second, an out-of-state retailer must send an 
annual report to each Colorado buyer 
itemizing the total amount of purchases the 
buyer made from that particular retailer. The 
report, known as an annual purchase 
summary, must also remind the buyer that 
he or she is responsible for filing a Colorado 
sales or use tax return. 
Third, the law requires out-of-state retailers 
to file an annual report with the Colorado 
Department of Revenue that shows the total 
amount of purchases Colorado buyers made 
during the preceding calendar year, known 
as customer information reports. 
Retailers are fined if they fail to comply 
with the requirements — $5 per 
transactional notice violation, capped at 
$50,000 per retailer; $10 per violation of the 
annual purchase summary requirement, 
capped at $100,000 per retailer; and $10 per 
violation of the customer information report 
requirement, also capped at $100,000 per 
retailer. 
DMA is represented by George S.Isaacson 
and Matthew P. Schaefer of Brann & 
Isaacson LLP. 
The case is Direct Marketing Association v. 
Brohl et al., case number 13-1032, in the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
. 
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“Supreme Court to Hear DMA Privacy Suit, Review Colorado Web Tax Sales 
Statute” 
Bloomberg 
Alexander Ripps 
July 7, 2014 
The U.S. Supreme Court July 1 agreed to 
hear a case challenging a Colorado law 
requiring out-of-state retailers to report to 
the state the names, addresses and total 
annual purchases of their Colorado 
customers. 
The court July 1 said it will review a case 
brought by the Direct Marketing Association 
(DMA), which seeks to overturn a ruling by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit that held that the Tax Injunction Act 
(TIA) barred federal court jurisdiction to 
enjoin the enforcement of the Colorado law. 
“We are pleased that the Supreme Court has 
agree to hear this important case,” Peggy 
Hudson, the DMA's senior vice president of 
government affairs, said in a July 1 DMA 
statement. “DMA began this fight four years 
ago with the goal of protecting consumer 
privacy by safeguarding businesses from 
being forced to divulge their customers' 
purchase history to the state of Colorado. 
Along the way, the fight has broadened to 
encompass not only issues of privacy, but 
also fundamental constitutional questions 
about access to federal courts.” 
The DMA's lead attorney, George S. 
Isaacson of Brann & Isaacson in Lewiston, 
Maine, told Bloomberg BNA July 1 that 
“the DMA is pleased the Supreme Court has 
decided to address the scope of the TIA.” He 
said the case involves constitutional 
questions that are important to retailers who 
offer their products in multiple states. 
Disputes over the release of customer 
purchase information from online retailers, 
such as Amazon.com, haven't been limited 
to Colorado. North Carolina's Department of 
Tax Revenue was one of the first state tax 
agencies to face legal challenges over 
demands for Web customer data. 
Court Challenges 
The DMA initially brought its lawsuit in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of 
Colorado, challenging a reporting 
requirement imposed on out-of-state vendors 
that don't collect and remit state sales and 
use taxes. The law requires those vendors to 
provide their customers' purchase history 
information to the state, the DMA explained 
in its statement. 
“In the lawsuit, DMA contends that the 
Colorado law constitutes an unprecedented 
invasion of consumer privacy and unfairly 
discriminates against interstate commerce by 
targeting solely out-of-state merchants,” the 
DMA said. 
In 2012, that court ruled in favor of the 
DMA, calling the “Amazon law” 
unconstitutional for violating the dormant 
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Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
The court imposed a permanent injunction 
preventing the state from executing the law. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit reversed the decision and dismissed 
the case, citing the lack of federal 
jurisdiction due to the TIA, 28 U.S.C. § 
1341. An attempt by the DMA to have the 
case reconsidered en banc was denied. 
After failing to get a full review from the 
Tenth Circuit, the case was removed to 
Colorado state court where the DMA won a 
preliminary injunction. Briefs for summary 
judgment in that case are due the week of 
July 7, Isaacson and Christopher Oswald, 
the DMA's vice president of state affairs, 
told Bloomberg BNA July 1. 
Notice, Reporting Requirements 
Oswald said the main issues in the case are 
the notice and reporting aspects of the 
Colorado law. “Those requirements are 
separate and apart from the taxation 
element,” he said. 
Oswald noted that the Supreme Court's 
decision could have implications beyond 
Colorado, particularly in states considering 
similar schemes such as Michigan and 
Colorado.  
Should the Supreme Court rule in the 
DMA's favor, Oswald said he feels 
confident about the DMA's chances of 
succeeding on the merits of the case. 
“The underlying question of whether the 
notice and reporting requirements are 
constitutional or not is something we won 
on in federal district court. We also won a 
preliminary injunction in state court. So we 
feel pretty confident,” he said. 
George S. Isaacson and Matthew P. Schaefer 
of Brann & Isaacson, in Lewiston, Maine, 
represented the DMA. John Suthers, Daniel 
D. Domenico, Melanie J. Snyder and Grant 
to Sullivan of the Colorado State Attorney 
General's Office, in Denver, represented the 
director of the Colorado Department of 
Revenue. 
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“Tenth Circuit: Tax Injunction Act Precluded Federal Jurisdiction in 
Colorado’s E-Commerce Use Tax Reporting Requirements Case” 
CBA Legal Connection 
Ellen Buckley 
August 29, 2013 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
published its opinion in Direct Marketing 
Ass’n v. Brohl on Tuesday, August 20 2013. 
Colorado imposes a 2.9% use tax on 
tangible goods stored, used, or consumed in 
the state when no sales tax has been paid. 
Because the dormant Commerce Clause 
prohibits Colorado from forcing retailers 
with no in-state physical presence to collect 
and remit taxes on sales to Colorado 
consumers, the state requires its residents to 
report and pay use taxes to the Department 
with their income tax returns. In 2010 the 
Colorado legislature enacted statutory 
requirements for non-collecting retailers. 
The statute and its implementing regulations 
impose three principal obligations on non-
collecting retailers whose gross sales in 
Colorado exceed $100,000: they must (1) 
provide transactional notices to Colorado 
purchasers, (2) send annual purchase 
summaries to Colorado customers, and (3) 
annually report Colorado purchaser 
information to the Department. 
The Direct Marketing Association (DMA) 
sued the Department of Revenue’s executive 
director, challenging the constitutionality of 
the state’s new notice and reporting 
requirements. The district court concluded 
that Colorado’s requirements for non-
collecting retailers discriminated against and 
placed undue burdens on interstate 
commerce, in violation of the Commerce 
Clause and entered a permanent injunction 
prohibiting enforcement of the state 
requirements. The Department appealed. 
The Tenth Circuit did not reach the 
Commerce Clause issue on appeal because it 
held that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) 
precluded federal jurisdiction over DMA’s 
claims. The TIA provides that “district 
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain 
the assessment, levy or collection of any tax 
under State law where a plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of 
such State.” 
The DMA argued that it sought to avoid 
notice and reporting obligations, not a tax, 
so the TIA did not apply. The court 
disagreed. “The purposes of the TIA apply 
both to a lawsuit that would directly enjoin a 
tax and one that would enjoin a procedure 
required by the state’s tax statutes and 
regulations that aims to enforce and increase 
tax collection.” The court also found that a 
plain, speedy and efficient remedy is 
available to retailers subject to the Colorado 
law. 
The court remanded to the district court to 
dismiss DMA’s Commerce Clause claims 
for lack of jurisdiction and to dissolve the 
permanent injunction. 
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Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter 
12-1497 
 
Ruling Below: United States ex rel. Benjamin Carter c. Halliburton Co., 710 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 
2013), cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 2899 (2014). 
 
Relator brought qui tam action against government contractor under the False Claims Act (FCA), 
alleging the contractor falsely billed the United States for services performed in Iraq. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, James C. Cacheris, Senior 
District Judge, dismissed the complaint. Relator appealed. 
 
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act – a criminal code 
provision that tolls the statute of limitations for “any offense” involving fraud against the 
government “[w]hen the United States is at war,” and which this Court has instructed must be 
“narrowly construed” in favor of repose – applies to claims of civil fraud brought by private 
relators, and is triggered without a formal declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite 
tolling; and (2) whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous courts, the False Claims Act’s 
so-called “first-to-file” bar – which creates a race to the courthouse to reward relators who 
promptly disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting repetitive, parasitic claims – 
functions as a “one case- at-a-time” rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative claims so long 
as no prior claim is pending at the time of filing. 
 
 
UNITED STATES ex rel. Benjamin CARTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
HALLIBURTON CO.; Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.; Service Employees 
International, Inc.; KBR, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 
Decided on March 18, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
FLOYD, Circuit Judge. 
Reversed and remanded by published 
opinion. Judge FLOYD wrote the majority 
opinion, in which Judge WYNN joined. 
Judge WYNN wrote a separate concurring 
opinion. Judge AGEE wrote a separate 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.  
Appellant Benjamin Carter appeals the 
district court's dismissal of his complaint 
with prejudice. The matter was initiated 
upon Carter's filing of a qui tarn lawsuit 
under the False Claims Act (FCA). The 
subject matter underlying this case involves 
Appellees' — Halli-burton Company; KBR, 
Inc.; Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.; 
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and Service Employees International, Inc. 
(collectively KBR) — alleged fraudulent 
billing of the United States for services 
provided to the military forces serving in 
Iraq. The district court concluded that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
Carter's claims because of the False Claims 
Act's first-to-file bar. The district court also 
held that Carter's complaint had been filed 
beyond the six-year statute of limitations in 
the FCA and was not tolled by the Wartime 
Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA), 
which the court ruled does not apply to non-
intervened qui tam cases. Accordingly, the 
district court dismissed Carter's complaint 
with prejudice. Because we conclude that 
the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction and find that the WSLA applies 
to this action, we reverse. Further, because it 
may be appropriate for the district court to 
make factual findings to consider the public 
disclosure claim urged by KBR, we remand 
so the district court can consider this issue.  
I.  
In his complaint, Carter brings a qui tam 
action under the False Claims Act. The FCA 
allows the United States to bring suit to 
recover funds and also allows, through the 
Act's qui tam provisions, for a private 
plaintiff (relator) to sue in place of the 
government and keep a share of the 
proceeds. Carter alleges that KBR falsely 
billed the United States for services 
performed in Iraq. Specifically, Carter 
alleges that KBR "knowingly presented to 
an officer or employee of the United States 
Government false or fraudulent claims for 
payment or approval in violation of 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)." Carter goes on to 
allege that KBR "knowingly made, used, or 
caused to be made or used, false records or 
statements to get false or fraudulent claims 
paid or approved by the Government" in 
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).  
KBR provided logistical services to the 
United States military in Iraq under a 
government contract. Carter worked for 
KBR as a reverse osmosis water purification 
unit (ROWPU) operator at two camps in 
Iraq from mid-January 2005 until April 
2005. Carter was hired to test and purify 
water for the troops in Iraq. Carter claims 
that KBR was in fact not purifying water 
during the time period but was repeatedly 
misrepresenting to the United States that it 
was. Carter submits that water purification 
did not actually begin until May 2005. 
Further, Carter maintains that he and his 
fellow employees were instructed to submit 
time sheets for twelve-hour days for work 
that they performed on ROWPU functions. 
During this time, Carter states that he was 
actually not working any hours on ROWPU 
functions. Carter also contends as part of an 
overall scheme by KBR to overbill the 
government for labor charges, that all trade 
employees were required to submit time 
sheets totaling exactly twelve hours per day 
and eighty-four hours per week and that it 
was "routine practice" of the employees to 
do so regardless of actual hours worked. As 
a result, according to Carter, the United 
States paid KBR for work not actually 
performed.  
Carter filed his original complaint under seal 
on February 1, 2006, in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of 
California. After over two years of 
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investigation into the matter, the action was 
unsealed in May 2008. Shortly thereafter, 
the case was transferred to the Eastern 
District of Virginia in October 2008, at 
which point Carter amended his complaint. 
The district court dismissed Carter's first 
amended complaint without prejudice in 
January 2009 for failure to plead fraud with 
particularity. Carter then amended his 
complaint for a second time and refiled his 
complaint in January 2009 (Carter 2009). 
KBR then moved to dismiss Carter's second 
amended complaint under Rules 9(b) and 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which the district court granted 
in part. The district court, however, refused 
to dismiss counts 1 and 4. Count 1 alleged a 
scheme by KBR to submit fraudulent claims 
for payment to the government, and count 4 
alleged fraudulent statements knowingly 
made to the government to receive claims 
for payment. At this point, KBR answered 
the remaining allegations and the case 
proceeded through discovery, which closed 
in March 2010.  
In March 2010, one month before the 
scheduled trial date, the parties were 
contacted by the United States Department 
of Justice, who informed them of the 
existence of a False Claims Act case 
containing similar allegations filed under 
seal in December 2005, in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of 
California. Thorpe also alleges that KBR's 
standard operating procedure was billing 
twelve hours per day, without regard to the 
actual hours worked to perpetuate a scheme 
to overbill the government. In April 2010, 
KBR filed a motion to dismiss Carter 2009, 
arguing that Thorpe constituted a "related" 
action under FCA § 3730(b)(5). In response, 
Carter argued that Thorpe was materially 
different from his case because he focused 
on KBR's alleged fraudulent 
misrepresentation to the government that 
KBR was actually performing water services 
for which it was submitting bills.  
The district court rejected Carter's 
characterization, reasoning that he must 
show that KBR employees were reporting 
hours that they did not work and the fact that 
KBR was not performing water services is 
merely evidence that the time sheets were 
false. The district court dismissed Carter 
2009 without prejudice on May 10, 2010. 
Carter appealed the dismissal on July 13, 
2010.  
Thereafter, the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California 
dismissed the Thorpe action on July 30, 
2010. In response, Carter refiled his 
complaint (Carter 2010) in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia while his appeal was still pending. 
When Carter refiled his complaint, he also 
sought to dismiss his appeal in the 2009 
action. This Court granted Carter's motion to 
dismiss his appeal on February 14, 2011. 
Meanwhile, Carter 2010 proceeded in the 
district court and, on May 24, 2011, the 
district court dismissed Carter's complaint 
without prejudice, on the grounds that Carter 
had filed Carter 2010 while Carter 2009 was 
still pending on appeal, thereby creating his 
own jurisdictional bar under the FCA's first-
to-file provision. Carter chose not to appeal 
this ruling.  
However, Carter refiled his complaint 
(Carter 2011) on June 2, 2011. The district 
359 
 
court unsealed the complaint on August 24, 
2011. The complaint in this case is identical 
to the earlier 2010 complaint as well the 
second amended complaint filed in 2009. 
After the complaint was unsealed, KBR 
moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the 
complaint was barred by two related actions, 
that the case was time barred, and that the 
case was barred by the public disclosure 
provision of the FCA.  
At the time Carter 2011 was filed, two 
allegedly related cases were pending: United 
States ex rel. Duprey, and another action — 
that is under seal — filed in Texas in 2007. 
Duprey and the Texas action allege that 
KBR "knowingly presented, or caused to be 
presented, to an officer or employee of the 
United States Government, false or 
fraudulent claims for payment or approval in 
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)." Since 
at least March 2003, KBR provided shipping 
and transportation  support in Iraq for the 
United States military. The Duprey relator 
was employed by KBR as a truck driver in 
Iraq from March 27, 2005, to January 15, 
2006. The Texas relators were also truck 
drivers in Iraq, and at least one relator was 
present in Iraq during the period of 
September 2003 to March 15, 2004. Both 
complaints allege substantially similar 
claims, namely that KBR had a policy that 
its drivers enter time sheets reflecting a 
twelve hour workday and an eighty-four 
hour work week, without regard to actual 
hours worked. The relators alleged that this 
practice was widespread throughout KBR's 
operations in Iraq and elsewhere. Duprey 
was subsequently voluntarily dismissed in 
October 2011, and the Texas action was 
voluntarily dismissed in March 2012.  
The district court granted KBR's motion and 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice on 
November 29, 2011, ruling that the case was 
related to Duprey and the Texas action. The 
court also found that Duprey was "pending" 
for purposes of the first-to-file bar, because 
it had not been dismissed at the time Carter 
2011 was filed. The court considered 
whether the Texas action was also "pending" 
as to bar Carter 2011, but ultimately 
concluded that it need not decide the issue 
because at least one case — Duprey — was 
pending. The district court also held that 
Carter 2011 had been filed beyond the 
FCA's six-year statute of limitations and 
would be time barred should it be refiled. 
Because of this reason, the court dismissed 
the case with prejudice. The district court 
further held that Carter's action was not 
tolled by the WSLA. The district court held 
that the WSLA does not apply to claims 
under the FCA brought by private relators. 
Finding ample grounds to dismiss the action, 
the district court did not consider whether 
the complaint was barred by the public 
disclosure provision of the FCA. Carter 
timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
II.  
We review de novo the district court's legal 
rulings, such as its granting of KBR's 
motion to dismiss. To the extent that the 
decisions below involved legal conclusions 
based upon factual determinations, we 
review the factual findings for clear error, 
viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Carter.  
III.  
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We first address Carter's contention that the 
WSLA tolls his action and there-fore, that 
his claims are not time barred under the 
FCA.  
A.  
First, as a general matter, qui tarn actions 
must be brought within six years after the 
date on which the alleged violation 
occurred. The WSLA was enacted in 1942 
to extend the time for prosecution to bring 
charges relating to criminal fraud offenses 
against the United States during times of 
war. When enacted, the law applied to 
"offenses involving the defrauding or 
attempts to defraud the United States . . . and 
now indictable under any existing statutes." 
When amended in 1944, the phrase "now 
indictable" was deleted. The WSLA was 
later codified, and is now to be used 
whenever the country is at war.  
The Fifth Circuit has determined that the 
WSLA has three components: "(1) a 
triggering clause ("When the United States 
is at war the running of [the applicable 
statute of limitations] shall be suspended . . 
.') (2) a suspension period ('three years'), and 
(3) a termination clause ('suspended until . . . 
after the termination of hostilities as 
proclaimed by the President or by a 
concurrent resolution of Congress.')." The 
Supreme Court has held that the WSLA 
applies only to offenses committed after the 
triggering clause and before the termination 
of hostilities. The running of the limitations 
period then begins when hostilities are 
terminated.  
Prior to October 4, 2008, the WSLA 
provided:  
When the United States is at war the 
running of any statute of limitations 
applicable to any offense (1) 
involving fraud or attempted fraud 
against the United States . . . shall be 
suspended until three years after the 
termination of hostilities as 
proclaimed by the President or by a 
concurrent resolution of Congress.  
In 2008, the Wartime Enforcement of Fraud 
Act (WEFA) amended the WSLA to expand 
its times of operation to "[w]hen the United 
States is at war or Congress has enacted 
specific authorization for the use of the 
Armed Forces, as described in section 5(b) 
of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 
1544(b))." Additionally, the suspension 
period was extended until "5 years after the 
termination of hostilities as proclaimed by a 
Presidential proclamation, with notice to 
Congress, or by a concurrent resolution of 
Congress."  
Courts are in disagreement as to which 
version of the WSLA applies to offenses 
that occurred before the amendments of 
2008. Additionally, courts are in conflict as 
to whether the pre-amendment WSLA 
requires a formal declaration of war or 
whether the authorized use of military force 
shall suffice.  
B.  
Carter contends that the conflict in Iraq in 
2005 is sufficient to trigger WSLA's "at 
war" status under either version of the 
WSLA. KBR however, urges us not to apply 
the post-amendment WSLA because it 
believes that the post-amendment WSLA 
implicates its constitutional due process 
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rights in that the Act may allow a statute of 
limitations to run indefinitely.  
The question presented is the meaning of "at 
war" as it appears in the WSLA. As with all 
questions of statutory construction, we begin 
by examining the statute's language. 
"[W]hen a statute speaks with clarity to an 
issue[,] judicial inquiry into the statute's 
meaning, in all but the most extraordinary 
circumstance, is finished." In interpreting a 
statute we "must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in 
a statute what it says there."  
Although the meaning of "at war" may 
appear unambiguous at first glance, its 
meaning in the context of the WSLA is not 
so clear. As the Supreme Court has noted, 
"Congress in drafting laws may decide that 
the Nation may be`at war' for one purpose, 
and`at peace' for another." Therefore, we 
must determine what Congress meant by "at 
war" in the context of the WSLA.  
As an initial matter, we find it un-necessary 
to decide which version of the WSLA 
applies because we find that the Act does 
not require a formal declaration of war. 
Therefore, under either version of the Act, 
the United States was at war when the acts 
at issue occurred. We find that the Act does 
not require a formal declaration of war for 
several reasons. First, had Congress 
intended the phrase "at war" to encompass 
only declared wars, it could have written the 
limitation of "declared war" into the Act as 
it has in numerous statutes.  
Next, we believe that requiring a declared 
war would be an unduly formalistic 
approach that ignores the realities of today, 
where the United States engages in massive 
military campaigns resulting in enormous 
expense and widespread bloodshed without 
declaring a formal war. In fact, the United 
States has not declared war since World War 
II. However, there have been extensive 
military engagements in Vietnam, Korea, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and twice in Iraq. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that 
the laws of war apply to non-declared wars, 
for example the war in Afghanistan. Surely 
these circumstances result in situations in 
which fraud can easily be perpetuated 
against the United States just as much as a 
formally declared war. The purpose of the 
WSLA — to combat fraud at times when the 
United States may not be able to act as 
quickly because it is engaged in "war" — 
would be thwarted were we to find that the 
United States must be involved in a declared 
war for the Act to apply.  
With these principles in mind, we now 
address the specific conflict in Iraq. On 
October 11, 2002, Congress authorized the 
President to use military force to "defend the 
national security of the United States against 
the continuing threat posed by Iraq" and 
"enforce all relevant United Nations 
Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." 
Although not a formal recognition of war, 
the AUMF signaled Congress's recognition 
of the President's power to enter into armed 
hostilities. Based on the foregoing analysis, 
we find that the United States was "at war" 
in Iraq from the date of the AUMF issued by 
Congress on October 11, 2002.  
We now turn to when — and if — the 
hostilities in Iraq terminated. The Fifth 
Circuit recently considered this issue in 
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Pfluger. There the court determined that 
termination clause of the WSLA required 
compliance with the formal requirements set 
out in the clause because the language of the 
clause was plain and unambiguous. We 
agree. The pre-amendment and post-
amendment WSLA both specify that 
termination shall not occur until the Act's 
formalities have been met. In the pre-
amendment WSLA, termination occurs 
when "proclaimed by the President or by a 
concurrent resolution by Congress." In the 
post-amendment WSLA, termination 
happens when "proclaimed by a Presidential 
proclamation, with notice to Congress, or by 
a concurrent resolution of Congress." 
Neither Congress nor the President had met 
the formal requirements of the Act for 
terminating the period of suspension when 
the claims at issue were presented for 
payment. We therefore conclude that the 
United States was at war during the relevant 
time period for purposes of the WSLA.  
C.  
KBR next argues that the WSLA does not 
apply to Carter's claims because the WSLA 
by its plain terms applies only to criminal 
cases. KBR bases its argument on the 
language in the statute that states it applies 
to "offense[s] involving fraud" and reasons 
that "offense" ordinarily means only crimes. 
Resolution of this issue requires us to 
interpret the meaning of "offense" as used in 
the WSLA.  
In Dugan & McNamara, the court examined 
both the legislative history of the Act and 
the meaning of "offense." The court 
reasoned that the term "offense" in the 1942 
version referred only to criminal penalties. 
However, when amended in 1944, the 
phrase "now indictable" was deleted. The 
WSLA was then applicable to all actions 
involving fraud against the United States. 
Further, all but one court, United States v. 
Weaver, to have considered the issue of 
whether the WSLA applies to civil claims 
have found that it applies.  
Had Congress intended for "offense" to 
apply only to criminal offenses, it could 
have done so by not deleting the words 
"now indictable" or it could have replaced 
that phrase with similar wording. However, 
Congress did not include any limiting 
language and it is our opinion that in failing 
to do so it chose for the Act to apply to all 
offenses involving fraud against the United 
States. Therefore, because we find the text 
of the WSLA, the 1944 amendments, and 
the legislative history persuasive, we find 
that the WSLA applies to civil claims.  
D.  
The district court found that even if the 
WSLA was applicable to civil cases, it 
remains inapplicable to actions where the 
United States is not a party. The district 
court relied on this Court's decision in 
United States ex rel Sanders v. North 
American Bus Industries Inc., for support 
that the WSLA includes actions brought 
only by the United States. This Court held in 
Sanders that 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2), a 
special statutory extension of the FCA's 
statute of limitations, was available only to 
the government. Sanders's reasoning is 
further supported by the fact that the FCA 
has a statute of limitations that applies 
specifically to relators. The limitations 
period in § 3731(b)(2) starts when the 
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government knows or should know of "facts 
material to the right of action." The court 
reasoned:  
This language makes perfect sense 
when referring to an action brought 
by the government: the limitations 
period is based on the government's 
knowledge of facts material to the 
right of action' because that 
particular knowledge notifies the 
government that it has an actionable 
FCA claim. But applying the 
statute's language to a relator's action 
makes no sense whatsoever.  
Unlike in Sanders, whether the suit is 
brought by the United States or a relator is 
irrelevant to this case because the 
suspension of limitations in the WSLA 
depends upon whether the country is at war 
and not who brings the case. As such the 
district court's reliance on Sanders was 
misguided.  
Courts are "authorized to deviate from the 
literal language of a statute only if the plain 
language would lead to absurd results, or if 
such an interpretation would defeat the 
intent of Congress." Sanders follows this 
logic, but this principle does not exclude 
relator-initiated actions from the ambit of 
the WSLA. Including such actions does not 
lead to "absurd results" nor "defeat the intent 
of Congress." In fact, including civil claims 
furthers the WSLA's purpose: to root out 
fraud against the United States during times 
of war. The district court's reasoning for 
relying on Sanders was that if the WSLA 
applied to a relator's claims this would 
"allow fraud [claims] to extend perhaps 
indefinitely." This is incorrect. The WSLA 
tolls the applicable period for a specified 
and bounded time while the country is at 
war. By offering this rationale, it appears the 
court was critiquing the purpose of the 
WSLA itself and not providing a valid basis 
for excluding relator-initiated claims from 
the WSLA. Accordingly, we are 
unpersuaded that relator-initiated claims are 
excluded from the ambit of the WSLA. 
Thus, Carter's action is not time barred.  
IV.  
We next consider KBR's argument that the 
FCA's first-to-file bar prohibits Carter's case 
from proceeding.  
A.  
The FCA prescribes penalties for claims 
submitted to the government that are known 
to be false. While encouraging citizens to act 
as whistleblowers, the Act also seeks to 
prevent parasitic lawsuits based on 
previously disclosed fraud. To reconcile 
these conflicting goals, the FCA has placed 
jurisdictional limits on its qui tarn 
provisions, including § 3730(b)(5)'s first-to-
file bar and § 3730(e)(4)'s public disclosure 
provision.  
Under the first-to-file bar, if Carter's claims 
had been previously filed by another relator, 
then the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction. By the same token, the public 
disclosure bar prevents a relator from 
bringing an action if the matters therein have 
already been made public knowledge, except 
if the person is an original source of the 
information. Although the provisions 
promote the same goals, they have different 
requirements. Here the district court ruled 
on the firstto-file bar and did not consider 
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the public disclosure bar. Because of this, 
we begin with the first-to-file bar.  
B.  
KBR argues that Duprey and the Texas 
action are related actions that deprive this 
Court of jurisdiction under the first-to-file 
bar. This Court has described the first-to-file 
bar as an absolute, unambiguous exception-
free rule. Therefore, whoever wins the race 
to the courthouse prevails and the other case 
must be dismissed. The text of the relevant 
section provides that "[w]hen a person 
brings an action under [the FCA], no person 
other than the Government may intervene or 
bring a related action based on the facts 
underlying the pending action." Section 
3730(b)(5) is jurisdictional and if an action 
is later filed that is based on the facts 
underlying the pending case, the court must 
dismiss the later case for lack of jurisdiction.  
In determining whether a complaint is 
similar enough as to be caught by the first-
to-file bar, courts have applied variations of 
a common approach. Although the 
approaches vary, courts have almost 
uniformly rejected an "identical facts" test 
on the ground that the provision refers to a 
"related" action rather than an "identical" 
action. The courts also agree that differences 
in specifics — such as geographic location 
or added facts — will not save a subsequent 
case. The Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, 
and D.C. circuits have all adopted a "same 
material elements test."  
Under this test, a later suit is barred if it is 
based upon the "same material elements of 
fraud" as the earlier suit, even though the 
subsequent suit may "incorporate somewhat 
different details." "[T]he test prevents the 
less vigilant whistle-blower from using 
insignificant factual variations to allege 
what is essentially the same fraudulent 
scheme already made known to the 
government." We find our sister circuits' 
reasoning persuasive, and we join these 
circuits in adopting the "material elements 
test."  
C.  
We shall now apply the material elements 
test to determine whether Carter's action is 
barred by either Duprey or the Texas action. 
The allegations in Duprey, the Texas action, 
and herein are substantially similar. All 
allege that KBR had a systematic practice of 
overbilling the government for hours 
worked by their employees. The employees 
were instructed to complete their time sheets 
without regard to the number of hours that 
were actually worked. These allegations of 
fraud provide the government with enough 
knowledge of essential facts of the scheme 
to discover related fraud. The government 
would likely investigate billing practices 
across the company, because Duprey notes 
that the official national policy was to bill 
correctly but that the employees were 
consistently instructed not to do so.  
Carter seeks to distinguish his action by 
pointing out that the other relators worked in 
different divisions and were truck drivers, 
whereas he was a ROWPU employee. We 
are unpersuaded that these distinctions are 
material. Duprey and the Texas action both 
allege a broad scheme that encompasses the 
time and location of Carter's action. Even 
though the fraud did occur via different 
types of employees and in different 
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divisions, this is insufficient to demonstrate 
that the scheme Carter alleges is different 
from the one Duprey and the Texas relators 
allege. As the Fifth Circuit noted, "a relator 
cannot avoid § 3730(b)(5)'s first-to-file bar 
by simply adding factual details or 
geographic location to the essential or 
material elements of a fraud claim. . . ." 
Here the fraud alleged — submission of 
false time sheets in support of claims for 
false payment — is the same in all of the 
complaints. Thus, Section 3730(b)(5)'s goal 
of preventing parasitic qui tam lawsuits 
would not be furthered if all three actions 
were allowed to proceed on the same 
essential claims.  
D.  
Carter argues that regardless of the 
relatedness of his complaint to the other 
cases, the other cases cannot continue to 
have a preclusive effect on his action. Carter 
argues that because the Duprey and Texas 
action have been dismissed neither can be 
deemed a "pending action" under § 
3730(b)(5).  
Following the plain language of the first-to-
file bar, Carter's action will be barred by 
Duprey or the Texas action if either case 
was pending when Carter filed suit. The 
Duprey action was filed in 2007, and 
voluntarily dismissed in October 2011, after 
the relator failed to serve the complaint on 
the defendants. The Texas action was filed 
in 2007 and voluntarily dismissed in March 
2012, when the government declined to 
intervene. Therefore, both actions were 
pending when Carter filed his complaint on 
June 2, 2011. Because we look at the facts 
as they existed when the claim was brought 
to determine whether an action is barred by 
the first-to-file bar, we conclude that Carter's 
claims are barred by the Duprey and Texas 
actions. However, this does not end our 
inquiry.  
Carter alleges that the district court erred 
when it dismissed his complaint with 
prejudice on the ground that his action was 
forever barred by the Duprey action. In 
United States ex rel. Chovanec v. Apria 
Healthcare Group, Inc., the Seventh Circuit 
reviewed a complaint that was dismissed 
with prejudice because of a pending case. 
The court reasoned that once the initial 
complaint was no longer pending, the bar of 
§ 3730(b)(5) was inapplicable and Chovanec 
was "entitled to file a new qui tarn 
complaint." However, if a case is brought 
while the original case is pending it must be 
dismissed "rather than left on ice." Although 
the doctrine of claim preclusion may prevent 
the filing of subsequent cases, § 3730(b)(5) 
does not. This is especially true when the 
original case is dismissed on reasons other 
than the merits or dismissed without 
prejudice. Because Chovanec was entitled to 
file a new complaint, the proceeding should 
have been dismissed without prejudice.  
Similarly the Tenth Circuit has explained 
why an action that is no longer pending 
cannot have a preclusive effect for all future 
claims. The court reasoned, "if that prior 
claim is no longer pending, the first-to-file 
bar no longer applies." "The`pending' 
requirement much more effectively 
vindicates the goal of encouraging relators 
to file; it protects the potential award of a 
relator while his claim remains viable, but, 
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when he drops his action another relator . . . 
may pursue his own."  
We agree that once a case is no longer 
pending the first-to-file bar does not stop a 
relator from filing a related case. In this 
case, both of the original actions have been 
dismissed. Because of this, the first-to-file 
bar does not preclude Carter from filing an 
action. The first-to-file bar allows a plaintiff 
to bring a claim later; this is precisely what a 
dismissal without prejudice allows a 
plaintiff to do as well. Therefore, Carter's 
only impediment at the moment is the 
district court's dismissal with prejudice. 
And, as we have already concluded the 
district court erred in dismissing Carter's 
complaint with prejudice.  
V.  
KBR argues that this Court should affirm 
the dismissal of Carter's complaint on the 
alternative ground of the FCA's public 
disclosure provision. As noted previously, 
the public disclosure bar removes subject 
matter jurisdiction for FCA claims that are 
based upon matters that have been disclosed 
publicly, unless the relator was the original 
source of the allegations. KBR alleges that 
Carter was not the original source of the 
information, and that he gathered the 
information from another KBR employee. 
The district did not reach this argument, 
having found grounds for dismissal 
elsewhere. We decline to address this issue 
for the first time on appeal. Because the 
district court should have the opportunity in 
the first instance to address the facts relevant 
to public disclosure, we remand this issue to 
the district court.  
VI.  
For the foregoing reasons we reverse the 
district court's dismissal of Carter's 
complaint. Rather than address the 
alternative ground of the public disclosure 
bar for the first time on appeal, we remand 
this issue to the district court for further 
consideration.  
REVERSED AND REMANDED  
WYNN, Circuit Judge, concurring:  
I fully concur in the fine majority opinion. I 
write separately to address what appears to 
be the heart of the dissent's objections: that 
applying the Wartime Suspension of 
Limitations Act, to the False Claims Act, 
actions in which the United States is not 
plaintiff or intervenor is unwise because 
doing so is contrary to the policy of strictly 
construing statutes of limitations and the 
goals of the False Claims Act. In particular, 
the dissent expresses concern that our 
decision will allow the False Claims Act 
limitations period to "extend indefinitely" 
and, consequently, will incentivize private 
plaintiffs to delay filing their claims to 
maximize their potential recovery. Because 
it is not our place to second-guess 
Congress's clearly expressed policy 
decisions, I respectfully disagree with the 
dis-sent.  
When interpreting a federal statute, the 
"cardinal rule . . . is that the intent of 
[Congress] is to be given effect." Typically, 
we ascertain Congressional intent from the 
plain language of the statute. If the plain 
language of the statute unambiguously 
expresses Congress's intent, our inquiry 
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comes to an end, even if we disagree with 
the policy embraced by the statutory 
language. For, as the Supreme Court has 
explained,  
Our individual appraisal of the 
wisdom or unwisdom of a particular 
course consciously selected is to be 
put aside in the process of 
interpreting a statute. Once the 
meaning of an enactment is 
discerned and its constitutionality 
determined, the judicial process 
comes to an end. We do not sit as a 
committee of review, nor are we 
vested with the power of veto.  
Here, as the majority correctly concludes 
and the dissent tacitly acknowledges, the 
plain language of the Wartime Suspension 
of Limitations Act extends the limitation 
period for "any offense" of fraud against the 
United States during a time of war. No 
doubt recognizing that it is not our role to 
question Congress's clearly expressed policy 
determinations, the dissent relies on strained 
readings of the Wartime Suspension of 
Limitations Act and our precedent in an 
attempt to argue that, under the plain 
language of the Wartime Suspension of 
Limitations Act, the term "any offense" does 
not encompass False Claims Act actions in 
which the government is not a party.  
First, the dissent appeals to our decision in 
United States ex rel. Sanders v. North 
American Bus Industries, Inc., in which we 
held that the False Claims Act limitations 
period tolling provision, does not apply to 
False Claims Act actions in which the 
government is not a party. Section 
3731(b)(2) provides that the standard six-
year False Claims Act limitations may be 
tolled until "no more than 3 years after the 
date when facts material to the right of 
action are known or reasonably should have 
been known by the official of the United 
States charged with responsibility to act in 
the circumstances." In Sanders, we reasoned 
that Section 3731(b)(2) does not toll the 
limitations period for private False Claims 
Act actions because it would make little 
sense to have a suit's limitations period turn 
on the knowledge of an entity that is not 
party to the action.  
The majority opinion correctly notes that 
Sanders is inapposite because it involved an 
entirely different statute, which includes 
express language that supports 
distinguishing between False Claims Act 
actions where the government is and is not a 
party. Nevertheless, the dissent tries to 
analogize the Wartime Suspension of 
Limitations Act to Section 3731(b)(2), 
which was at issue in Sanders, by asserting 
that federal government conduct controls the 
limitations periods set out in both statutes. In 
particular, the dissent notes that  
[b]y the terms of the [Wartime 
Suspension of Limitations Act], the 
government is solely entitled to 
invoke and terminate the tolling 
provisions of the statute. . . . The 
private qui tarn plaintiff has no 
connection with these decisions and 
it seems odd to conclude that such a 
private plaintiff should be entitled to 
the same limitations period as the 
necessary actor, the government. 
There is no such clear statutory 
direction.  
But Congress does not "invoke" the 
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act. 
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Rather, the Wartime Suspension of 
Limitations Act becomes effective when 
Congress declares war or authorizes the use 
of military force. The invocation of the 
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act is at 
most a tertiary consideration in Congress's 
decision to declare war or authorize the use 
of military force, and thus there is only a de 
minimus relationship between the 
government conduct discussed in the 
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act and 
any particular False Claims Act claim. By 
contrast, with Section 3132(b)(2) the 
connection between the relevant government 
conduct and a particular False Claims Act 
claim is quite close, because whether 
Section 3132(b)(2) tolls the limitations 
period turns on the government's knowledge 
of the alleged fraudulent conduct at issue in 
the particular False Claims Act claim.  
The dissent also places great weight on the 
fact that both the Wartime Suspension of 
Limitations Act and its legislative history 
are silent regarding qui tarn relators in False 
Claims Act actions, arguing that this silence 
"strongly suggests that Congress did not 
intend the tolling provisions of the statute to 
reach indiscriminately to any private 
plaintiff pursuing a claim for fraud against 
the government." Yet the Supreme Court has 
admonished courts to tread carefully in 
attempting to find meaning in statutory 
silence because such silence is frequently 
amenable to multiple interpretations:  
Not every silence is pregnant. In 
some cases, Congress intends silence 
to rule out a particular statutory 
application, while in others 
Congress' silence signifies merely an 
expectation that nothing more need 
be said in order to effectuate the 
relevant legislative objective. An 
inference from congressional silence 
certainly cannot be credited when it 
is contrary to all other textual and 
contextual evidence of congressional 
intent.  
Here, finding meaning in the War-time 
Suspension of Limitations Act's silence is 
improper because the silence just as 
reasonably can be interpreted as indicating 
that Congress did not intend to distinguish 
between False Claims Act actions by private 
plaintiffs and those in which the government 
is a party as it can be interpreted as 
excluding actions by private relators from 
the ambit of the Wartime Suspension of 
Limitations Act, as the dissent does.  
Moreover, Congress's decision not to clarify 
the scope of "any offense" when amending 
the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act 
in 2008 in the face of numerous decisions 
broadly interpreting "offense" in the 
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act 
casts further doubt on the dissent's appeal to 
statutory silence. A canon of statutory 
construction is that "[w]e presume that when 
Congress amends a statute, it is 
knowledgeable about judicial decisions 
interpreting the prior legislation."  
Congress amended the Wartime Suspension 
of Limitations Act in 2008 to broaden its 
scope by lengthening the tolling period and 
clarifying that the statute applies to 
Congressional authorizations of the use of 
military force as well as declared wars. 
Notably, the amendment did not in any way 
alter, narrow, or circumscribe the scope of 
the term "any offense." By the time of the 
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2008 amendment, numerous courts had held 
that the term "offense" in the earlier version 
of the Wartime Suspension of Limitations 
Act encompassed civil fraud claims, 
including False Claims Act cases, and the 
only court to address whether the Wartime 
Suspension of Limitations Act applies to 
non-intervened False Claims Act actions had 
determined that it did, albeit in dicta. We 
must presume that Congress was aware of 
these interpretations when it amended the 
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act in 
2008, and its decision not to amend the 
statute to exclude, or even discuss, False 
Claims Act actions, let alone non-intervened 
False Claims Act actions, in the face of this 
precedent suggests that it agreed with, or at 
least acquiesced in, these judicial decisions. 
In such circumstances, Congress's silence 
favors the majority's reading, rather than 
undermining it.  
Thus, neither of the dissent's rationales for 
reading ambiguity into the plain language of 
the statute is persuasive. Therefore, we are 
left to conclude that when Congress said 
"any offense," it meant any offense, 
including offenses raised by private False 
Claims Act relators. Because the plain 
language of the Wartime Suspension of 
Limitations Act indicates that Congress 
intended the statute to apply to non-
intervened False Claims Act actions, it is not 
our place to question the wisdom of this 
policy decision. 
Even if the plain language of the War-time 
Suspension of Limitations Act would allow 
us to consider the policy concerns 
highlighted by the dissent — that our 
decision will "extend indefinitely" the 
limitations period for False Claims Act 
claims and will encourage would — be 
relators to delay filing their claims — I am 
not convinced that either concern is 
justified. First, the Wartime Suspension of 
Limitations Act tolls the limitations period 
for fraud actions for a bounded period of 
time: the time during which the country is at 
war or otherwise engaged in a military 
conflict. Moreover, even if the informal 
nature of modern military conflicts renders 
the limitations period established by the 
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act 
somewhat less definite, it is within 
Congress's purview to determine that certain 
conduct is sufficiently egregious — such as 
defrauding the government during a time of 
war — that an extended or indefinite 
limitations period is warranted. Indeed, 
Congress has elected to entirely do away 
with limitations periods for many federal 
crimes.  
Second, any concern that our holding will 
encourage relators to sit on their claims in 
order to maximize recovery is alleviated by 
the False Claims Act's public disclosure and 
first-to-file bars, which preclude a would-be 
relator from bringing a claim that is based 
on information that has already been 
publicly disclosed or that is "related" to a 
pending action. Regardless of the 
applicability of the Wartime Suspension of 
Limitations Act, False Claims Act relators 
have an incentive to bring actions as early as 
possible to avoid having their claims 
dismissed under either of these two 
provisions.  
In sum, the majority correctly concludes that 
the plain language of the Wartime 
370 
 
Suspension of Limitations Act 
unambiguously encompasses False Claims 
Act actions in which the government is not a 
party. It is not this Court's — or any court's 
— place to revisit Congress's clearly 
articulated policy determinations, even when 
we feel they are unwise. If, after reviewing 
our decision, Congress agrees with the 
dissent that limiting the Wartime Suspension 
of Limitations Act to False Claims Act 
actions in which the government is a party is 
the best policy, it is free to amend the 
statute, as it did in 2008. Until that point, 
however, we are required to give effect to 
Congress' intent, as expressed through the 
plain and unambiguous language of the 
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, that 
the tolling applies to "any offense."  
AGEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part:  
I concur with the majority opinion that the 
"first-to-file" rule does not act as a barrier to 
Benjamin Carter's qui tarn action against 
Halliburton, Kellogg Brown & Root, and 
Service Employees International 
(collectively "KBR"). However, I do not 
agree with the holding in the majority 
opinion, principally section III D, that the 
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act 
("WSLA"), tolls the six-year limitations 
period set forth in the False Claims Act 
("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1), when the 
United States is not the plaintiff or an 
intervenor. For that reason, I respectfully 
dissent from the majority opinion insofar as 
it would allow Carter to proceed on those of 
his claims that fall outside the six-year FCA 
limitations period.  
I.  
Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(1), a civil 
action under the FCA may not be brought 
more than six years after the date on which 
the alleged violation was committed. In this 
case, the vast majority of Carter's claims 
against KBR stem from violations that 
allegedly took place before May 1, 2005. 
Pursuant to § 3731(b)(1), therefore, Carter 
had until May 1, 2011, to file his qui tarn 
complaint against KBR for it to be deemed 
timely. The latest iteration of Carter's 
complaint, however, was not filed until June 
2, 2011. Thus, absent tolling, in some form, 
the bulk of Carter's claims are barred by the 
FCA's limitations period because they did 
not take place within six years of the filing 
of the complaint.  
In 1942, Congress unanimously approved 
the first version of the WSLA, which 
temporarily suspended the statute of 
limitations in criminal contracting fraud 
cases arising out of the Second World War. 
Congress amended the WSLA in 1948, and 
the majority concludes that the effect of 
those amendments was to extend the reach 
of the WSLA to civil limitations periods, not 
merely those arising in the criminal fraud 
context. The majority may be correct, but 
the issue is not without doubt.  
In 2011, at the time Carter filed his 
complaint, the WSLA provided:  
When the United States is at war or 
Congress has enacted a specific 
authorization for the use of the 
Armed Forces . . . the running of any 
statute of limitations applicable to 
any offense (1) involving fraud or 
attempted fraud against the United 
States or any agency thereof in any 
manner, whether by conspiracy or 
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not, or (2) committed in connection 
with the acquisition, care, handling, 
custody, control or disposition of any 
real or personal property of the 
United States, or (3) committed in 
connection with the negotiation, 
procurement, award, performance, 
payment for, interim financing, 
cancelation, or other termination or 
settlement, of any contract, 
subcontract, or purchase order which 
is connected with or related to the 
prosecution of the war or directly 
connected with or related to the 
authorized use of the Armed Forces, 
or with any disposition of 
termination inventory by any war 
contractor or Government agency, 
shall be sus pended until 5 years 
after the termination of hostilities as 
proclaimed by a Presidential 
proclamation, with notice to 
Congress, or by a concurrent 
resolution of Congress. For purposes 
of applying such definitions in this 
section, the term "war" includes a 
specific authorization for the use of 
the Armed Forces.  
Carter argues that, by operation of the 
WSLA, the FCA limitations period was 
suspended in 2005, at the time KBR 
submitted allegedly false claims to the 
United States for payment. Accordingly, 
Carter posits (and the majority opinion 
agrees) that the WSLA precludes KBR from 
asserting the statute of limitations as a 
defense in this case. For reasons explained 
below, I do not agree with that construction 
of the WSLA.  
II.  
A.  
This appeal presents a quintessential 
question of statutory interpretation, which 
we review de novo.  
"As in all cases of statutory interpretation, 
our inquiry begins with the text of the 
statute." "In that regard, we must first 
determine whether the language at issue has 
a plain and unambiguous meaning with 
regard to the particular dispute . . . and our 
inquiry must cease if the statutory language 
is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is 
coherent and consistent." "We determine 
the`plainness or ambiguity of the statutory 
language . . . by reference to the language 
itself, the specific context in which that 
language is used, and the broader context of 
the statute as a whole.'"  
B.  
I note at the outset that no case has ever held 
(other than in dicta) that the WSLA applies 
to civil cases where the United States is not 
a plaintiff or intervener in the qui tarn 
action. In the only case in which a court 
suggested the WSLA did so apply, the 
court's conclusion was not the ratio decendi 
of the decision and was clearly dicta. In 
McCans, the relator brought a qui tam 
complaint against Armour & Co., a 
government contractor, alleging that Armour 
sold certain pork products to war 
procurement agencies at prices in excess of 
limitations set by Congress during World 
War II. Although the allegedly illegal sales 
were conducted between 1942 and 1943, the 
relator did not file her complaint until 1954. 
While the district court discussed the 
application of the WSLA tolling provisions 
to the relator's complaint, it concluded that 
the complaint was not timely filed, even if 
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WSLA tolling were applicable. Any 
discussion of WSLA tolling in McCans was 
thus clearly unnecessary to the district 
court's holding that the suit was untimely. 
Accordingly, the court's references to the 
WSLA's applicability to private plaintiffs is 
mere dicta.  
C.  
As there is no direct authority for 
application of the WSLA here, I find the 
reasoning in United States ex rel. Sanders v. 
North American Bus Industries, Inc. a 
persuasive guide to our disposition of this 
issue. Sanders concerned the construction of 
31 U.S.C. § 3731(b), the FCA's limitations 
provisions; the same statute providing the 
statute of limitations in this case. That 
statute provides that  
[a] civil action under [the FCA] may 
not be brought —  
(1) more than 6 years after the date 
on which the violation of [the FCA] 
is committed, or  
(2) more than 3 years after the date 
when facts material to the right of 
action are known or reasonably 
should have been known by the 
official of the United States charged 
with responsibility to act in the 
circumstances, but in no event more 
than 10 years after the date on which 
the violation is committed, 
whichever occurs last.  
The Sanders relator, whose complaint was 
filed beyond the six-year limitations period 
described in § 3731(b)(1), sought to avail 
himself of § 3731(b)(2), which runs the 
limitations period from the time the United 
States receives (or reasonably should 
receive) notice of the violation. We rejected 
that attempt.  
Although we observed that § 3731(b) 
applied to "civil action[s]" under the FCA, 
we held that the language of § 3731(b)(2) 
could only be logically applied when 
referring to an action brought by the United 
States, not by a private relator. In support of 
this holding we reasoned that "applying the 
statute's language to a relator's action makes 
no sense whatsoever. The government's 
knowledge of`facts material to the right of 
action' does not notify the relator of 
anything, so that knowledge cannot 
reasonably begin the limitations period for a 
relator's claims."  
The Sanders court also made important 
observations about the practical effect of 
allowing a private relator to claim the 
benefit of a statutory limitations period 
intended for the benefit of the government. 
It noted that extending the limitations period 
for up to 10 years (the outer limit provided 
by § 3731(b)(2)) in the case of a private 
relator would create incentives contrary to 
the purposes of the FCA. "[R]elators would 
have a strong financial incentive to allow 
false claims to build up over time before 
they filed, there-by increasing their own 
potential recovery." Critically, the court 
went on to note that the relator's proposed 
construction would undermine the very 
purpose of the qui tarn provisions of the 
FCA: "to combat fraud quickly and 
efficiently by encouraging relators to bring 
actions that the government cannot or will 
not."  
Following the reasoning of Sanders in the 
instant case, I agree with the holding of the 
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district court that application of the WSLA 
to a suit brought by a private relator is 
inconsistent with the WSLA and its 
legislative history and would be contrary to 
the articulated goals of the FCA. Let me 
explain why that is so.  
At first blush, Carter is correct that the 
WSLA applies to "any offense," involving 
fraud against the United States (obviously, 
when certain conditions are met). But to 
read "any offense" as encompassing actions 
by private relators is a superficial reading of 
the WSLA and fails to construe the statute in 
context. By the terms of the WSLA, the 
government is solely entitled to invoke and 
terminate the tolling provisions of the that 
statute, however, the text of the WSLA is 
entirely silent as to private relators. The 
triggering and terminating provisions of the 
WSLA are both related to and solely 
controlled actions of the United States 
government: declaration of war or 
congressional authorization for use of 
military force (to trigger) and congressional 
resolution or Presidential proclamation (to 
terminate). In either circumstance, Congress 
and the President possess the unique power 
to invoke the WSLA to toll the limitations 
period for fraud offenses: a period when the 
same government is thus released from a 
looming time bar to bring an FCA claim. 
The private qui tarn plaintiff has no 
connection with these decisions and it seems 
odd to conclude that such a private plaintiff, 
absent a clear statutory direction, should be 
entitled to the same limitations period as the 
necessary actor, the government. There is no 
such clear statutory direction.  
In Sanders, we declined to find that the 
private party relator could latch onto the § 
3731(b)(2) exception since the relator was 
neither mentioned in the statute or 
legislative history as authorized to do so. 
Similarly, here with the WSLA, we find no 
mention of the private party relator in the 
statute or its legislative history: again, an 
odd basis upon which to extend the tolling 
of a statute of limitations which is to be 
strictly construed.  
Simply reading "any offense" to encompass 
all offenses regardless of whether the United 
States is the plaintiff, is inconsistent with the 
nuanced approach that courts have 
employed when reading the "civil action" 
language in § 3731(b). We reasoned in 
Sanders that "a civil action" should not be 
read to encompass all FCA actions, but 
rather, should be read in context to include 
only those actions brought by the United 
States. Here, the WSLA (like § 3731(b)(2)) 
mentions the United States, not private 
relators. Thus the text of the WSLA, on its 
own, supports the proposition that only the 
United States may take advantage of its 
tolling provisions. Nevertheless, I also find 
that this interpretation is consistent with the 
purposes and legislative history of the 
WSLA.  
D.  
The Supreme Court has described the 
rationale underlying the passage of the 
WSLA during World War II as follows:  
The fear was that the law-
enforcement officers would be so 
preoccupied with prosecution of the 
war effort that the crimes of fraud 
374 
 
perpetrated against the United States 
would be forgotten until it was too 
late. The implicit premise of the 
legislation is that the frenzied 
activities, existing at the time the Act 
became law, would continue until 
hostilities terminated and that until 
then the public interest should not be 
disadvantaged.  
In other words, the Court recognized that the 
primary concern motivating Congress in 
passing the WSLA was the ability of law 
enforcement to effectively police fraud 
against the government during the fog of 
war. This concern is evident in the WSLA's 
legislative history.  
During normal times the present 3-year 
statute of limitations may afford the 
Department of Justice sufficient time to 
investigate, discover, and gather evidence to 
prosecute frauds against the Government. 
The United States, however, is engaged in a 
gigantic war program. Huge sums of money 
are being expended for materials and 
equipment in order to carry on the war 
successfully. Although steps have been 
taken to prevent and to prosecute frauds 
against the Government, it is recognized that 
in the varied dealings opportunities will no 
doubt be presented for unscrupulous persons 
to defraud the Government or some agency. 
These frauds may be difficult to discover as 
is often true of this type of offense and many 
of them may not come to light for some time 
to come. The law-enforcement branch of the 
Government is also busily engaged in its 
many duties, including the enforcement of 
the espionage, sabotage, and other laws.  
Once again, the concern of Congress, as 
expressed in the legislative history, was the 
inability of the Department of Justice and 
other federal law-enforcement entities to 
effectively prevent and prosecute fraud in 
light of other duties antecedent to waging 
war. The legislative history makes no 
mention of private plaintiffs bringing relator 
actions against those allegedly engaged in 
fraud.  
The legislative history of the Wartime 
Enforcement of Fraud Act of 2008 
("WEFA"), which contained the most recent 
amendments to the WSLA, reveals that the 
same concerns motivated Congress in 
passing the 2008 amendments to the WSLA. 
In sending the WEFA to the full Senate, the 
Judiciary Committee report repeatedly 
emphasized the difficulty of investigators, 
auditors, and the Department of Justice in 
ferreting out fraud against the United States 
during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Again, the legislative history is silent with 
respect to private party relators.  
The purpose of the WSLA (as articulated by 
the Supreme Court) and the legislative 
history of that statute confirm what the text 
reflects: that Congress was concerned with 
the ability of the federal government to 
police fraud when the resources of its law 
enforcement were stretched thin by war. 
Tolling afforded law enforcement the ability 
to thoroughly investigate allegations of 
fraud without compromising the ability of 
the United States to fulfill its military 
mission. Unlike federal law enforcement, 
private relators are not "busily engaged in . . 
. many duties, including the enforcement of 
the espionage, sabotage, and other laws." 
And extending the benefits of tolling to 
private relators does not "afford the 
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Department of Justice sufficient time to 
investigate, discover, and gather evidence to 
prosecute frauds against the Government." 
Id. In sum, Congress has shown no intent to 
toll the FCA's limitations period when the 
United States is not a plaintiff to the FCA 
action.  
The complete silence as to relators in the 
legislative history of the WSLA is all the 
more telling when one considers that the 
FCA, which was originally passed in 1863, 
was on the books when the Congress 
considered the WSLA in 1942 and the 
WEFA in 2008. "Faced with statutory 
silence, we presume that Congress is aware 
of the legal context in which it is 
legislating." Thus, the fact that Congress did 
not mention qui tarn plaintiffs in the 
legislative history of any version of the 
WSLA strongly suggests that Congress did 
not intend for the tolling provisions of that 
statute to reach indiscriminately to any 
private plaintiff pursuing a claim for fraud 
against the government.  
E.  
Looking finally to the policies underlying 
the FCA, the majority's interpretation of the 
WSLA is plainly at odds with the goals of 
the FCA. The policy concerns underlying 
the FCA will be directly thwarted by 
allowing private relators to take advantage 
of the WSLA's tolling provisions. In this 
case, for example, Carter's claims arose in 
2005, and application of the WSLA would 
extend the limitations period for his actions 
well into the next decade at least, depending 
on the date hostilities in Iraq are deemed 
terminated. Assuming for the sake of 
argument, as the district court did, that the 
August 31, 2010, presidential statement of 
"the end of our combat mission in Iraq" was 
sufficient to end the tolling provisions of the 
WSLA, Carter would have until 2019, 
nearly fourteen years after his claims 
accrued, to file a qui tarn action. Before the 
district court, Carter argued that hostilities in 
Iraq have not formally ended, meaning that 
the limitations period would still be tolled 
today, seven years after the allegedly false 
claims were presented to the government. 
When (and if) hostilities are formally 
declared terminated in Iraq, it could be up 
another eleven years (five years after 
termination of hostilities pursuant to the 
WSLA, plus the normal six year limitations 
period prescribed in § 3731(b)(1)) before the 
limitations period would be deemed to have 
ended. Such an expansive limitations period 
applicable to private qui tarn plaintiffs is 
unsupported by statute, legislative history, 
or precedent.  
In this respect, Sanders is again instructive, 
because it accurately described the differing 
incentive structures that motivate relators, as 
opposed to law enforcement, in the context 
of FCA actions. As Sanders explained, a 
lengthy limitations period would create a 
"strong financial incentive" for relators to 
"allow false claims to build up over time 
before they filed, thereby increasing their 
own potential recovery." The government, 
on the other hand, always has an incentive to 
quickly act to root out fraud against the 
United States. The lengthy limitations period 
of the WSLA, therefore, is uniquely helpful 
to a government that is otherwise hampered 
from enforcing antifraud laws by the 
externalities of waging a military conflict. 
Applying that same lengthy limitations 
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period to relators is uniquely problematic 
because doing so thwarts the whole purpose 
of the FCA: "to combat fraud quickly and 
efficiently by encouraging relators to bring 
actions that the government cannot or will 
not — to stimulate actions by private parties 
should the prosecuting officers be tardy in 
bringing the suits."  
In fact, the concern identified by Sanders is 
exacerbated in the context of wartime 
enforcement of anti-fraud laws. As the 
legislative history to the WE FA notes, 
"often," during war, "the Government does 
not learn about serious fraud until years after 
the fact." In contrast, private party relators 
will be inclined to delay, allowing their 
potential recovery to increase, knowing that 
the government is unlikely to discover the 
fraud, and therefore unlikely to be the first 
to bring a claim against the perpetrators. 
Absent WSLA tolling, relators are at least 
restricted to a six year window in which to 
bring their claims. In the context of virtually 
indefinite WSLA tolling, however, a relator 
could wait a decade or more to bring a qui 
tarn claim, secure in the knowledge that law 
enforcement is otherwise too occupied with 
the exigencies of war to discover the fraud 
on its own.  
F.  
The majority opinion does not address the 
arguments set forth above, but summarily 
dismisses Sanders as inapplicable because, 
"whether the suit is brought by the United 
States or a relator is irrelevant to this case 
because the suspension of limitations in the 
WSLA depends on whether the country is at 
war and not who brings the case." This is a 
misreading of Sanders, the statute, and the 
legislative history. Like the WSLA, the 
limitations period at issue in Sanders did not 
contain an express limitation on who could 
take advantage of the tolling provision. 
Rather, the analysis in Sanders focused on 
whether § 3731(b)(2) could be plausibly 
read to encompass actions brought by 
private parties. Like § 3731(b)(2) in 
Sanders, the WSLA should be read in 
context, keeping in mind both the purposes 
of that statute and the dire effects of 
extending to relators a provision obviously 
intended only for the government.  
III.  
The text, the purposes, and the legislative 
history of the WSLA all counsel in favor of 
holding that the government only, and not 
private relators, are entitled to take 
advantage of that statute's tolling provisions. 
Because the majority takes the altogether 
novel step of expanding the WSLA to apply 
to actions by relators, I must respectfully 
dissent from that aspect of the majority's 
holding. 
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“US Supreme Court Agrees To Address Two Important False Claims Act 
Issues” 
Mondaq 
Jonathan G. Cedarbaum & Daniel S. Volchok 
July 8, 2014 
Yesterday, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Kellogg Brown & Root v. 
United States ex rel. Carter, No. 12-1497, a 
case presenting two important issues under 
the False Claims Act (FCA). The first is 
whether the Wartime Suspension of 
Limitations Act—which tolls the limitations 
period during wartime for any "offense" 
against the United States—applies to a civil 
FCA claim brought by a qui tam relator. The 
second is whether the FCA's "first-to-file 
bar"—which provides that once a relator 
brings an FCA action, "no person other than 
the government may intervene or bring a 
related action based on the facts underlying 
the pending action"—precludes a later 
action only so long as the earlier action is 
still pending. 
Background 
Petitioner Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) 
provided logistical services to the U.S. 
military during the Iraqi war. In 2006, 
Respondent Carter, a former KBR 
employee, filed an FCA action against KBR, 
alleging that KBR had fraudulently billed 
the government. After a lengthy procedural 
history, the district court (Cacheris, J.) 
dismissed the latest complaint with 
prejudice. The court first held that the first-
to-file bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5), 
precluded Carter's action because another 
FCA case alleging similar facts had already 
pending in another federal district court 
when Carter filed his operative complaint. 
Although that other case had since been 
dismissed, the district court here held that 
the first-to-file bar depended on the state of 
affairs at the time of the filing of the 
complaint. The court also held that most of 
Carter's claims were time-barred, rejecting 
his argument that the Wartime Suspension 
of Limitations Act (WSLA), 18 U.S.C. § 
3287, tolled the limitations period. The court 
ruled that the WSLA does not apply to a 
civil fraud claim brought by a qui tam 
relator. 
The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court held 
that although the complaint was properly 
dismissed under the first-to-file bar, because 
the earlier-filed case had still been pending 
at the time Carter filed his latest complaint, 
the dismissal should have been without 
prejudice because the subsequent dismissal 
of that case meant that the first-to-file bar no 
longer applied, leaving Carter free to re-file. 
The court of appeals also held that Carter's 
claims were not time-barred because the 
WSLA applies to civil FCA suits, even those 
in which the government has declined to 
intervene. One judge dissented from this 
portion of the court's ruling, arguing that the 
WSLA does not apply to qui tam suits in 
which the government has declined to 
intervene. 
In its certiorari petition, KBR argues that the 
Fourth Circuit's first-to-file rule would 
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improperly allow relators to bring case after 
related case based on very similar facts, so 
long as they were brought seriatim. On the 
WSLA question, KBR contends that the 
term "offense" is limited to crimes, that the 
Fourth Circuit's approach is contrary to the 
WSLA's purpose, and that the Fourth 
Circuit's decision would lead to enormously 
long periods of tolling given the nature of 
the military conflicts in which the United 
States is engaged. 
Next Steps 
The case will likely be argued in December 
2014 or January 2015. KBR's opening brief 
is due August 15, 2014 and Carter's 
opposition brief is due September 15, 2014, 
though those deadlines may well be 
extended. 
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“Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of KBR over False Claims Act Lawsuit” 
Young Law Group 
Eric Young 
July 9, 2014 
Last week, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in the case of Kellogg Brown & 
Root Services v. U.S. ex rel. Carter, adding 
another appeal involving a whistleblower to 
its schedule in the fall. The petition initiated 
by KBR asked the Court to review the 
appropriate statute of limitations and the 
application of the first to file bar in False 
Claims Act litigation. 
The history of the case is a bit unusual. 
Benjamin Carter, the relator who worked for 
the defendant in Iraq, filed a qui tam 
complaint in 2006. The complaint was 
amended in 2008 to include allegations of 
false billing for labor costs. This complaint 
was dismissed by the district court because 
of similar allegations in a pending relator 
complaint filed prior to Carter’s allegations.  
As those familiar with the False Claims Act 
are aware, the statute bars a person from 
bringing a “related action based on the facts 
underlying the pending action.” 31 U.S.C. § 
3730(b)(5). This is commonly known as the 
“first to file” bar. 
While on appeal, the complaint by the other 
relator was dismissed. Carter filed a new 
complaint in 2010. However, since his 2008 
appeal was still pending, the new complaint 
was dismissed because of his own pending 
appeal. Strategically, Carter dismissed the 
appeal of the 2008 complaint.  
By the time Carter refiled his complaint, 
another relator had filed against the 
company with similar allegations. The 
district court held that this pending 
complaint barred Carter’s latest complaint. 
Because a significant amount of time had 
passed since the events underlying this 
litigation, the district court also held that 
most of the allegations were now barred by 
the statute of limitations of the False Claims 
Act, set forth in § 3731(b). 
Carter appealed successfully to the Court of 
Appeals. The Fourth Circuit held that the 
statute of limitations in the case was tolled 
by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations 
Act (WSLA). It also authorized him to refile 
his complaint because there were no other 
pending actions.  
The defendant now contests those issues on 
appeal.  
It contends that the WSLA applies solely to 
criminal cases brought by the government. It 
makes three key arguments:  
1. The WSLA does not apply to civil fraud 
cases where the U.S. government is not a 
party;  
2. The WSLA does not apply when the 
government has not formally declared war; 
and  
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3. The WSLA does not modify the ten year 
statute of repose in the False Claims Act. In 
other words, the WSLA does not 
indefinitely toll the statute of limitations. 
The Supreme Court will also review whether 
a previous lawsuit, not dismissed on the 
merits, bars a subsequent relator from filing 
a qui tam lawsuit because of the “first to 
file” requirement of the False Claims Act. 
The defendant contends dismissal is 
appropriate because the government has 
already been put on notice of the fraud. 
KBR is the second case involving a 
whistleblower to be scheduled by the 
Supreme Court. In May, it agreed to hear the 
appeal of Homeland Security in the case of 
TSA air marshall Robert MacLean, 
Department of Homeland Security v. 
MacLean. MacLean informed the media that 
the TSA had discontinued posting air 
marshals on certain overnight flights 
because of budget concerns despite an alert 
about a plot to hijack airlines. He was 
terminated when the TSA learned of his role 
blowing the whistle. The Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals sided with MacLean in his 
retaliation claim under the Whistleblower 
Protection Act. 
The Supreme Court has already weighed in 
on two cases involving whistleblowers this 
year.  
A few weeks ago in June, the Supreme 
Court decided Lane v. Franks. Lane, in his 
capacity as director of a statewide program 
for underprivileged youth, terminated an 
individual on the payroll that had not been 
reporting to her office. Subsequently, Lane 
was compelled to testify in the ex-
employee’s criminal trial. He alleged that he 
was terminated in retaliation for the 
testimony. In a 9-0 opinion written by 
Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that the 
First Amendment protects a public 
employee providing truthful sworn 
testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside 
the course of the employee’s ordinary job 
duties. 
In March, it extended SOX protections 
against retaliation to whistleblowers who 
work at private contractors to public 
companies in Lawson v. FMR LLC. The 
decision reversed the First Circuit decision 
denying protection to two employees of a 
privately held financial institution providing 
services to mutual fund clients. 
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“The Supreme Court Will Review Fourth Circuit Decision that Weakened the 
False Claims Act’s Statute of Limitations and First-to-File Bar” 
Vorys 
Patrick M. Hagan & Brent D. Craft 
July 1, 2014 
Today, the Supreme Court granted the 
petition for certiorari in Kellogg Brown & 
Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. 
Carter.  The petition presented two 
questions: (1) whether the Wartime 
Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA) 
applies to claims of civil fraud brought by 
qui tam relators, and (2) whether the False 
Claims Act’s (FCA) first-to-file rule is an 
absolute bar or whether it permits 
subsequent actions so long as the first-filed 
action had been dismissed on non-merits 
grounds prior to filing of the subsequent 
action.  The Fourth Circuit’s decision was 
unfavorable to potential FCA defendants on 
both issues.  The Supreme Court’s decision 
to grant certiorari is important news for all 
companies that do business with the 
government, as both issues significantly 
impact potential FCA exposure. 
On the first question, the Fourth Circuit held 
that the WSLA applies to civil as well as 
criminal cases, and applies to FCA actions 
in which the government has declined to 
intervene.  The practical effect of that ruling 
is that the statute of limitations in all FCA 
cases is tolled while the United States is at 
war (defined broadly to include all conflicts 
for which Congress has authorized the use 
of the Armed Forces) until “5 years after the 
termination of hostilities as proclaimed by a 
Presidential proclamation, with notice to 
Congress, or by a concurrent resolution of 
Congress.”  District courts have begun to 
issue contrary rulings, with courts in both 
the Eastern and Western District of 
Pennsylvania holding that the WSLA does 
not apply to non-intervened FCA 
cases.  Most recently, in the well-known 
“Lance Armstrong case,” the District of 
D.C. held that the WSLA does not apply to 
any civil FCA cases because the FCA does 
not require “proof of specific intent to 
defraud.” 
On the second question, the Fourth Circuit 
joined the Seventh and Tenth Circuits in 
holding that the FCA’s first-to-file rule does 
not prohibit duplicative actions so long as 
the earlier-filed actions are not pending at 
the time the duplicative case was filed.  That 
conflicts with the approach taken by the 
First, Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which have 
held that allowing duplicative actions to 
proceed, regardless of whether the 
previously filed action was “pending” at the 
time, “cannot be reconciled with [the 
FCA’s] goal of preventing parasitic [suits].” 
If the Supreme Court upholds the Fourth 
Circuit’s ruling on both of these issues, the 
consequences for FCA defendants could be 
disastrous.  The application of the WSLA to 
all civil FCA cases, including non-
intervened cases, essentially eliminates the 
statute of limitations for FCA cases 
indefinitely.  Indeed, the president recently 
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ordered additional troops to Iraq to address 
the recent instability there, which suggests 
that the “termination of hostilities” in Iraq is 
not imminent.  The weakening of the first-
to-file rule compounds the harm caused by 
the tolling of the statute of limitations by 
decreasing incentives for relators to report 
fraud promptly.  The practical effect of the 
Fourth Circuit’s “one-two punch” to 
defendants is to encourage relators to delay 
filing claims to maximize the potential 
damages.  These incentives directly conflict 
with the purpose of the FCA. 
When read in its entirety, the dual purposes 
of the FCA are to provide financial 
incentives to encourage private citizens to 
promptly report fraud while limiting the 
ability of those whistleblowers to profit 
based on publicly disclosed, previously 
alleged or stale information.  Three pillars of 
the FCA provide the limitations on 
relators.  The public disclosure bar prevents 
relators from profiting from suits based upon 
information that was already publicly 
available.  The first-to-file rule serves a 
similar purpose – once the government has 
been alerted to potential fraud by the first-
filed qui tam action, there is no reason to 
incentivize additional lawsuits.  Finally, the 
vast majority of courts have correctly held 
that relators cannot benefit from the tolling 
provision in the FCA’s statute of limitations 
and thus, that the limitations period for non-
intervened cases is six years (as opposed to 
up to 10 years for the government).  All 
three of these provisions of the FCA provide 
incentives for relators to make prompt 
allegations of fraud.  
Unfortunately, the 2010 amendments to the 
FCA have already weakened the public 
disclosure bar by leaving its application to 
the government’s discretion. The Fourth 
Circuit’s holding in Carter undermines both 
the statute of limitations and the first-to-file 
rule.  If the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning is 
upheld, companies doing business with the 
government could face lawsuits for alleged 
FCA violations that occurred many years 
earlier.  Defending old claims is often 
difficult.  Paper documents are often 
destroyed in accordance with document 
management policies or are stored in less 
accessible locations.  The relevant electronic 
files may be stored on a sunset email or 
document management system.  Witnesses 
may have moved away or forgotten relevant 
facts.  Some may even be dead.  And, if the 
relator alleges a continuing violation, the 
potential damages and penalties that have 
accumulated over a long period of time may 
be astronomical. 
Amicus curiae briefing on the petition for 
certiorari in Carter illustrates that this case 
is set for a showdown.  In his amicus brief, 
the solicitor general indicated that the 
government would support the Fourth 
Circuit’s application of the WSLA to all 
civil FCA cases and its interpretation that 
the first-to-file rule does not bar subsequent 
actions when the first-filed action is no 
longer pending.  The Chamber of Commerce 
filed an amicus brief in support of the 
defendant to alert the Court that “the sum 
effect of [Carter] will be to increase the 
number of aged and duplicative cases that 
serve only to inflict substantial litigation 
costs on businesses.”  All companies that in 
some way do business with the government 
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– including health care, government 
procurement and banking and finance – 
should closely watch this case during the 
Supreme Court’s October term. 
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“Halliburton, KBR Whistle-Blower’s Case Revived on Appeal” 
Bloomberg 
Tom Schoenberg 
March 18, 2013 
Halliburton Co. and KBR Inc. (KBR) must 
face a whistle-blower lawsuit that was 
revived by a federal appeals court, which 
ruled that military operations in Iraq 
exempted the plaintiff from a six-year 
deadline for filing claims.  
In a 2-1 ruling today, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals in Richmond, Virginia, reversed a 
lower-court judge’s dismissal of a case 
against the companies filed by Benjamin 
Carter under the False Claims Act. Carter’s 
claims that Halliburton and KBR falsely 
billed the U.S. in 2005 triggered the 
Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act 
even though the Justice Department declined 
to intervene in the case, the judges said.  
“Whether the suit is brought by the U.S. or a 
relator is irrelevant to this case because the 
suspension of limitations in the WSLA 
depends on whether the country is at war 
and not who brings the case,” U.S. Circuit 
Judge Henry Floyd wrote in the ruling.  
Carter, who worked for KBR as an operator 
in a water purification unit in 2005, alleges 
the companies billed the U.S. government 
for purifying water for four months at two 
Iraqi camps that year when it hadn’t done 
so. He also alleges the he and his colleagues 
were instructed to submit time sheets 
showing that they worked 12-hour days on 
the purification when he hadn’t worked on it 
at all.  
Carter first sued in 2006. That case and three 
subsequent complaints were dismissed on 
procedural grounds. In sending the case 
back to U.S. District Judge James Cacheris 
in Alexandria, Virginia, the appeals court 
said Carter’s claims may still be barred 
under a different provision of the false 
claims law.  
Dissenting Judge  
U.S. Circuit Judge G. Steven Agee, in a 
dissenting opinion to today’s decision, said 
people might allow false billing to continue 
knowing that they have more than a decade 
to file a claim and that their reward is tied to 
the size of a recovery.  
“Private party relators will be inclined to 
delay, allowing their potential recovery to 
increase, knowing that the government is 
unlikely to discover the fraud, and therefore 
unlikely to be the first to bring a claim 
against the perpetrators,” Agee said.  
Susie McMichael, a spokeswoman for 
Houston-based Halliburton, referred 
questions to KBR, stating that the activity 
alleged in the lawsuit was pursuant to a 
KBR contract.  
John Elolf, a spokesman for Houston-based 
KBR, said in a statement that the company 
was disappointed with the ruling and 
“respectfully disagrees” with the majority’s 
opinion.  
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“KBR is continuing to study the decision 
and weighing our options,” he said. “We 
believe the underlying case is without merit, 
and we are confident that it will ultimately 
be dismissed.”  
The case is United States ex rel. Benjamin 
Carter v. Halliburton Co. (HAL), 12-01011, 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
(Richmond). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
